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In recent years, as a result of several developments, the status of ‘the city’ as a unit of analysis has been thrown into doubt. Socio-economic and demographic changes have issued in a loss of investment, employment and population from the city. These problems particularly afflict the old industrial cities of the north of England. One such city, Manchester, is the focus of this paper. There is a tendency to turn away from the city and its apparently irremediable problems. The city stands condemned in the literature as socially unjust, economically inefficient and ecologically unsustainable. Further, even apart from the various crises to which the city is subject, there is a question mark against the city as an independent unit of analysis. The city, that is, is subject to and constrained by a number of pressures and forces which transcend the geographical boundaries. That the city is constrained by private economic forces and imperatives has long been recognised. The difference now is the extent to which these forces and imperatives have become global in scope and extent. Not only is the city seemingly a secondary phenomenon to the socio-economic forces which comprise it, these forces are global in their reach and significance. Any investigation of the future prospects of the city will necessarily have to critically reflect upon the global dimension, taking care to fit the city to global developments.
A growing literature has cast doubts upon the whole point of regenerating the city. From this perspective, the city is a relic of a past, overscale world that is decaying and collapsing as a result of its own excess. A substantial proportion of the literature indicts the city as the primary site of economic, ecological and moral dissipation. The city is criticised as the built physical expression of both Leviathan and Mammon, serving the aggressive, manipulative, exploitative interests of the bureaucratic machine and of capital (Zukin 1995). This study seeks an alternative conception by recovering the metanarrative of the good city to serve as the foundation of a revitalised industrial urbanism.

Of course, attempts to regenerate the old industrial cities of the nineteenth century have been made throughout the twentieth century, without notable success. Changes in the national and international economy are associated with changes in the sites of economic activity. Balanced spatial and urban development would appear to be the solution. Instead, the urban crisis has thrown the modernist conception of town planning into question as a result of its failure to live up to its own lofty objectives. Peter Hall refers to more than a half a century of bureaucratic practice as resulting in the degeneration of planning into a ‘negative regulatory machine, designed to stifle all initiative, all creativity’ (Hall 1996:11). Hall notes with irony the way in which left wing thought has returned to the anarchist roots of planning in order emphasise the small scale, bottom-up approach, whilst right wing thought has come to advocate an entrepreneurial style of development. The dominant approach to urban regeneration now seeks to cut through the red tape associated with bureaucratic planning to ensure regeneration through the encouragement of a rugged entrepreneurial culture (Hall 1996:11).

That the problems facing the city are permanent and are the product of the city as such is suggested by the persistence of urban crises over a number of decades. This intractability is apparent despite a number of various approaches to regeneration and despite an expansion in the agencies pursuing regeneration and development. As Hall comments, ‘instead of getting better, some parts of some cities – and definitely some people in parts of these cities – were getting worse, at least in a relative sense, possibly in an absolute one’. Hall goes so far as to draw the pessimistic conclusion that ‘these people were simply transmitting their plight from one generation to another’ (Hall 1996:11 ch 12).

Nowhere do these points apply more than to the old industrial cities of the North of England and of Scotland. To the extent to which they apply to Manchester, and the extent to which a concerted effort to reinvent itself has allowed Manchester to escape the seemingly inevitable fate of northern cities will be the subject of this study.
The assumption underlying Hall’s pessimism may certainly be challenged. Whilst it may be true that significant sections of the urban population are becoming increasingly detached from the mainstream society and economy – and evidence will be cited to show that this is indeed an aspect of development in Manchester – this needs to be related to an embedding of asymmetrical structures and relations within the mainstream, as integral to the dominant culture, as opposed to being considered a moral problem, as it is for Hall, a quality which the urban poor pass down the generations. The view taken in this study, then, is that it makes more sense to examine the unequal and unjust structures and relations composing contemporary society and to raise possibilities for their transformation by urban dwellers than to subscribe to a discourse which too easily conceives the problem of the urban poor as one of regulation. Hall’s negative assessment serves to narrow the vision somewhat: ‘we are almost back where we started’, back to the city ‘as a place of decay, poverty, social malaise, civil unrest and even insurrection’ (Hall 1996:45). Insurrection? One lives in hope. The medieval free city tradition of Germany had an expression ‘town air makes you free’. Some of that spirit is needed to check attempts to subordinate local meaning to global priorities. But if Hall is right – and there is plenty of evidence to support his view – the reasons are to be sought in an institutional and structural analysis rather than in the supposed moral failings of the urban poor. There is no uni-linear passage from the ‘dangerous classes’ of the Victorian city to the contemporary urban poor. Contemporary problems are a direct consequence of political, economic and institutional changes issuing in new urban divisions and metropolarities. To succumb to Hall’s pessimism and accept these polarities as in some way ineradicable, as written into the human nature of some, is to identify the city as a problem, and hence make it available as a site to be externally policed and regulation. The modernist (in origin anarchist) ideal of town planning comes to be reduced to law and order. Such an approach could not be further removed from the meta-narrative of the city as concerned with the good life of each and all. Nevertheless, there are grounds for believing that this replacement of the polis ideal by police represents the more likely future for the city, so long as the city is conceived not as possibility for the realised, flourishing life but as a moral problem.

This study is motivated by a concern that the city is in danger of losing what may be considered as its traditional functions as a place of human interaction and reciprocity, as meeting place and associational space. The quality of individual interaction establishes the content of civic, political and cultural life in the city. The problem is that these precious resources are being suppressed by purely quantitative measures of growth and development. This study seeks to recover the sense of the city as an urban public life, an approach which conceives the city as being something more than a commercial centre and the individual as something more than a consumer. The city is valued as a key site in efforts aiming at civic and cultural renewal (Landry et al 1989). This view defines urban regeneration as involving much more than economics, as pertaining to a public, communal and civic modus vivendi. 

The concern to recover the public-urban sense of well being does not ignore contemporary realities. Given the scale of inequality, the question of social justice is crucial to defining the contours of the good city. This issue is of moral import and hence must address much more than material conditions. A genuine urban public life is as much a moral and spiritual question as material. Towards the end of his life, the great historian of cities and their evolution, Lewis Mumford, emphasised this point in drawing attention to ‘one of the chronic puzzles of history’: the ‘breakdown of law and order at the very peak of metropolitan power and prosperity’ (Mumford 1982:5). Mumford emphasised the loss of the ‘moral stability and security’ that had characterised the city of his youth as the crucial factor in the predicament of the modern city. This moral factor was lacking ‘even in such urban models of law and order as London’ (Mumford 1982:5). For Mumford, modern New York bore comparison with Petrarch’s account of Provence after the Black Death, ‘desolate, wolfish, robber infested’ (Mumford 1982:5).

The contemporary city lacks an overarching moral code which ensures the connection of each and all in a common project. This sense of urban unity and solidarity has been eroded through atomising and commercialising pressures. How moral bonds and civic ties can be recovered in moral plural society is a crucial question when it comes to developing an urban form that is able to check the criminal, even pathological, tendencies of the modern city. Mumford’s quote concerning medieval Provence indicates that crime is not the particular product of the modern city. Urban pathology is linked with a moral malaise and is the result of the absence of good urban forms establishing the structured moral context and infrastructure of good conduct.

This discussion obtains a specific focus in relation to the old industrial city. Since the 1980’s urban regeneration has been a function of economic development. Local and national politicians, architects and planners have come to agree that the future of the city depends upon success in attracting capital investment. More critical observers are more inclined to discern in contemporary urban trends an altogether more disturbing scenario. There are those who have serious doubts as to whether the city has a future at all (Morgentau and McCormick 1991).

The crucial issue that this study addresses concerns the fate of the old industrial cities as they seek to carve out a new identity for themselves, leaving their nineteenth century heyday well behind. The main concern is to chart a path by which the old cities can transcend the long term, seemingly inescapable, industrial decay and can escape the seemingly inevitable future of a post-industrial militarization of an increasingly polarised urban space. To chart this path entails more than the reshaping of the old industrial cities as post-fordist cities, older cities repositioning themselves in the expanding markets of the global economy, services, high technology, media and communications. Such a transition is difficult enough but still only amounts to the solution of one big problem within a much greater problem. The problem of symmetrical structures and relations not only remains but, given the new metropolarities, is even intensified. This is generating a tendency towards urban incarceration, the designing-in of police features into a divided and divisive urban form. The carceral city is in the process of emerging, a city which rests upon a division between a permanent underclass, a casual, part-time, low paid sector, and a core dependent upon headquarter style development. Such differential publics offer no ground for generating a universal public life. The failure to embed such an inclusive public means that the tendency towards a divided city goes unchecked. This results in the carceralisation of urban space. And, in the process, the meta-narrative of the good city is lost, maybe for a long, long time.

The old industrial city, confronted with a massive process of economic restructuring, involving a process of demilitarisation, is having to innovate a number of developments in order to engage in a restructuring of their own. The old industrial city is having to find a new role for itself within a new international division of labour, a role which leaves their nineteenth century prime well behind them. The future of the city has become one of the most popular subjects of academic discussion and journalistic controversy. Whilst there is no shortage of voices claiming that the city has no future at all, at least not in its present form, there is no shortage of politicians, planners and developers talking up the prospects of the regenerated cities. Whilst these optimistic assessments suffer from a tendency to boosterism, necessarily so given their vested interest in successful regeneration, they also show a level of engagement quite lacking in the more gloomy academic prognostications.

In discussing future prospects for the city there is a need to avoid the tendency to isolate key trends and inflate their importance. The contemporary literature is replete with facile references to the ‘postmetropolis’, the postmodern or post-industrial city. The prefix ‘post’ here designates what the new city isn’t – or isn’t supposed to be – but is less forthcoming as to what it is. The electronic or the informational city indicates a wired up world. If so, what happened to place, the city as a physical site of human interaction? Such notions fetishize particular aspects of a transformation that may – or may not be – underway. The problem is that this transformation is far from complete and its character far from certain. The insistence that old industrial cities must radically reinvent themselves may well be misplaced given that the forces behind this transformation show greater continuities with the past than are immediately apparent. Further, an examination of the future of the city addresses not merely the few postmetropolises or postmodern metropoles but the much more numerous deindustrialised cities – the decaying industrial areas whose heyday lies in the nineteenth century.

This stress upon continuity over discontinuity does not mean that significant developments are not taking place. The city is in the process of being reinvented on an unprecedented scale. The contemporary city is located within an increasingly interconnected global environment. This networking between cities does not proceed on an even or equal basis. On the contrary, a regulated division is emerging between cities which are located in the growth areas of the global economy and those which are not. The global economy is becoming more integrated but also more unequal. From the perspective of this study, the important point to emphasise is that many of the old industrial cities have found themselves outside of the growth areas and hence facing an uncertain future. Not only are these old cities confronted with the substantial problems caused by deindustrialisation, they are also facing the problem of peripheralisation as a result of being distanced from the economic opportunities generated by the growth areas of the global economy. This has implications for strategies of urban regeneration. In the non-growth sectors of the global economy, urban regeneration has become a property-led or market-led strategy which is designed to encourage entrepreneurial activity and leverage private investment. This, in turn, has been associated with the redefinition of the identity and the image of the industrial city. The city emerges as a post-industrial sphere made up of convention centres, waterfront developments and business and leisure landscapes. This shift to entrepreneurial strategies for urban regeneration in deindustrialising cities has generated an intensified international inter-urban competition within new structures having uneven impact among their own populations. These are, then, forces which generate and reinforce patterns of social division which are inimical to traditional conceptions of city life. The non-growth world, that is, represents an inequality at the heart of the global economy which is also apparent within the city as social and public needs come to be neglected by financial institutions more concerned to exploit economically profitable opportunities elsewhere. A regeneration strategy which repositions the city within the ‘post-fordist’ global economy runs the risk of ignoring the ‘real’ economy of the ‘real’ city, governing the city according to imperatives and priorities which arise from outside of the city.

As an old industrial city seeking to carve out a role for itself as a global and post-fordist city, Manchester makes for an interesting case study. Manchester has been the subject of a great deal of interest, academic and journalistic, and occupies an important place in the contemporary urban literature. Manchester may stand as the most important example of an old industrial city seeking a future for itself in a postindustrial world. Manchester is all the more important given the extent to which many industrial cities tend to be overlooked in the global urban focus. This neglect is to be regretted. However neglected in the literature they may be, the old industrial cities remain the most familiar places for the bulk of the urban population. The neglect of these cities indicates a much greater neglect of the people who live in them. These cities, whose origins lie in the industrial revolution, the age of mass production, manufactures and heavy industrial commerce, remain real cities in so far as countless millions of individuals are concerned, whatever the extent to which the specific economic forms behind their rise may have passed. And these cities, in their form, shape and culture, betray their origins in a whole number of ways. No amount of ‘post-fordist’ reinvention can obliterate those roots and nowhere is this more evident than in Manchester. The old industrial cities have a ‘feeling’, a culture, a pattern of life which its inhabitants share, reproduce and reinforce. This is something that is made by experience and cannot simply be re-made as a matter of economic and cultural expediency.

Of course, no matter how much a city expresses a spirit and a culture, attention should always focus upon the way that any discourse and discursive practice expresses experience and articulates structure in relation to existing power relations. There is a need to pay attention to ideas and language as objectifications of power, expressions of social relations and interests. This power is embodied not in discourse but in social relationships, the property of dominant groups. ‘The particular representations that we call “facts” and “data” are by no means independent of the theories which inform them and to which they may be applied. The choice is between different modes of approach to this universal problem’ (Harvey 1989:7/8).

Harvey’s marxist approach infuses the material concerns of political economy with the moral and philosophical concern with the good city. As Harvey comments, it makes little sense to measure the growth of cities as if there were no trade, capital flow, migration or cultural or political influence between them (Harvey 1989:8). Harvey’s approach demands a coherent and consistent theory with which to explain ‘unique configurations of historical-geographical processes’. This requires a ‘continuous dialogue between experience, action, concept formation and dialectical theorizing’ (Harvey 1989:8).

A major concern of this study is to develop an awareness of how different groups within the city live as different ‘publics’ and work to make sense, practically, of the many, complex, rapid changes proceeding within cities, with respect to the profound changes in local labour markets associated with the decline of manufacturing and mass production and with respect to urban regeneration as a post-modernisation leading to the post-fordist city. This study is most concerned to integrate this approach within the meta-narrative of the good city, recovering the classical concern with what Aristotle called ‘the public sense of well-being’.

The attempt to found the city on a universalist ethic acknowledges the extent to which the city is constituted by different publics, each possessing competing visions of public well-being. This study recognises the extent to which the city is a contested concept. In asking ‘Whose culture? Whose city?’, Sharon Zukin poses the question of who is hegemonic to the city (Zukin 1995). Zukin is concerned with the assault on the public sense of well-being that is taking place within the contemporary ‘post-modern’ city. Zukin shows how public life and culture is being systematically privatised as a result of commercial pressures. Corporations are becoming the dominant forces in the urban environment, presiding over a process of commodification which threatens to suppress an authentic democratic public culture. In the final analysis, urban life cannot be reduced to the abstractions of class, economics, material dynamics but must encompass the lived experience and practical consciousness of all citizens as they make sense of their everyday life world. Revaluing and incorporating these activities and experiences and practices of real individuals serves to ground the urban public as a communal modus vivendi.

The urban experience is not homogeneous. The history and evolution of cities exhibits unevenness and difference, particularly in relation to local forms of industrial organisation. This interest in local forms is supplemented with an understanding of how the city appears to and is experienced by different groups organised around issues of gender, ethnicity, age. The practical ways in which different groups of people comprehend and use cities shapes how those cities are. The city is apprehended as the site of different life projects. This perspective evaluates urban regeneration as a project undertaken by local growth coalitions, partnerships and entrepreneurs but also as embracing the life projects of other urban groups concerned to survive but also to live in the city.

The city is to be understood as a contested concept comprising competing visions. The city is a variegated entity, exhibiting all the ambiguity of a space which projects emancipatory potential and opportunity on the one hand and actualises oppression, exclusion and coercion on the other hand. The city is a terrain of struggle over empowerment and control. There is a struggle over the vision of the city. Postmodernist analyses emphasise the ambivalence of the city (Wilson 1991), but are otherwise lacking in terms of a point or a conclusion. This underlines the need to recover the meta-narrative of the good city.

Historically and philosophically, the city has contained the promise of emancipation and has been the hub of human activity whilst simultaneously being at the centre of the regulation of repressive and exploitative relations. The competing visions of the city are inextricably related to the struggle for the concern of social space. From this perspective, the strategies pursued by urban governments in recent years have been partial political, shifting redistributive policies away from notions of a collective sense of justice and more towards desert.

In conceiving the city as a differential public space comprising competing visions, then, this study is concerned to relate the differentiated character of urban space to class relations of power and domination. Struggles over interests shape urban practices and create an urban terrain which is contested in a variety of ways. The city is a power infused urban infrastructure in which dominant groups attempt to preserve existing social relations whilst subaltern groups engage in forms of struggle which contain the potential to restructure power in their favour.

In addition to the views of the city as a contested concept and as a diremptive sphere conditioned by the class structure, there are other visions, visions of the city as a site of joy, hope and play. Debord’s ‘society of the spectacle’ focuses upon the ambivalent character of the city as both the site of freedom and repression, of expression and exploitation (Debord 1983). Debord’s project centres on reconceiving the urban sphere as the embodiment of jouissance. This study will examine how post-fordist conceptions of urban regeneration reconfigure the city as a site of play, defining the city as a consumer paradise and as a centre of recreation and causal acquaintance. This study understands Debord’s view as quite distinct from this late capitalist consumerism. Debord’s jouissance is the antithesis of the anodyne ‘spectacle’ of the theme park. Taking this critical approach reveals late capitalist urbanism as a war of attrition which works against the creation of a genuine public space.


In seeking to recover the sense of a genuine public space, this study sets competing visions of different publics within a realist framework that is centred upon the everyday life world. This revalues the mundane and routine patterns and practices by which individuals understand and use cities as something which belong to them, whichever part of the city they inhabit and use. These local voices reveal different aspects of the city according to the realities of class, gender, ethnicity, generation. Taking this perspective throws the overfamiliar cultural domain of shopping in new light, identifying different kinds of dominant and subaltern social groups constituting the urban population by their everyday patterns of life.
The concern to identify the different publics constituting the city is to be distinguished from postmodern celebrations of difference and otherness. Difference and otherness are not ends in themselves. Facile assertions of social pluralism and diversity fail to relate difference to underlying relations and structures. There is no value, from a perspective concerned with social justice, in a difference which derives from asymmetrical relations of power. The analysis of the city within the context of an emerging postmodern socio-political culture must address the new polarities unfolding in the contemporary social and cultural trajectory. These polarities are not liberatory assertions of ‘otherness’ but are the product of conflictual, exploitative relations. This study will seek to integrate a social pluralism and diversity that has abolished relations of superordination and subordination within a universal ethic that establishes the conditions securing the unity of the freedom of each individual with the freedom of all individuals.
In defining this universal ethic, this study goes back to the classical origins of the city. In asking ‘what is a city?’, Lewis Mumford emphasises the need to treat the city as a social institution and not merely as ‘a purely physical fact’. ‘The earlier answers to these questions, in Aristotle, Plato, and the Utopian writers from Sir Thomas More to Robert Owen have been on the whole more satisfactory than those of the more systematic sociologists: most contemporary treatises on “urban sociology” in America throw no important light upon the problem’ (Mumford 1937). This study proceeds from the definition of public well-being contained in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

The theoretical foundation of this study is, therefore, somewhat unusual, erecting an overarching conceptual framework concerned with a universal ethic and drawing upon classical political philosophy, urban political economy, the new geographies of place and space and postmodernist celebrations of diversity. These theoretical concerns are continually brought down to earth through contact with the facts of regeneration and urbanisation in ‘post-industrial’ and ‘post-fordist’ Manchester.

It should be stressed that the approach taken imposes no overarching moral and communal ideal of the ‘good’ city but is concerned to revalue the creative, constitutive significance of real urban voices in composing the good. These voices are not to be suppressed on account of the privileging of a priori principles of rationality – whether instrumental as in the case of the economic development of the city or normative as in the case of a vision of the good city. If there is a public sense of well-being – and there is – it is for real urban individuals to apprehend it and assimilate it in their everyday social and cultural practices. The main moral concern of this study, then, is to delineate the connection between local urban feelings and concerns for a genuine public life and the meta-narrative of the good city. Approaching the question this way invests the ‘good city’ with an existential power which stems from local ways and patterns of urban life, giving apparently abstract moral visions a local provenance.

2 THE GOOD CITY

The argument in this chapter seeks to define the good city as premised upon a concept of public life which is articulated within a philosophical tradition which emphasises that the well-being of each individual is actualised only in relation to and on the condition of the well-being of all other individuals. The locus of this ethic is the public community, the ‘good city’. The reconstruction of the meta-narrative of the ‘good city’ on the basis of a philosophical tradition which articulates an ontological concern with creative human self-realisation grounds the project of social justice as something which applies to all equally or applies to no-one. The critical recovery of classical themes emphasises the principle which affirms the unity of the freedom and happiness of each individual and all individuals, embedding this universal principle in a differentiated, self-representing, self-policing public. This public accommodates the plurality of social identities in the modern world, stimulating the active involvement of real individuals and avoiding the homogenising tendencies of a unitary state citizenship. Equal freedom is not to be achieved through the absence of differentiation (Taylor 1992:51/2). The conception of public life developed within the meta-narrative of the ‘good city’ achieves universalism in such a way as to respect what Young defines as a ‘politics of difference’ (Young 1990). The second half of this chapter will examine Young’s argument more closely. The first half will be concerned with defining the principles of the ‘good’.

Leo Strauss defined the proper subject of political philosophy to be the good life of society, ‘the complete political good’, government lifting individuals beyond the limitations of their immediate selves and relating political matters to the ultimate goal, freedom (Strauss 1988:10). Strauss acknowledged the controversial nature of ‘the common good’ and notes the contemporary tendency to evade the comprehensive conception of politics as merely one of many compartments (Strauss 1988:17). Strauss is nevertheless clear that, to be complete human beings, individuals must apprehend their circumstances in a holistic manner, according to a notion of the good (Strauss 1988:89).

This classical conception was repudiated as unrealistic by the moderns. Machiavelli came to define politics according to how people are in an empirical sense as opposed to how people ought to be in a moral-ontological sense. The politics of the good was overthrown and replaced by an amoral technology of power (Miller 1975:78; Strauss 1988:41; Foster 1947:ch 8; Jones 1947 ch 1). 

Whilst Strauss’s philosophy has conservative implications, it is capable of being radicalised. Normative political philosophy contains an implicit ‘ought-to-be’ in its concern with realising the good social order (Heller 1984:10/1 11 12/3 20). This radical conception is directly relevant to the concern to embed public life in the situated context of human beings. It answers the question of how human beings ought to live. ‘Philosophy as a rational utopia is always the utopia of a form of life’ (Heller 1984:20). As a form of life, philosophy has a view of the good, criticising an existent form from the perspective of a better form (Heller 1984:26).

The principle which affords the unity of each and all emphasises the associational character of real life, making the point that freedom is a collective project which depends upon the quality of the social bonds connecting individuals with each other. Social institutions and relationships are crucial in grounding the public sense of individual and collective well-being.

The phrase the ‘public sense of well-being’ belongs to Aristotle. The conception of the ‘good city’ is classical in origin. Aristotle’s conception of the polis forces us revaluate the nature of the modern state (Thompson 1994:43). The polis is not a state and is the very antithesis of the modern overscale, centralised state. The classical language of politics is more down to earth. Politics and philosophy were born in the agora, in the citizen assembly and the market place of Athens (Heller 1984: ; Doyle 1963: ch 2). Most modern political ideals – justice, liberty, constitutional government, respect for the law, citizenship, equality, democracy – are not modern at all but ‘began with the reflection of Greek thinkers about the institution of the city state’ (Sabine 1937:3). The city state, the proper site of a meaningful politics, is quite distinct from the modern nation state. This observation is crucial in envisaging a smaller scale public life located in everyday urban activities. The polis was the all important political unit in classical Greece and was more on the scale of a modern medium sized town (Jones 1964; Davies 1978; Mayo 1960: ch 2). The Athenian polis was more a public community than a state. And whereas the modern state leaves the good to be decided by private individuals, the function of the classical community is the good life.

Philosophy has its origins in the pursuit of the ‘good city’: ‘the more closely I studied the politicians and the laws and customs of the day .. the more difficult it seemed to me to govern rightly … in an age which had abandoned its traditional moral code but found it impossibly difficult to create a new one’. Plato thus raises the issue which is central to this study – how is it possible to recover the overarching moral framework sustaining the common good in a pluralist society characterised by an irreducible polytheism of values. ‘Finally I came to the conclusion that all existing states were badly governed, and that their constitutions were incapable of reform without drastic treatment and a great deal of good luck. I was forced, in fact, to the belief that the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy, and that mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become by some miracle true philosophers’ (Plato The Seventh Letter 1987:xvi). The attempt to realise good government through the integration of politics and philosophy is the central theme of Plato’s Republic.

Crucial to Plato’s argument is the idea of justice as a social virtue which applies to all equally. This leads Plato to criticise personal liberty as a licence which is inimical to the freedom of each and all. For Plato, Athens declined as a consequence of the ‘extravagant liberty of living’, particularly amongst the masses. The masses had grown impudent through ‘a reckless excess of liberty’ (Laws 701 b). Plato’s ideal city repudiates the identification of freedom with personal liberty. For Plato, personal liberty, if it is not to degenerate into licence, must be incorporated within a structured collectivist context. Plato criticises the atomistic model of democracy in which individuals are mainly concerned with promoting their own interests, private, individual interests without regard to others in the community. Without the check of community and of relations to others, these interests are pursued to excess. Such individualism issues in an unconscious collective constraint upon all, something which entails a suppression of the personal liberty of each. Plato presents a definition of organic freedom in which the best interests of all are served within a properly ordered and functioning whole. Harmony is produced by a combination of external constraint and internal self-control so that each individual is taught to define freedom as something that occurs in relation to other individuals. The freedom of each and all is interconnected. No one person can be free unless all persons are free. Ingrained in the soul of each will be ‘the habit of never so much as thinking to do one single act apart from one’s fellows, of making life, to the very uttermost, an unbroken consort, society, and community of all with all’ (924 c).

The connection of the freedom of each with the freedom of all is embedded in an organic social order. The ideal city is a harmonious society of ascending functional purposes organised so as to eradicate selfishness and to promote the cardinal virtues. Plato’s main target was individualism and the corrosive effects that it has upon the city in terms of egoism, excess and anarchy. Plato thus defines justice in reciprocal terms, each individual looking after ‘the common interests of all by reconciling them with each other and with himself’ (Plato 1987:354/5). The conception of justice as the social virtue par excellence subverts the notion of private interest which is harmful to others and detrimental to the good of others. If the good of each and the good of all exists in a reciprocal relation, then the common good which benefits all is harmed by some coming to promote private interest at the expense of others. Private self-seekers harm their own good:





Every individual should be ‘under the control of divine wisdom’. ‘That wisdom and control should, if possible, come from within; failing that it must be imposed from without, in order that, being under the same guidance, we may all be friends and equals’ (Plato 1987:356). The ‘intention of the law’ is to have educated the best in citizens so that they may be given their freedom. It cannot pay to be unjust if, by acquiring more money and power, the individual becomes a worse human being (Plato 1987:256/7). Instead, the rational, ‘humaner’ part of human beings is to be set free so that individuals may make the best of their natural gifts (Plato 1987:356/7). In the ideal city, and in no other society, the individual is equipped to take part in public affairs (Plato 1987:358).

Aristotle essentially agrees with Plato’s organic conception of rational freedom, defining politics in terms of creative self-activity within a mode of life which counts as ‘good’ in realising the human ontology. A public life is bad in contradicting the human ontology. Aristotle’s conception determines the contextual and communal basis of individual freedom and assigns a positive function in the city-state or polity in promoting the good life of each and of all (Clark 1975:103/4; Barnes 1982:82/3).

Aristotle distinguishes himself from Plato by criticising the view that there should be as much unity as possible in the state: ‘a state which becomes progressively more and more of a unity will cease to be a state at all. Plurality of numbers is natural in a state; and the further it moves away from plurality towards unity, the less a state it becomes and the more of a household, and the household in turn an individual … So, even if it were possible to make such a unification, it ought not be done; it will destroy the state’ (Aristotle 1981:104). For Aristotle, it is this ‘reciprocal equivalence’ which keeps the state in being. It is also the principle which permits unity to be combined with diversity, making it possible to conceive the common good in conditions which preserve and enhance social pluralism. Reciprocal equivalence is the principle of mutually supporting diversity of function (Aristotle NE). In the Politics, Aristotle employs this concept in a wider, more political sense in order to embrace the ‘services’ which the rulers and the ruled render each other through the proper performances of their duties according to their function (Aristotle 1981:104 105).

Aristotle’s ‘state’, then, forms an integral public life as the supreme natural association formed out of smaller natural associations, each formed ‘with a view to some good purpose’. The state is the supreme association of all associations and ‘will aim at the highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods’ (Aristotle 1981:54).

Aristotle criticises Plato’s view of society as a supra-individual organic unity for ignoring the necessary role played by smaller groupings in securing human well-being. Aristotle therefore insists upon a diversity of functions and membership (Aristotle 1981:103/126). The smaller associations perform a crucial function in generating and sustaining a public life and culture. Individuals come to take account of wider relations within the polis by grouping together within various forms of association, from household to village to city to state (Aristotle 1981: 1.ii; Evans 1987:157/8; Edel 1982:319/20).

Aristotle rejects the view of society as a supra-individual organism with an existential significance over and above the individuals composing it. He also rejects the notion of an autonomous private self which is privileged over against larger social units. An authentic public life integrates both the individual and the collective aspects of human nature. ‘Man is by nature a political animal’ who can be free and self-realising as a substance only within the greater substance of the polis (Aristotle 1981:59). What must be emphasised here is that ‘the political’ for Aristotle embraces social life as a whole. The view that ‘man is a creature who lives in a polis’ affirms an associative and relational conception of human well-being. The polis establishes the social context within which individuals may fully realise their moral, spiritual and intellectual capacities – but only in relation to and with mutual respect for each other. The polis is thus a holistic social and moral framework. How to embed that connection and reciprocity between each and all is the crucial problem of urbanisation, the problem being how to ground the ties between each and all within the meta-narrative of the good city.

A public life creates the community which is natural for human beings, reconciling freedom and sociality in the good society (Clark 1975:110 101/2). The free individual is at once self-determining and social. ‘Common interest’ unites individuals in a political association ‘in so far as it contributes to the good life of each. The good life is indeed their chief end, both communally and individually’ (Aristotle 1981:187).

The polis is created by human beings in accordance with their nature in order ‘to secure the good life’ (Aristotle 1981:59). The end of the polis is happiness (eudaimonia), the ‘complete utilization’ of human faculties under the guidance of virtue (Aristotle 1981:394/401 427/30; 1980:I.vii; Clark 1975:145: Edel 1982:266ff). There is a moral imperative to exercise the human faculties as a condition of the good (Aristotle 1981:178).

The polis expresses the needs of the individual on a higher plane (Edel 1982:319). The polis rationally constrains self-seeking individuals to secure the common good, distinguishing a genuine liberty from the licence of individualism which is ‘divorced from law and justice’ (Aristotle 1981:59/60). Liberty conceived as ‘doing what one wants’ is ‘bad’. Living according to the constitution is not ‘slavery’ but ‘salvation’ or ‘self-preservation’ (Aristotle 1981:332; 1958:1310a). Aristotle thus rejects the ‘negative’ conception of individual freedom as a freedom from the political community which individuals require to realise their human nature.

The public life that Aristotle proposes rests upon an active conception of citizenship. He defines citizenship as ‘participation in giving judgement and in holding office’ (Aristotle 1981:169). This definition of a citizen as an individual ‘entitled to participate in office’ ‘is best applied in a democracy’ (Aristotle 1981:170). Further, since Aristotle’s statesman is not a modern politician but a ruler of equals, of people of the same status, the polity is essentially a companionship of free individuals each of which take a ‘turn at ruling or at being ruled’ (Aristotle 1981:54; Edel 1982:309ff). This ‘association of free men’ overcomes the dualism of rulers and ruled (Aristotle 1981:189).

Aristotle’s definition of the ‘state’ as a natural entity concerned with promoting the common good serves as a critical tool by which to condemn the reduction of public life in the modern world to the pursuit and protection of private material advantage. For Aristotle, ‘a state’s purpose is not merely to provide a living but to make a life that is good’. The state is more than ‘a military pact of protection against injustice’ in a society concerned with the ‘exchange of goods’ but is concerned with the ‘virtue and vice of the citizens’. Without the conception of the good ‘the association is a mere military alliance’, ‘a mutual guarantor of justice’ which is ‘unable to make citizens good and just’ (Aristotle 1981:196). Aristotle’s ethical conception of politics repudiates the individualist-protective liberal tradition which reduces politics to a legalistic concern with civil order in the context of exchange relations (Aristotle 1981:189/90). Aristotle’s conception is important in making politics integral to the realisation of the good, public life promoting the goal of the rational and moral good of individuals. The key critical task is to integrate this politics of the good with modern plurality and subjectivity via an inclusive definition of citizenship.

The purpose for which the city-state is formed, hence the purpose of the kinds of authority controlling individuals, as members of an association, derives from the nature of human beings as political animals. ‘Hence men have a desire for life together, even when they have no need to seek each other’s help. Nevertheless, common interest too is a factor in bringing them together, in so far as it contributes to the good life of each. The good life is indeed their chief end, both communally and individually; but they form and continue to maintain a political association for the sake of life itself’ (Aristotle 1981: 187). ‘The state is an association intended to enable its members, in their households and the kinships, to live well; its purpose is a perfect and self-sufficient’ (Aristotle 1981:198).

It is precisely this conception that is absent in the modern world. Postmodern writing continues to refer to the exhaustion of the meta-narratives of the good, declaring the age of the grand meta-narratives to be over. The problem is that such a loss cuts human beings off from a good deal of what it is to be human. Since individuals need each other in order to be themselves, to realise a higher level of human purposes, they require a degree of social structuring and a community. For this reason, Aristotle describes justice as a ‘social virtue’. Aristotle reasons that a state must be composed of free members. ‘But obviously something more is needed besides: I mean justice, and the virtue that is proper to citizens. For without these additions it is not possible for the state to be managed. More exactly, whereas without free population and wealth there cannot be a state at all, without justice and virtue it cannot be managed well’ (Aristotle 1981:208/9).

The problem of the right ordering of the city is therefore much more than a material question. No amount of economic development and growth could compensate for the absence of justice. There is an ineliminable moral dimension to the city and schemes which are deficient in morality will always fall short of a true regeneration. As Lewis Mumford argued, regeneration is above all a moral and spiritual question, ensuring the proper ordering of material aspects. This conception goes back to Plato and Aristotle. ‘In every kind of knowledge and skill, the end which is aimed at is a good. This good is greatest, and is ‘good’ in the highest sense, when that knowledge or skill is the most sovereign one, i.e. the faculty of statecraft. In the state, the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community’ (Aristotle 1981:207). The greatest good of the greatest number fails that test. All must benefit and none must be disadvantaged. And this requires justice as a social virtue: ‘One which is sure to bring all the other virtues along with it’ (Aristotle 1981:211).

The Greek conception of the universal ethic sustaining the ‘good city’ is confronted by the modern principle of subjectivity and the facts of social pluralism. There are many competing conceptions of ‘the good’ in a Weberian modernity characterised by a polytheism of values. The difficulties facing the construction of a universal good which all individuals and groups are able to accept are immense. The notion of ‘the common good’ is problematic in the modern pluralistic world. In The Common Good, Raskin proposes an implicit conception of the commonality of the good. For Raskin, a ‘caring instinct’ is common amongst human beings (Raskin 1986:89). Raskin asserts the ‘natural right that people have as a result of their being human’, this generating ‘bonds of community and natural law’ (Raskin 1986:276 195). The problem, however, is that the social identity connecting the private interest of individuals with the common good is unavailable in a society which divides public and private life. The terms of the social identity which could constitute the common good need to be delineated. The common good lacks social relevance without the creation of a social identity which connects the private interests and actions of individuals in their everyday life activities with the public good of all. This social identity makes it possible to reconcile social pluralism and the common good through an internal coordination, and avoids resort to an externally formulate good imposed through an abstracted legal-institutional apparatus.

The crucial task is to define a conception of justice which reconciles the values of equality and diversity within class divided societies. Such a conception is able to discern and articulate a common interest in conditions of social pluralism. David Harvey has developed an approach which acknowledges the validity of multiple publics within a holistic conception of the good. Harvey develops a discourse which is capable of forming a majority in pursuit of a programme of social transformation by uniting a diversity of social groups. Harvey thus challenges postmodernist celebrations of otherness, difference and fragmentation.





In addressing the problem of ensuring that this universal appeal has social relevance in a pluralist society, Harvey argues that transient coalitions between subaltern groups around particular issues are insufficient to form a basis for effective mobilisation. Harvey is calling for a radical social urban movement which has universal appeal, integrating fragmented discourses within a unifying argument. Harvey’s approach does not involve specific appeals to class (socialism), gender (feminism), or substantive belief (ecologism) but instead depends upon a generalised conception of social justice. Harvey’s concept is defined from the standpoint of oppressed groups and is open to continuous negotiation from this standpoint. Social transformation thus proceeds through the agency of a coalition of oppressed groups possessing a shared moral position which puts them in antagonistic relation to relations of oppression, seeking to subvert those relations.

As Harvey explains the problem: ‘It is easier to recommend an abstract concept of social justice on which members of one’s own moral community can agree than to find an expression for it that will attract a mass following. Fairness in the city requires the devising of programmes that do not offend concepts of just rewards, that respond to individual aspirations as well as to a formulation of the social good … without pandering to the forces that wall off homogeneous groups in exclusion communities’ (Harvey 1973:38).

This tendency to walling off is a real and growing one, the dissolution of the old industrial cities being accompanied by the emergence of new divisions layered upon the old class divisions. The challenge is to reverse the tendency towards exclusion back towards inclusion through an urban politics based upon a universal appeal.

The inclusive community must, however, acknowledge difference. Iris Young objects to the notion of ‘community’ for the way that it projects unity over difference (Young, ‘The ideal of community and the politics of difference’ in Nicholson ed 1990:302). Young is open to the objection that community can be formulated in other than abstract, oppressive and statist forms (Hoffman 1995:208). Conceiving the individual in relational terms makes available a conception of community that suffers from none of these defects, making it possible to combine both unity and difference: ‘A relational view of common interests requires us to break both with an abstract individualism which conceives conflicts of interests in zero sum terms and with an abstract communitarianism which denies that differences exist at all’ (Hoffman 1995:209).

The last part of this chapter will look more closely at the relational conception of the individual and society, showing its implications for living in the city. At this stage, Young’s argument for the politics of difference merits closer attention. Young makes a powerful case for difference as against the unity implied by the ideal of community:





Young’s argument is directly relevant to the question of the quality of the urban life sustaining a city. Young is concerned to emphasise that emancipation lies in the assertion of a ‘positive sense of group difference’, the group defining itself through this process rather than being defined from the outside (Young 1990:172). The politics of difference ‘promotes a notion of group solidarity against the individualism of liberal humanism’ (Young 1990:166). Social relations of subordination and superordination are abolished in favour of creating a democratic and pluralist civil society that permits the free expression of group difference.

Young criticises some of the dominant themes of feminism as they relate to the ideal of community. The ‘desire for unity or wholeness in discourse’, Young argues, ‘generates borders, dichotomies and exclusions.’ Further, the concept of community ‘often implies a denial of time and space distancing’ and an insistence upon ‘face to face interaction among members within a plurality of contexts’. However, there are ‘no conceptual grounds for considering face-to-face relations more pure, authentic social relations than relations mediated across time and distance’. This is a critical issue. As the discussion on Plato and Aristotle indicated, there are conceptual grounds for believing immediated and direct human relations to be more authentic than mediated and indirect relations. Young herself agrees that ‘in modern society the primary structures creating alienation and domination are bureaucracy and commodification’. Nevertheless Young rejects the alternative of immediate face-to-face relations. Indeed, Young rejects both sides of the dichotomy between authentic and inauthentic community in favour of a conception of the ‘unoppressed city’. Young builds upon the positive experiences of city life in which differences of all kinds are embedded, negotiated and tolerated within all kinds of mediated relations in time and space. The ‘unoppressive city’ is conceived in terms of an ‘openness to unassimilated otherness’.

Young’s argument has the merit of locating the postmodern celebration of difference and diversity within an overarching conception of unity. Young’s politics of difference projects a lofty ideal which can be developed as the basis of an emancipatory urban politics. How to embody that ideal within everyday life is the crucial question. At the real level, the ideal raises obvious dangers of an ‘exclusive inclusivity’ which can undermine the ‘openness to unassimilated otherness’. 

Pursuing the politics of difference requires an understanding of the complexity of the emerging postmodern socio-political culture. The appreciation of the sociology of class, race, gender and age reveals the city as a site of different life projects and, hence, different publics. A reconstituted urban public must necessarily be multi-layered and multi-sectored. Any particular social group within the city constitute what Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge have defined as a ‘counter-public’, a subaltern public containing an emancipatory potential and interest. Overcoming its own marginalisation from centres of power restructures society in such a way as to diminish oppression in general. The counter-public thus tends to develop ‘a sense of solidarity and reciprocity rooted in the experience of marginalisation or expropriation’ (Hansen 1993:xxxvi). The task is to extent this sense of solidarity and reciprocity to other counter publics fighting the exploitative and alienative relations which extend marginalisation and exploitation across society.

There is a danger that the politics of differences serves to reinforce existing fragmentations and antagonisms. It is no longer possible to conceive communities, places, cities, regions and nations as fixed entities enclosed in themselves when processes of globalisation are eroding barriers and boundaries of all kinds. A simplistic justification of fragmentation is vulnerable to the increasing centralisation of power which is accompanying the mode of flexible accumulation. The failure to relate the particular qualities of place and community to the qualities of a global process demonstrates an incredible geographical illiteracy. Which isn’t to argue that ‘globalisation’ is a process that has to be accepted as an unalterable force. Practices which are developed only in terms of globalisation ‘define a politics of adaptation and submission rather than of active resistance and of socialist transformation’ (Harvey 1989:276/7).

The point is that a global resistance and transformation can succeed only by proceeding from the realities of place and community. A unified politics needs to be constructed out of the politics of difference so that emancipatory counter-publics are able to contest the increasingly centralised power of the mode of flexible accumulation whilst at the same time remaining true to its grass roots of local resistances. The challenge as Harvey defines it is to fuse the new movements for decentralisation and deconcentration with the traditional agencies of left and labour politics which have developed in response to the previous mode of capital accumulation. ‘There is plenty of scope here for progressive forces, at both local, regional, and national levels to do the hard practical and intellectual work of creating a more unified oppositional force out of the maelstrom of social change that flexible accumulation has unleashed’ (Harvey 1989:277).

Harvey brings his concern with social justice to bear upon Young’s politics of difference in order to define the key principles of an urban planning which is concerned to create liveable cities and workable environments:

1.	That just planning and policy practices must confront directly the problem of creating forms of social and political organisation and systems of production and consumption which minimize the exploitation of labour power both in the workplace and the living place.
2.	That just planning and policy practices must confront the phenomenon of marginalisation in a non-paternalistic mode and find ways to organise and militate within the politics of marginalisation in such a way as to liberate captive groups from this distinctive form of oppression.
3.	Just planning and policy practices must empower rather than deprive the oppressed of access to political power and the ability to engage in self-expression.
4.	That just planning and policy practices must be particularly sensitive to issues of cultural imperialism and seek, by a variety of means, to eliminate the imperialist attitude both in the design of urban projects and modes of popular consultation.
5.	A just planning and policy practice must seek out non-exclusionary and non-militarized forms of social control to contain the increasing levels of both personal and institutionalised violence without destroying capacities for empowerment and self-expression.
6.	That just planning and policy practices will clearly recognise that the necessary ecological consequences of all social projects have impacts on future generations as well as upon distant peoples and take steps to ensure a reasonable mitigation of negative impacts.

There is a need to address the social processes which lead to a differentiated conception of social justice. Social policy and urban planning have to work on two levels. ‘The different faces of oppression have to be confronted for what they are and as they are manifest in daily life, but in the longer term and at the same time the underlying sources of the different forms of oppression in the heart of the political economy of capitalism must also be confronted, not as the fount of all evil but in terms of capitalism’s revolutionary dynamic which transforms, disrupts, deconstructs, and reconstructs ways of living, working, relating to each other and to the environment. From such a standpoint the issue is never about whether or not there shall be change, but what sort of change we can anticipate, plan for, and proactively shape in the years to come’ (Harvey 1992). These principles speak to the marginalised, excluded and exploited in this time and place and project a genuinely universal politics of the good. On the basis of these principles it is possible to envisage the city of the future as a place that has dissolved the barriers and borders separating sections of the community and dividing city space between the dominant and the marginalised, the core and the periphery. Such a conception puts the accent upon the quality of the relationships that serve to connect individuals with each other in community, securing the unity of the freedom of each and of all. This relational perspective founds the conception of a multi-sectored public sphere, establishing a common identity on the basis of the situated and contextual sphere of different individuals and groups.

The contribution made by feminist theory to this perspective merits some attention. This would reveal Young’s view that feminism values unity at the expense of difference to be overstated and, in significant respects, misplaced. Thus Virginia Held has argued for the need for different moral approaches for different spheres of life (Held 1984:1993). It follows from this that no singular morality or public sphere is capable of encompassing the diversity of life. Nancy Fraser therefore argues for a multi-sectored public sphere to replace the dominant unitary conception (Fraser 1992:109/42).

The most important contribution to this debate has been made by Carol Gilligan and her attempt to revalue the ‘different’ moral voice that has been silenced by the hegemonic voice. This argument makes it possible to theorize a multiplicity of publics which are connected to moral subjects who are related and situated rather than autonomous and disembodied. This relation and situation contains the potential to embody the universal ethic that connects each with all and hence prevents fragmentation and relativism. Morality is reconceived as something active and ongoing in everyday relationships, no longer something objective and impersonal, invested in an abstracted legal-institutional apparatus.

Feminist theory has made a valuable contribution here. Nancy Chodorow has replaced the autonomous self with the relational self: ‘Differentiation is not distinctness and separateness, but a way of being connected to others’ (Chodorow 1987:257). This new morality/politics of experience offers the possibility of reconnecting the public sphere with multiple sources of identity which have been fragmented within abstract conceptions of the rational self. Questions of identity which have arisen around issues of class, race, gender and sexuality have generated postmodern celebrations of fragmentation but have led to the possibilities for collective emancipation within a common identity coming to be neglected. There is a need to preserve and strengthen multiple identities without imposing a unified notion of the subject but without also losing the universal ethic that embraces each and all.

Hoagland’s work is full of insight with respect to the notion that the reworking of morality implies a new approach to the subject. Hoagland rejects the concept of ‘autonomy’ as implying separation in favour of a definition in which the self is expressed in terms of relations with others; in terms of ‘autokoenomy’, self in community (Hoagland 1988:144/5). For Hoagland, it is by ‘attending’ to each other that individuals increase their own and each other’s moral agency (1988:115). The end of this ‘attending’ is not control or power as in the impersonal state public but empowerment and enablement (Hoagland 1988:137). In the relational conception, moral agency does not mean the exercise of ‘free’ choice – the ideal of the self-legislating, autonomous subject – but working within limits and recognising boundaries (Hoagland 1988:231).
Catherine Keller’s From a Broken Web also affirms the morality of the relational self. Differentiation is achieved through relations which establish connectedness without dependency (Keller 1986:161). Keller thus defines a ‘composite selfhood’ in terms of multiplicity without dispersion (Keller 1986:163).
These observations on feminist theory make it clear that it is possible to have unity with difference and that there is no necessary reason to sacrifice the one in order to achieve the other. From this, it follows that the multi-sectored nature of the future city as a public realm needs to be grounded in a universal ethic and a relational unity of individuals. For Jameson, there is a need to generate new forms of representation appropriate to the ‘late’ condition of multinational capitalism so as to ‘regain a capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralised by our spatial as well as our social confusion’ (Jameson 1984:92). This ‘is not a question of substituting a total class/party politics for the politics of new social movements’ (Jameson 1988:360) but of expressing ‘local struggles involving specific and often different groups’ within a common project so as to effect a ‘total transformation of society’ (Jameson 1988:355).
This chapter concludes with an examination of Antonio Gramsci’s ‘city of the future’ as integrating the diverse strands discussed in this chapter – normative political philosophy, social justice and universalism, social differentiation and the relational conception of freedom. Antonio Gramsci extrapolated the ‘city of the future’ from the ideals of normative political philosophy deriving from Plato and Aristotle, seeking to embed different sections of the public within an inclusive public that treats all individuals equally. Gramsci targets urban division and diremption, repudiating the division between core and periphery as ‘an abstraction, not a reality’. ‘The city exists as a complete whole, not as a centre plus a periphery. In this city, the two classes of citizens are the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, not the centralists and the peripheralists. There exist unitary interests, whether bourgeois or proletarian. This geographical division of the city is absurd; this wish to make of the city two materially distinctive sections rather than two parts that are intellectually and historically distinct is a grotesque absurdity’ (Gramsci 1980:687/8).

Gramsci’s words are pertinent to the divisions which serve to make the city an iniquitous experience. Overcoming the split between the core and the periphery is crucial in ensuring a truly universal interest. The purpose of the city council is to serve the general interest, Gramsci argues. The city council, in true Aristotelian fashion, is concerned to secure the good of the whole city. If anything is amiss in any particular sector in the city, the whole city will be affected. Any particular wrong is the concern of the whole city. Further, where one sector is privileged over others, the city council should be concerned to eradicate this privilege in the cause of justice rather than create a counter-veiling privilege in response. Rather than ‘create two vampires’, the objective should be ‘to kill the one vampire now sucking the blood of the majority’.
Gramsci’s argument is both normative and spatial. Gramsci is seeking to overcome the split between centre and periphery through developing an inclusive politics of justice. Gramsci’s argument has contemporary relevance. As against the old dualistic politics resting upon relations of subordination and superordination, a politics which entrenches and extends the privileges of certain groups at the expense of subaltern groups, the new inclusive politics abolishes privilege in favour of justice. In relating this privilege to the ‘one vampire’ of capital, Gramsci is seeking to ground Aristotle’s ‘public sense of well-being’ in inclusive social relationships which sustain a politics/morality which is applicable and available to one and all.





‘Tutti’ is the most inclusive word that Gramsci could have used, applying to all equally, without regard to distinction. Gramsci is looking to erect the city of the future on the basis of the knowledge that all individuals wish to participate in freedom. Freedom embraces both the material and the spiritual aspects of the human ontology and is enhanced by its being shared between all rather than denied to some by others. Freedom is a collective project in which each and all are connected in mutually beneficial relations. The class division and egoism at the heart of the capitalist system means that the modern city lacks the moral and social roots enabling a genuine universalism. What is required is a social architecture which ensures the coincidence of the freedom of each individual and the freedom of all individuals. Gramsci affirms that true freedom, as the birthright of all individuals as human beings, will be enjoyed by some only when it is enjoyed by all. Gramsci is thus clear that the distinction between the ‘few’ (pochi) and the ‘many’ (molti) has to be overcome.

Through association and organisation, the ‘many’ create the collective ties which are crucial to freedom, contesting privilege, achieving the good of all by working for their own good. Gramsci therefore defines ‘the City of the Future’ as an inclusive order that ensures the freedom of each individual and all individuals.





The city of the future thus has the freedom of each and all at its core. Since freedom is the birthright of all individuals as human beings, it is diffused throughout a society that becomes inclusive the more that it eradicates divisions of the centre and the periphery. The city of the future replaces the dualism of the centre and the periphery with an inclusive society which is achieved by the oppressed, excluded and marginalised sectors moving in on an expanding centre, absorbing the centre into itself. This is the era of human emancipation in general, achieving a complete, realised humanity beyond class designation. Human emancipation is the triumph of inclusiveness, creating social relationships which connect each with all and all with each.

The architecture of the new city is firmly rooted in a modus vivendi which articulates the aspirations and concerns of living individuals. The new city is constructed from below, from within the structures of the everyday urban reality as against the dominant megastructures of the overscale order. The new city encompasses the centre and the periphery within an inclusive order, canalising the energies of the whole citizen body into meaningful public activity that shapes the external environment and ensuring the unity of subjective and objective factors. This is to translate the themes and values of classical philosophy into everyday life. In Gramsci’s conception, the city of the future emerges through the collaborative effort of the many.

3 GLOBALISATION AND LOCALISATION

This chapter examines the altered perspectives on the city as a result of the process of globalisation. Globalisation has become the buzzword of late capitalism. Some have even claimed that globalisation studies are ‘the successor to debates on modernity and postmodernity in the understanding of socio-cultural change and as the central thematic for social theory’ (Featherstone, Lash and Robertson eds 1995:1). The process of globalisation changes the approaches to and the conceptions of the local and thus demands that new strategies for urban regeneration be adopted.

The significance of globalisation is evident in the growing array of consequences visible in the cities of the world. The emergence of the global city is the most visible consequence of all. The impact of globalisation, however, extends much further, generating a global culture and economy throughout the whole of society. It follows from this that strategies for economic development and urban regeneration will be shaped by global perspectives and imperatives. Globalisation has implications for the city with respect to social development, processes of restructuring and urban-regional development, the international division of labour, the formation of global regions, the transnationalisation of identity and citizenship and, most interesting of all, a reassertion of the power of the local. Global connections are evident with respect to the media, electronic landscapes, new or post-modernities, communications, the end of the nation state and the rise of the borderless world, the end of the public and the rise of private collectivism, the end of geographical space and the rise of a transnational imagery. These developments contain both dangers and opportunities, create problems but offer possibilities. Ambitious designs for the future of the city will be influenced by a number of features in the globalised world.

The globalisation of economic relations has produced a major paradigm shift in urban studies. The city and urban life in general are directly connected to the development of a global economy. This paradigm shift is evident in the increasing number of critical studies which locate metropolitan growth in a global context (Friedman 1986; Cooke 1986b; Dickens 1986; Henderson and Castells 1987; Hill and Feagin 1987; Perry 1987; Smith and Feagin 1987). The connection between the global economy and urbanisation has become the central theme in contemporary literature (Timberlake 1985).

From the middle of the seventies it has become increasingly apparent that the dominant forces in the system of production has become global in scope and scale. In the beginning, the first effects were observable in the most immediate sense, in terms of the loss of employment and the rise in unemployment. As production went multi-national, employment came to be exported to newly industrialsing countries where labour costs were lower (Dunning 1983; Portes and Walton 1981; Massey 1986). The principal agency in this transformation of urban space is the transnational corporation (TNC). The TNC’s are able to exploit their global power and reach in order to evade the national controls of government. The city and the process of urbanisation cannot be studied without taking the global perspectives and effects of the TNC’s into account. Urban development can only be thoroughly comprehended ‘by analysing cities in terms of their transnational linkages, especially their connections with the world capitalist economy’ (Smith and Feagin 1987:5). The activities of all cities in the contemporary economy are subject to global forces and developments. Since this is so, all those concerned with urban development must extend linkages beyond the local urban area, even beyond national boundaries, so as to address the larger economic system in which urban activities take place. This approach takes the view that initial explanations of urban growth and decline suffered from far too narrow a focus and required a deeper (historical) and broader (geographical) framework (Harloe 1987). The development of a geopolitical economy, setting urban life in the framework of a geopolitical economic framework, attempts to offer this deeper and broader apparatus for explanation (and transformation).

The point has general significance. There is a need for effective outward looking institutions and policies at city level since national governments are ill equipped to deal with local and regional problems, let alone promote local initiatives and innovations which pertain to a rapidly changing global environment. The local aims of national governments are incapable of doing more than maintain routine functions. Cities and local authorities, in contrast, are in tune with complex developments and are able to adopt a proactive policy mediating between local needs and global requirements. This points to the need to enhance and accentuate the capacity of local government to manage the process of urbanisation. With globalisation, the city is assuming a new functional significance.

The global shift that has been underway since the 1970’s has induced some theorists to downgrade the significance of the local. Scott Lash and John Urry have offered an influential account in this respect, relating the global unimportance of locality to trends towards an essentially and necessarily ‘disorganised’ post-industrial capitalism (Lash and Urry 1994). In the capitalist market, organisations need to have speed and mobility, being able to migrate across different labour and consumer markets so as to survive and succeed. From this perspective, the very idea of a city becomes problematic. It becomes impossible to think of any fixed location as a centre with respect to the ‘new circuits of capital’. As Lash and Urry argue, the three elements of capital – money, productive capital and commodities – circulate with increasing speed and energy throughout an increasingly global space. At the same time, traditional or modernist modes of thought, action and organisation concerning the relation of cities to production and consumption have been superseded by the development of electronic communications networks. Lash and Urry place a heavy emphasis upon global economic transformations undermining the identity of place and locality, superseding industrial urbanism and subverting traditional patterns of everyday life. The conclusion is clear. Individuals and localities need to adjust and adapt to the massive transformations now underway in the socio-cultural and geopolitical environment.

This chapter takes account of the far reaching nature of globalisation but is concerned to qualify the Lash and Urry thesis in a couple of significant respects. In the first place, this chapter is concerned to argue for the continued importance of place whilst recognising the global transformation of space. In the second place, this chapter is concerned to argue for the continued importance of manufacturing in face of the post-industrial thesis and its connection to the post-fordist regeneration of the city.

The argument acknowledges the stresses that have been placed upon the city as a result of the impact and interplay of remote, abstract global forces upon place. The myriad linkages and loyalties which serve to tie people to localities are increasingly subjected to global pressures which, the further that they proceed, threaten to unravel the local urban fabric. The evidence is growing that these global pressures are eroding the city as an urban public realm. The city as a public life is in retreat. The redefinition of freedom and happiness from being public goods obtained together in a collective arena to being private goods obtained in the sphere of economic exchange and consumption is having a visible effect upon the urban environment. 
Public spaces, public access, freedom of movement and association for all within the city, the participation in civic urban life that once formed the backbone of politics, have all been increasingly curtailed with the redefinition of urban life as a social problem to be policed and regulated (Worpole 1992:3).

The critical perspective taken here is motivated by the sense that the very things which define the city have been in crisis and retreat as a result of recent developments in the global economy. As a result of the weakening of the identification of people and places there has been a downgrading of the public sense of citizenship in favour of a market citizenship which identifies freedom and happiness with private consumerism. In consequence, the very essence of city life as a progressive force has been lost, to be replaced by a preoccupation with attracting investment and fostering economic growth. The problem is that it is this very prioritisation of the economic factor that is the cause of the urban problem in the first place and hence cannot be the solution. At best, the economic factor is part of the solution, as means to other than economic ends. Many regeneration strategies which are preoccupied with the need to attract capital investment are undermined by the lack of democracy. ‘Too little monitoring or reflection was built into the planning or development process, too little consultation had been undertaken’. Instead, there was a once and for all decision making, leaving later generations to deal with its consequences (Worpole 1992:6/7).
Picking up this question again with respect to Lash and Urry’s theorisation of the global unimportance of locality, there is a need to address the question of the space of flows coming to supersede the space of places. Manual Castells concludes The Informational City by emphasising ‘the reconstruction of social meaning in the space of flows’. Castells draws attention to the major social trend of the era, ‘the historical emergence of the space of flows, superseding the meaning of the space of places’. By this. Castells means ‘the deployment of the functional logic of powerholding organisations in asymmetrical networks of exchanges which do not depend on the characteristics of any specific locale for the fulfilment of their fundamental goals’. This has a number of features:





Castells’ argument has a direct bearing upon the de-traditionalisation of urban space in the argument of Lash and Urry. ‘The emergence of the space of flows actually expresses the disarticulation of place based societies and cultures from the organisation of power and production that continue to dominate society without submitting to its control’ (Castells 1989:349). The restructuring of power has the effect of undermining place based conceptions of local identity, control, citizenship and democracy.





Castells’ argument is full of insight and raises a number of critical points with respect to globalisation in the information economy. Castells develops a creative synthesis of elements which are normally separated in urban discourse – capital and labour, manufacturing and services, the global and the local, social and spatial structures. The problem is that Castells’ argument that the space of flows has replaced the space of places possesses a deterministic logic that runs contrary to any notion of a reality constituting urban praxis. There seems to be no way of resisting the all-encompassing logic of the space of flows on Castells’ account. This is a serious point. For, as Castells’ himself recognises, people live in places, not in flows. If power governs through flows, as Castells reasons, then people confined to superseded places are subject to an overwhelming, irresistible alien control.

For Castells, the new spatial logic which characterises the Informational City is determined by the pre-eminence of the space of flows over the space of places. By space of flows, Castells refers to the system of exchanges of information, capital and power that structures the basic processes of societies, economies and states between different localities (Castells 1993). That irresistible deterministic logic which leaves place bound human beings subject to the control of vast external forces is evident in Castells’ reasoning here. The space of flows is characterised by an increasing abstraction, removing the world from comprehension and control.





Castells’ argument has a number of implications for the city. Castells describes The Informational City as a Global City in that it ‘articulates the directional functions of the global economy in a network of decision making and information processing centres’ (Castells 1993). The Informational City is also the Dual City since the informational economy possesses the structural tendency to generate a polarized occupational structure according to the differential informational capacities of different social groups. Improved productivity through information at the top can generate structural unemployment at the bottom, or the downgrading of the social conditions for labour, especially if trade unions are undermined in the process and the welfare state is dismantled by governments with a neo-liberal policy agenda. The erosion of place, therefore, has wider political implications in that it is part of a process which subverts a social contract concluded in a previous but dying mode of accumulation. Without the conclusion of a new contract, division is inevitable.





This generates the ‘fundamental urban dualism of our time’. ‘It opposes the cosmopolitanism of the elite, living on a daily connection to the whole world (functionally, socially, culturally), to the tribalism of local communities, retrenched in the spaces that they try to control as their last stand against the macro forces that shape their lives out of their reach’ (Castells 1993). This argument begs the question not only of the character of regeneration but of whose interests are served by a particular regeneration strategy. How is the balance between flows and places to be resolved so that the interests of all people who live in the city are taken into account? A post-fordist strategy, on this reasoning, comes with obvious dangers of reinforcing and intensifying an urban dualism that destroys the public sense of well-being. And without that quality, no true regeneration is possible. Castells’ analysis reveals the fundamental dividing line in contemporary cities to be the inclusion of the cosmopolitan elite in the making of the new history and the exclusion of the local mass from the control of the globalised city. The Informational City, the Global City and the Dual City are thus closely interrelated and constitute the background of urban processes in the major metropolitan centres of Europe. The crucial issue concerns the increasing lack of communication between the informational elite in charge of the directional functions within a globally oriented economic sector and the locally oriented population that is tied to place, subjected to external pressures and is undergoing an identity crisis as a result. ‘The separation between function and meaning, translated into the tension between the space of flows and the space of places, could become a major destabilising force in European cities, potentially ushering in a new type of urban crisis’ (Castells 1993). To predicate regeneration upon globalisation and the new information, service and media forces is not enough and, indeed, risks exacerbating existing divisions to the overall detriment of place. A more nuanced approach seeks to relate the new forces of local cultures and concerns. The relational conception which this study affirms conceives the city in terms of its situated, routine, often mundane processes and practices. Such an approach seeks to dissolve the abstract structure of the city into its rooted infrastructure. This is to reinstate a concern with the living systems that constitute the city, particularly the way that these systems are generated, experienced and transformed by individual city dwellers. ‘Urban forms and functions are produced and managed by the interaction between space and society, that is, by the historical relationships between human consciousness, matter, energy and information’ (Castells 1983:xv). The crucial question concerns how this sphere of everyday life can be recovered over against the abstract and abstracting forces and systems currently dissolving place.
The project of revaluing the everyday life activities and social practices constitutive of the space of places is confronted – and confronts – the vast power of abstraction. In contemporary society, information is becoming central to everything. The production of information is becoming even more important than the production of material goods. The corollary of this is that the wealth of society has come to be measured by information rather than by products.





This observation shows the potentially radical aspect to Castells’ space of flows. The society of networks is potentially subversive of the formal organisation of politics and of economics. The old political structures and geographical boundaries need no longer exist. New modes of representation and expression are required. ‘If we are foresighted enough, we know that state structures and national boundaries will disappear’ (Ellul 1990:185). For reasons that Ellul himself gives, the belief that such foresight may be exercised may be overly optimistic. There is currently a global tendency for the information revolution to be exploited in order to centralise decision making. Power is being transferred from the formally democratic political spheres of society to technocrats functioning in the private economy.
The projection of the future of the city cannot be predicated upon technology and technique, still less read off according to some technological determinism. Reorganising society and its purposes according to technique represents a drastic, dehumanising break with the historico-moral-anthropological connection of urban space with civilisation, culture and creative human self-realisation. For whilst technique may be many things, it is certainly not a philosophy. It is silent on ends. The enlargement of technique to become more than what it is invites pathological consequences through the suppression of ends. ‘There can be no philosophy of technique because technique has nothing whatever to do with wisdom. On the contrary, it is solely an expression of pride. It makes excessiveness finally possible … excessiveness that on the one hand rolls on without our wanting or participating in it … technique attains a dimension so exorbitant that we cannot even record its products, let alone direct them… Hence our own machines have truly replaced us. We cannot make a philosophy of them, for a philosophy implies limits and definitions and defined areas that technique will not allow’ (Ellul 1990:216).

Quite so. But Ellul gives reasons for believing that the reassertion of ends over means will be a remarkably difficult project. New technologies certainly contain the potential for greater decentralisation and an expansion of free time. Nevertheless, this emancipatory potential could only be realised through a fundamental social transformation which alters existing relations: ‘change is possible if a politico-economic about face goes hand in hand with the new technique’ (Ellul 1990:xiii).
Ellul has many interesting things to say with respect to the supposed evolution of a post-industrial or post-fordist society. For the transition that is underway is only very imperfectly theorised in terms of the development from an industrial to a post-industrial society. Industrial society was itself the product of new technology whilst the apparently post-industrial society of the present age has mass production as its objective (Ellul 1990:2). Nevertheless, whilst it is possible to overstate discontinuity at the expense of continuity, a new era of human activity has evolved with the transition from the production of material goods to the production of information. The goal in the former mode of development had been larger, more profitable material goods. In contrast, the new world of computers, office automation, telematics, robots etc., is a very different, energy efficient but hugely productive world (Ellul 1990:3). ‘Whether we like it or not [the information revolution] sets up networks in society that have nothing whatever to do with ancient networks or traditional structures. We cannot continue as before. Simply because the computer is there, we cannot ignore it’ (Ellul 1990:9).

The challenge before society is to comprehend and control technique. This project may take various forms. Some advocate a planning policy. Some advocate law as capable of regulating technique. Indeed, the globalisation of law through new supra-national institutions, treaties and codes of conduct corresponds to the globalisation of technique behind the globalisation of economic relations. Ultimately, however, the goal of comprehension and control must proceed to the heart of capital’s social metabolic system of production and reproduction, democratising society at its roots and aiming for the decentralisation and diffusion of power and with it the self-organisation of society.

For Ellul, what is underway is not so much a transition to the post-industrial society as a further phase in the industrial revolution. ‘After the textile revolution and the metallurgical revolution has come the information revolution, that is, the production of goods which themselves produce and manage information’ (Ellul 1990:15). The problem is that no one has taken control of the system in order to develop a human and social order which corresponds to the level of technological development. Technique has superseded morality and politics. Things are done by force of circumstance since ‘the proliferation of techniques, mediated by the media, by communication, by the universalisation of images, by changed human discourse, has outflanked prior obstacles and integrated them progressively into the process’. Points of resistance have been encircled and dissolved without meeting any hostile reaction or refusal since ‘what is proposed infinitely transcends all capacity for opposition (often because no-one comprehends what is at issue), and partly because it has an obvious cogency that is not found on the part of what might oppose it. For what would it be opposing?’ (Ellul 1990:18).

Contemporary developments are pointing to the emergence of a technopolis, the very antithesis of the polis ideal of democracy grounded in place, in the agora. Technopolis is a form which represents the systematic destruction of the public sense of well-being, freedom and happiness as public goods. Those possessing technical competence have the potential to form a new aristocracy which has no interest in the notion of a public sphere or urban realm. As a result of their technical knowledge, this new aristocracy possesses the capacity to organise society without requiring the mediation of the state. This aristocracy holds and exercises power on account of its technical knowledge. Meritocracy is thus actualised on a narrow base, taking the form of the dictatorship of the technically competent. Such elitism destroys the notion of the public sphere as a sphere composed of free and equal citizens, all able to participate and all with a contribution to make to the ordering of society.





The public is divided from within as knowledge, practice and language elevate a technical elite above the common people. The ability of the technicians is of general application, enabling them to exercise a totality of powers at the centre of every organism of management and decision – armaments, space exploration, health, communications, industry. All that is power depends upon the techniques.

The Technopolis (Rodgers and Larsen 1984) inclines to become a motive centre for society and the economy: ‘What happens comes to expression in the linguistic transition from the technopolis, the city of technique, to the technopole, the pole of technique’ (Ellul 1990:28). The promise held out by those who celebrate this development is that the technopolis will become the source of a new vitality. Technology parks are multiplying, promising a cross-fertilization between the university and industry, with a centre located outside of town. ‘When a centre is set up, it exerts an appeal. Risk capital flows toward it. New enterprises are set up according to an interesting process. Researchers, industrialists, students and financiers follow one another. The technopole is a rallying point’ (Ellul 1990:28).

Cities of this type are poor social models and certainly do not offer a vision of a viable future city. Such cities do not represent a new departure but instead reproduce all the vices of a technocapitalist society. Most important here is the division between the high-tech technicians who command high salaries and the mass of ordinary workers. This aristocracy of technicians is deficient in its knowledge of the wider society beyond the sphere of their technical competence. Democracy, culture, ecology and politics in general are a closed book to the technicians. ‘They are also totally indifferent to morality. What does it matter if their discoveries serve a destructive purpose e.g. improving armaments?’ (Ellul 1990:29). This political and moral ignorance is a source of weakness:





Ellul focuses upon the contradictory combination of two ‘globalities’.





Nowhere is this ambivalence more in evidence than in the expansion of the technology of social control, as applied in the name of protecting society, the individual and liberty. The problem is that this technology is leading inexorably to a total control, the surveillance and administration of all human activity, from the cradle to the grave. To protect the freedom of the individual in the abstract it is necessary to sacrifice the real individual to social regulation. And yet the true measure of human advance is the extent to which human beings realise autonomy through creative self-realisation in a social order that corresponds to the human ontology. And this requires that the global networks of the new electronic and informational society be brought under a comprehension and control that invests the local with new meaning.

Castells argues that the most important challenge facing all major cities ‘is the articulation of the globally oriented economic functions of the city with the locally rooted society and culture’. The separation between these two levels generates a ‘structural urban schizophrenia’ which threatens the social equilibrium and the quality of life. Despite proliferation of international institutions within an increasingly globalised economy, it is local government which may come to the forefront of attempts to manage new urban conflicts and contradictions. Although local government is as powerless as national government in face of global forces, they are nevertheless much more adaptable to the changing social, economic and functional environment of cities (Castells 1993). This points to the emergence of novel forms of urban government. In this new globalised environment, the effectiveness of new political institutions depends more upon the capacity for negotiation and adaptation than upon the power that they command. Power is increasingly fragmented and shared between a range of decision making organisations. The crucial thing is not to control the whole complexity of the new society but to address specific sets of problems and objectives as they arise and apply in specifically local conditions’ Local governments are therefore to be strengthened as a precondition of the effective management of cities given their ability to operate in the global economy whilst living in the local culture. Local government must fulfil three essential criteria to realise this management potential:

1.	Through the extension of structures for citizen participation, strengthened local communities are able to provide local government with information, communicate citizen demands, and form the ground for the legitimacy of local government. Through this active citizen engagement, local governments are able to become respected partners with the global forces operating within their territory.
2.	The power of global economic forces to play governments off against one another is reduced by the interconnection and cooperation between local governments, ‘this forcing the cooperation of global economy and local societies in a fruitful new social contract’ (Castells 1993).
3.	New information technologies make possible a qualitative upgrading of the cooperation between local governments. A network of instant communication between local leaders enables ‘the formation of a true association of interests of the democratic representatives of the local populations. An electronically connected federation of quasi-free communes could pave the way for restoring social and political control over global powers in the informational age’ (Castells 1993).

Castells projects a vision of the new city and new society that is able to act upon the social forces that underlie the new urban conflicts and contradictions. These conflicts and contradictions need to be managed at the local level. The globalisation of urban space, then, creates the conditions for the revaluing of locality. This requires the creation of cooperative mechanisms with national governments and European institutions, beyond the competition of political parties. In this respect, the historical specificity of European cities is a fundamental asset in creating the conditions for the management of the contradictions between the global and the local in the new informational society. European cities are grounded in strong civil societies and articulate a rich, diversified culture. This history offers a foundation for the extension of citizen participation so as to check the tribalism and alienation that threatens to result from new urban contradictions. In this context, the collective memory of the autonomous city-state could be provoked into the pursuit of its recreation as the necessary complement to the expansion of the global economy and a supranational institutional framework. European urban tradition could be employed to re-establish cities as centres of politics, culture, commerce, and innovation. Such a development contrasts with ‘the meaningless suburban sprawl of high technology complexes that characterize the informational space in other areas of the world’ (Castells 1993). European cities could therefore manage the articulation between the space of flows and the space of places, between function and experience, power and culture, building the city of the future upon foundations laid in the past.
The creation of the new city will be no easy task. Powerful forces beyond the scope and control of the city have been unleashed by recent developments. The process of economic restructuring which followed the ending of the long boom has resulted in the massive transformation of cities. Intensified competition through the globalisation of economic relations has decimated the manufacturing heartland of western economies and cities. There has been a substantial transfer of manufacturing employment and production from the developed nations to the newly industrialising countries (NIC’s). In the new international division of labour, the vertically integrated manufacturing giants which characterised Fordism have come to be replaced by flexibly networked corporations which operate across global distances.
The growth of high-tech manufacturing, service and leisure industries in the economies and cities of the advanced world has resulted in a profound transformation of urban dynamics. The liberalisation which has accompanied globalisation has fostered the growth of financial services. This has led to the rise of cities which are at the hub of global electronic and financial services networks (Graham and Marvin 1996). As a result of these developments, the advanced economies are now dominated by processing and adding value. This even extends to commodity based industries like retailing and manufacturing which are increasingly information rich. Information occupies a central place in production in all sectors and is therefore a key commodity to be bought, sold, traded, exchanged. The whole process is facilitated by the way that telematics increases capabilities for processing, storing and controlling vast flows of electronic information on a continuous and real time basis. As a result of these shifts industrial cities have become ‘information’ or ‘post-industrial’ cities dominated by consumption industries, the processing and circulation of knowledge and symbolic goods. The bulk of new jobs being created are information based. ‘Investment in telematics –the basic information infrastructures of cities – now surpasses investment in other industrial machinery. Because telematics make information so easy to move around, these shifts increasingly take a global complexion, tied in with the wider shifts towards globalisation and the growing power of the TNC’s’ (Graham and Marvin 1996).
These developments pose the question once more of the relevance and status of locality in an increasingly globalised environment. Whilst some, like Lash and Urry (1994), consider that globalisation amounts to the supersession of locality there is an important argument to the effect that globalisation permits a renewed emphasis upon locality. This latter view explores possibilities for a new political and intellectual terrain emerging out of globalisation. Taking the view that globalisation could be accompanied by the rediscovery of the local is to reject the either-or dualism which conceives the global and the local to be antithetical. A richer conception integrates both aspects (Dunford and Kafkalay 1992). It is in this sense that Swyngedouw has developed the concept of ‘glocalisation’ as ‘neither global nor local’ but a politics of scale that integrates both aspects (Swyngedouw 1997:137/66).

The concept of ‘glocalisation’ rejects the idea that globalisation and localisation are distinct processes which are antithetical to each other. In the intersection of the global and the local neither aspect has primacy. Rethinking the whole process in terms of the interpenetration of the local and the global makes it possible to envisage the actions of individual citizens in local communities as making a difference in face of vast but nevertheless controllable global forces. Individuals can act locally but such local actions can ascend in scope to become global, influencing and being influenced by the hierarchy of space, embracing regional, national and global levels. This approach makes it possible to rethink globalisation not as an overarching process that operates beyond the control and consciousness of individuals but as a process that is capable of being localised at every level of urban life. From this perspective, every local area is globalised. And in being globalised, the local area is urbanised, regionalised and nationalised. This approach offers a basis for rethinking the whole fabric of relations composing the spatiality of social life, particularly the spatial specificity of urbanism.

Erik Swyngedouw defines the ‘glocal’ conception as a politics of human scale. The global does not imply the unimportance of the local. On the contrary, the global can lead to the revaluing of the local.





This reinforces the earlier point concerning the renewed importance of local government on account not so much of the power that it commands but of its capacities for negotiation, adjustment and adaptation. The concept of ‘glocalisation’ concerns the reduction of human relations to an appropriate scale that enables citizens to have conscious control of their relations.

This conception bears a close relation to Michael Storper’s attempt to develop a critical regionalism. This standpoint is critical of the territorialist overemphasis upon globalisation and the impression that this gives of vast abstract processes operating over the heads of individuals. Storper rejects the dualism of the global and the local as resting upon a false antithesis. Storper’s perspective points to the recovered importance of the local in the new urbanism.





This definition of territorialisation is pertinent in the attempt to define an appropriate human scale in establishing localisation and globalisation as a singular process. Localisation is here conceived in an expansive sense as covering all geographical scales, proceeding from the bottom up as opposed to from the top down.

Storper’s views are directly relevant to the attempt to redefine local urban space in the context of global processes of restructuring. Storper focuses in the main upon firm-based economic processes, seeking meso-level resolution between macro-economic (top down) forces and micro-economic (bottom up) forces. Storper’s meso-level resolution is grounded in a series of interrelated concepts, from renascent regional economies and regional spheres of production as crucial forces which ensure territorial development within a globalised economy. With this conception of a ‘reflexive capitalism’. Storper seeks to switch the focus away from a narrowly conceived globalisation via a meso-level regional resolution. This conception relates to the development currently underway in the space in between the national and the local scales of government. The economic restructuring that has accompanied globalisation has involved the resurgence of regional economies and it is this resurgence that is the focus of this study.

The relation of the global and the local raises a number of issues – of decentralisation and recentralisation, the expansion of globalisation, the resurgence of regionalism and the reassertion of the local. The developments that have been taking place in between the blocks of geopolitical and economic power contain possibilities with respect to the attempt to recover the public dimension of the city. This study has sought to define the city in terms of the public sense of well-being, going on to relate this moral and philosophical argument to the scope and scale of geopolitical and economic power, identifying intermediate spaces between national and local states. These spaces are being filled with forces and activities that suggest the resurrection of the city state (Petrella 1991:59/64). These ‘subnational entities might best be described as (globalised) city region states to emphasise their resurgent regionality and their growing role as motors of the global geopolitical economy’. The ideal is ‘to combine their multiscalar description into the notion of the postmetropolis itself, as an incipient form of the postmetropolitan region-state or polity’ (Soja 2000:208). These postmetropolitan region-states have started to assume the functions and authority of the nation state, in terms of diplomatic and trade relations, effecting investment partnerships, negotiating foreign loans. Though subnational city regions are not independent of the nation state they are increasingly able to bypass the state through establishing global ties, bringing a political dimension to their increasing profile as dynamics of the global economy. Allen Scott has written well on the political dimension which regions have added to their profile, generating new possibilities within the geopolitical economy of globalisation.





It remains to trace these themes and trends in terms of their empirical effects. This chapter began by referring to the ‘de-traditionalisation’ of urban space in the movement towards global markets. In the old cities of the advanced economies this de-traditionalisation has been expressed in terms of the destruction of local mass manufacturing industry and the communities dependent upon mass manufacturing. Those who live in these communities find themselves having to alter their activities in order to fill the void which the demise of old industries has left in terms of work, identity, everyday life at every level.

Without doubt, it is possible to identify towns in the UK which exhibit a radical transformation of their core economic activities beyond the ‘mass’ perspective of Fordism (Swindon). In these towns, significant percentages of the workforce are employed in high technology service industries. Saxenian (1989) gives the evidence in this respect for Cambridge whilst Urry focuses upon Lancaster (1987 1990). Significantly, many of these workers are not locals and do not identify themselves as locals.
Extreme care should, however, be exercised in interpreting these developments. It is not possible to generalise from particular instances. The local-global fallacy, the errors resulting from generalising from the particular, make certain developments appear more widespread than they really are. As even Lash and Urry concede: ‘not all local economies are experiencing the same pattern.. In Britain, Rochdale is very far from being post-industrial and service dominated’ (Lash and Urry 1994:212). It is inadmissible to consider all cities as dominated by services and as composed of mobile individuals. The old social classes and the local cultures that have developed around slowly evolving social relations are still very much in evidence.

There has been a substantial amount of empirical research concerning the uneven experience of localities within the UK with respect to the shift from Fordist to Post-Fordist modes. The evidence points to a complex picture of local responses to the challenges of deindustrialisation, post-fordism and globalisation. From the perspective of this study this research can be faulted on account of its failure to take into account the ‘lived experience’ of urban dwellers in the transition between economic forms. And, further to this point, this research stands condemned for exaggerating the switch from manufacturing to services. The old industrial cities may need to engage in a process of economic restructuring but that does not mean that they should necessarily cease to be industrial cities. Certainly, the ‘productive services’ that Lash and Urry emphasise account for a substantial proportion of the new jobs created in the advanced economies. But manufacturing is far from extinct. Figures from 1989 show manufacturing as accounting for 25% of employment in Manchester. Taking into account the extent to which services revolve around and are dependent upon manufacturing industries, the centrality of manufacturing industries, the centrality of manufacturing to the employment structure and to the health and wealth of the city can be appreciated.

To argue for the continued importance of manufacturing does not deny the scale of socio-economic transformation that has taken place since the late 1970’s. The immediate impact of this transformation for the bulk of the urban public in these years was experienced in terms of the massive loss of employment in the old manufacturing industries. ‘In the decade from 1979, 94% of all job losses occurred North of a line drawn from the Wash to the Severn. Of the manufacturing jobs lost, 70% were in the North’ (Dickinson 1990:76). Such figures indicate the trauma suffered by the old cities of the industrialised North. This trauma was increased by the deliberate political withdrawal of the local and the national state from responsibilities for social provision and welfare. The old cities were forced to reinvent themselves in the worst possible circumstances. Such straitened circumstances made it possible to do little more than capitulate before vast impersonal forces. The concluding part of this chapter is concerned to argue that the process of economic restructuring that has occurred in the past quarter of a century ought to be understood less as a deindustrialisation than as a transformation containing potentialities for a reindustrialisation. In short, just as the process of globalisation does not necessarily imply the downgrading of the locality but, rather, points to its renewed centrality, so deindustrialisation with regard to the earlier modes of accumulation does not necessarily imply the end of industry but contains the potential to engage in a reindustrialisation which emphasises a new manufacturing economy. Taking this approach involves exercising a good deal of scepticism with respect to regeneration strategies which emphasise the global, the post-fordist, the informational and the symbolic at the expense of the local and the industrial.

THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF MANUFACTURING

The globalisation of urban space is inextricably related to the emergence of a new international division of labour. Since 1945 there has been an increasing internationalisation of production which has altered the shape of national economies. Manufacturing production processes have been increasingly relocated from the advanced western economies to Third World nations which had formerly specialised in the export of primary products. Whilst western economies imported few manufactures in the 1950’s, by the 1970’s manufacturing production in industrial sectors like textiles and electrical goods was increasingly located abroad under the control of metropolitan companies.

The development of the world economy has increasingly created conditions in which the survival of more and more companies can only be assured through the relocation of production to new industrial sites, where labour power is cheap to buy, abundant and well-disciplined: in short, through the transnational reorganisation of production.

Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreuz 1980:15

This transnational reorganisation of production has caused the deindustrialisation of the old industrial cities.

With the increasing interconnection of cities and states within the global economy, a new international division of labour has emerged. The newly industrialising countries (NIC’s) have switched from primary products to manufactures, computers, televisions, phone systems and fax machines for export to the western market. At the same time, the older industrial cities in the advanced economy have suffered from deindustrialisation whilst other cities, like London, New York, and Tokyo, have emerged as centres for the management and manipulation of information, for technological innovation and for global financial command and control functions.
The principal factor behind the emergence of the new international division of labour was the change in the labour process which reduced the level of skill required to produce manufactures. To capital, Third World labour has certain advantages over labour in the developed world – labour is cheap and abundant, trade unions are weak or non-existent, social and environmental standards are low. Improvements in communication and transport have made it easier for capital to have access to this reserve of cheap labour. Pliable governments offering tax concessions, the absence of social and environmental controls mean that transnationals are willing to relocate production to sites outside of developed urban areas in the West (Frobel et al 1980:145/7). The implications of this new international division of labour have been profound. The old cities of the advanced economies have suffered from a process of deindustrialisation, the effects of which have been most manifest in the loss of manufacturing jobs and the deterioration of the physical environment.
The emergence of the new international division of labour has therefore had a profound impact upon the urban environment. The process of deindustrialisation afflicting the old industrial cities has to be set within the globalisation of economic relations. This process is predicated upon the capacity of large corporations to exploit spatial differences in global labour markets in conjunction with a new technical specialisation within specific industrial sectors. The economic imperatives driving this process need to be identified.

The determining force, the prime mover, behind capitalist development is therefore the valorisation and accumulation process of capital, and not for example, any alleged tendency towards the extension and deepening of the wage labour/capital relation or the ‘unfolding’ of the productive forces.

Frobel et al 1980:25

The dynamic behind the deindustrialisation afflicting the old cities concerns the global pursuit of profits. Setting the problem in the context of the international division of labour challenges the notion of an inevitable process of deindustrialisation. Rather, cities are to be analysed in terms of their location within the global economy. The continued importance of western capital cities is to be attributed to their coordinating function within the global economy. At the same time, the expansion of cities in the developing world may be attributed to their existence as sites for new industrial production. What needs to be worked out is where, exactly, does this leave the old industrial cities. These old cities are having to carve out a new urban identity for themselves.
A good deal of the literature has focused upon manufacturing industry. The concentration upon the old industrial cities and regions has given the impression that deindustrialisation is the most salient characteristic of the new international division of labour. The corporate restructuring of the global economy appears as an urban degeneration in the old industrial cities, identified with manufacturing job losses, decaying infrastructure, poverty and crime. Nevertheless, this is a partial effect of this process. Not only have many countries within the new international division of labour industrialised, many parts of the advanced economy have reindustrialised. There is no necessary need for the old cities to switch from manufactures to services. The crucial thing is to realise an appropriate mix.
The ‘restructuring approach’ (Bagguley et al 1990) demonstrates the connection between economic restructuring, urban and regional change and political conflict. Doreen Massey pays less attention to the logic of capital accumulation and is instead concerned to delineate the effects of business strategies to compete in the global economy. This approach is concerned with the spatial consequences of business restructuring in response to changes in the economic environment. This pays particular attention to the different strategies that firms in different sectors of the economy have adopted in response to global economic pressures (Massey and Meegan 1979 1982). The key strategies identified were rationalisation – closing particular units of production – intensification – getting more work out of the workers – and investment and technical change – increasing productivity. As a result of these strategies, some regions gain and some lose as production and employment is rationalised away from some areas to others. In Spatial Divisions of Labour (1984) Massey put this argument on a systematic basis by arguing that, in restructuring, companies tended to specialise their activities where labour is cheap and pliable. R&D and administrative functions were located in areas near centres of power, where elite professional and managerial staff were located. In adopting this approach to global economic restructuring the intention is to avoid theorising an inevitable process of deindustrialisation. Many critics have been concerned to argue for the continued importance of industry (Storper 1997:236/41). For industrial urbanists, industrialism has not ended but has assumed new forms within the old world.

The shift from manufacturing industry to services has implications with respect to the overall productivity and competitiveness of the economy. Extreme caution should be exercised when considering strategies of urban regeneration which presume the inevitable demise of manufacturing and the centrality of services. As Ellul comments with regard to the decline in US productivity:





The need to reassert the centrality of manufacturing in a new industrial urbanism proceeds in the context of an expansion of the international service economy. The internationalisation of production and of finance has entailed the internationalisation of administration and control through advanced producer services, activities enabling user firms to undertake administrative, developmental and financial functions, whether R&D, strategic planning, banking, insurance, real estate, financial and legal services, consultation, advertising etc. These developments have radically transformed the employment structure in the contemporary economies. It is the expansion of activities that is crucial to the formation of global cities (Thrift 1986b:60). This has profoundly transformed urban economies in the advanced world. Whilst the economies of the periphery have acquired importance as industrial centres, in the core economies attention has shifted from production to product development, distribution, marketing, selling and advertising (Noyelle 1986). Having exhausted opportunities for economies in the production of goods and services, a greater emphasis has come to be placed upon ‘hype’ and ‘designer’ functions.

A division has opened up between the new global cities and the old industrial cities. Global or world cities are those which depend on multinational financial services. These are linked to the circulation and realisation of wealth. Global cities are typically the site of the headquarters of the large transnational corporations. They are the site of ‘control functions’ (Massey 1988). Global cities are centralised, possessing a distinct urban core which specialises in global financial services. Within global cities there is a core group of elite workers who are serviced by a mass of poorly paid workers (Kasarda 1988).
The older industrial cities are those subject to decline owing to the collapse of old manufacturing industry. These cities are characterised by urban degeneration, poverty, unemployment and a decaying physical infrastructure. The regeneration of such cities has been a major problem for more than a quarter of a century. Saskia Sassen in The Global City argues that the combination of spatial dispersal and global integration has had the result of creating a new strategic role for major cities. Over and above their historic role as centres for international trade and banking, these cities now function in new ways.

1.	as highly concentrated command points in the organisation of the world economy;
2.	as key locations for finance and for the specialised service firms which have overtaken manufacturing as the leading sector of the economy;
3.	as sites of production, including the production of innovations in the leading economic sector;
4.	as markets for products and innovations.

World cities concentrate control over vast resources, presiding over the restructuring of the urban social and economic environment proceeding through the finance and service industries. The global city is thus a new form of the city, its leading examples being New York, London and Tokyo (Sassen 1991:3/4).

Friedmann and Wolff have defined the process of world city formation. They are concerned with ‘the spatial articulation of the emerging world system of production and markets through a global network of cities’. In particular, they are concerned with ‘the principal urban regions in this network in which most of the world’s active capital comes to be concentrated, regions which play a vital part in the great capitalist undertaking to organise the world for the efficient extradition of surplus … the world economy is defined by a linked set of markets and production units, organised and controlled by transnational capital, world cities are the material manifestation of this control, occurring exclusivity in core and semi-peripheral regions where they serve as banking and financial centres, administrative headquarters, centres of ideological control and so forth (Friedmann and Wolff 1982).

This world system requires ‘nodal points to coordinate and control this global economic activity’ (Sassen-Koob 1984:140). The production of highly specialised services, top-level management and control functions form essential components of ‘global control capacity’ (Sassen-Koob 1986:88). Global control is exercised to produce and reproduce the management and organisation of the global system of production and the global labour force (Sassen-Koob 1986:88).

In the view of Ross and Trachte, global cities of this kind are ‘the location of the institutional heights of worldwide resource allocation’, concentrating the production of cultural commodities that forms global capitalism into a web of symbolic hierarchy and interdependence. Global cities like New York, London and Tokyo are:

the headquarters of the great banks and multinational corporation. From these headquarters radiate a web of electronic communications and air-travel corridors along which capital is deployed and redeployed, and through which the fundamental decisions about the structure of the world economy are sent. In these global cities work, but not necessarily reside, the cadre of officials and their staff who, in their persons and official capacities, embody the concentration and centralisation of capital that now characterizes the global system.

Ross and Trachte 1983:393/4





This chapter proceeds from the premise that the global capitalist economy has undergone a transition from a Fordist mode of production, characterised by mass production, large industrial factories and social welfare via the nation state, to a post-fordist economy characterised by flexible forms, small firms, specialised production and permeable sovereignty in a global environment. Various studies have demonstrated the emergence of a post-fordist political economy through the restructuring of capital (Beauregard 1989; Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Bradbury 1985; Castells 1985; Fainstein and Fainstein 1989; Harrison and Bluestone 1988). These studies reveal the extent to which fordist means, techniques and social organisation of production have come to be replaced by post-fordist forms. This has implications for the regeneration of the city. The post-fordist economy is characterised by information, symbolic capital, new technologies and high technology products and processes, a greater concentration upon the financial circuit of capital, more flexible work processes and a defensive and weakened labour force (Albertsen 1988; Cooke 1988). It would seem from this that the future of the city is post-fordist, showing all the features which characterise post-fordism. But is such a strategy appropriate to the old industrial city? The neo-marxist urban political economy in the 1970’s is helpful in answering this question, bringing politics into urban issues (Dear and Scott eds 1981). This urban political economy centres upon the fordist (or Keynesian) metropolis, the agglomerations of mass production and consumption that were the central dynamics of the ‘long boom’ of post-war capitalism. The notion of the fordist city, the city of industrial capitalism, explains the spatial specificity of urban life – and urban crisis – in terms of their grounding in social relations of production, generating asymmetrical relations of class power. The centre of the fordist city has been subject to the threat of perpetual crisis and class conflict, potential decay and social unrest, ultimately a disabling demoralisation. Once such a city lost its importance as a site of production and consumption it would find it difficult to exist. Subject to the vicissitudes of industrial capitalism, the fordist city is also vulnerable to socio-economic change within the system.

The shift from the fordist city to the post-fordist city expresses the transition from monopoly capitalism to post-industrial urbanisation. The restructuring that has been underway since the 1960’s has other aspects to it which have a bearing upon urban space, like globalisation and liberalisation. These aspects combine to subject urban space to forces and processes which are external to it. The city is not so much reinvented on this basis as disempowered and demoralised.

Something that needs emphasis in discussing this transition is the fact that monopoly capitalism was driven to increasing levels of economic, social and urban concentration and centralisation in the attempt to reproduce its existence. The structural adjustment and uneven development that has accompanied the destruction of the fordist mode has entailed a massive economic dislocation and has imposed great social costs through the devastation of urban regions. In a global sense, this process involves the relocation of production to regions with the lowest costs, regardless of where these are globally. The result is the global integration, sub-contracting and capital flows via the agency of the transnational corporations. Part of this process may be designated ‘post-fordist’. But is it for that reason post-industrial?

The crisis of 1973 signalled that the stagflation at the end of the long boom was giving way to an era of generalised crisis and restructuring. The existing regime of capital accumulation had exhausted its possibilities and was now in the process of irreversible decline. The new regime which was in the process of emerging was characterised by a remarkable flexibility with respect to labour processes, markets, products and patterns of consumption (Armstrong et al 1984; Aglietta 1974; Piore and Sabel 1984; Scott and Storper 1986; Harvey 1988). Not surprisingly, recommendations for the future of the city are dominated by such notions. The ‘post-fordist’ restructuring of the city was built upon the economic crisis afflicting the industrial capitalist regime of accumulation in the advanced economies. At the same time that the local manufacturing labour market collapsed, ‘post-fordist’ transformations were taking place in the infrastructure and layout of towns and cities (Hall and Jacques 1989). The basic direction of such transformations pointed to a global process of reorganisation of consumption, changes in form and organisation which generate a range of new cultural facilities, sports facilities, waterfront developments, office blocks and so on. But how much substance does such ‘post-fordism’ have?

This chapter seeks to answer this question in two parts. After a discussion of the new mode of flexible accumulation, the first part examines the rise of the symbolic economy and how this shapes perspectives on cities and their regeneration. The second part subjects the post-industrial thesis to close critical examination and concludes that manufacturing still matters.

The processes of economic and urban restructuring which followed the end of the long boom has resulted in a massive transformation of cities. The globalisation of economic relations and the increase of competition that has followed has destroyed the manufacturing heartland of many western economies and cities. The substantial transfer of manufacturing production and employment to the NIC’s indicates that this restructuring is far from being postindustrial. What is true is that, in the west, the vertically integrated manufacturing giants which characterised fordism have come to be replaced by more flexibly networked corporations operating across global distances.

In the cities in the advanced economies, the expansion of information, high tech manufacturing service and leisure industries, has induced a profound transformation in urban labour markets and urban dynamics. Globalisation has also been accompanied by a liberalisation which has fostered the growth of financial services. This has led to the rise of cities at the hub of global electronic and financial services networks (Graham and Marvin 1996). The economies of the west are now dominated by processing and adding value. This even extends to commodity based industries like retailing and manufacturing. These are increasingly information rich. Information has assumed a central place in production in all sectors and is thus a key commodity to be bought, sold, traded, and exchanged. This whole process is facilitated by the way that telematics increases capabilities for processing, storing and controlling vast flows of electronic information on a continuous and real-time basis. As a result of these shifts industrial cities have become ‘post-industrial’ or ‘information’ cities dominated by consumption industries and the processing and circulation of knowledge and symbolic goods. The bulk of new jobs created are now information based. ‘Investment in telematics – the basic information infrastructures of cities – now surpasses investment in other industrial machinery. Because telematics make information so easy to move around, these shifts increasingly take a global complexion, tied in with the wider shifts towards globalisation and the growing power of TNC’s’ (Graham and Marvin 1996).

The restructuring of economic relations had proceeded to such an extent by the 1990’s that it became evident that the problems of urban degeneration, uneven development and deindustrialisation – including the failure of schemes for urban regeneration – were not accidental but were an integral part of the transformations underway in corporate reorganisation, globalisation and the accompanying social and spatial divisions of labour. The other side of the ‘crisis of fordism’ and the ending of the long boom is the emergence of the post-fordist economy, society and city. Not that post-fordism signals the end of capitalism. In its immediate impact, post-fordism has strengthened the capitalist logic of modern society and politics, something which has a bearing upon the character and orientation of regeneration strategies. The state has become more politically and ideologically capitalist, more explicit in its concern to facilitate the functional imperatives and needs of capital, more concerned with economic growth as a priority over welfare. The policy implications of the structural dependence of the state upon the process of private accumulation has never been more evident than since the nineteenth century. As far as the city is concerned this fact is registered in the redefinition of regeneration as economic development. Although the imperatives and demands of capital to continue to be achieved through the involvement of the state, the connection between economic growth and social welfare has been severed at the policy level (Kantor 1988; Smith 1988). In consequence, local urban regeneration now pivots around economic development, attracting capital investment and boosting employment (Stone and Saunders 1987). New spatial forms have emerged in the process (Conzen 1988). The postmodern city has emerged as the counterpart to the postmodern political economy of flexible accumulation and the globalisation of capital (Harvey 1987; Soja 1986).
Since a good deal of new urban thought is predicated upon the mode of flexible accumulation, some comment is required here. The ‘postmodern city’ – if there is such a phenomenon –is not a benign, politically neutral phenomenon. For Frederic Jameson, the institutionalisation and hegemony of ‘post-modernism’ rests upon the creation of a distinctive ‘cultural logic’ appropriate to a late capitalism (Jameson 1984). The process has its basis in economic shifts, particularly the evolution of capitalist urbanisation in the direction of flexible accumulation (Harvey 1985a 1985 b). The shift to the mode of flexible accumulation has proceeded by transforming the urban process. There is, though, a close link between the transformed urban experience and this aesthetic and cultural moment (Berman 1982; Clark 1984; Frisby 1986). There is a need, then, to closely examine transitions in the urban process as being of crucial significance in the evolution of the capitalist mode of production towards a regime of flexible accumulation (socio-economic shift) and towards post-modernism (cultural-aesthetic shift) (Harvey 1989:259).
The first part of this chapter examines the impact of flexible accumulation upon urban space, before evaluating the extent to which ‘post-fordist’ developments have sustained or can sustain a genuine regeneration. In this sense, the focus in the first part will fall upon the creation of the symbolic economy in the place of the declining manufacturing economy. Flexible accumulation capitalises upon the cultural developments of the 1960’s, particularly in the concern with individuality and difference and in the rejection of ‘mass’ culture and standardisation. The end of the long boom encouraged the exploration of product differentiation generating a repressed market demand to acquire symbolic capital that could be captured through the production of built environments (Smith and Lefaivre 1984). It is this development that the critical focus of this chapter falls upon. The evidence is that regeneration efforts have been overinfluenced by the view that such developments are both inevitable and desirable, a view which has profoundly altered the character and orientation of urban regeneration. At worst power and responsibility in regeneration schemes have been shifted to the very forces and agencies responsible for urban degeneration in the first place. Flexible accumulation has had a profound impact upon the urban economy. Urban governments have increasingly adopted the entrepreneurial model of ‘public-private partnerships’. In some analyses, this development contains the potential to evolve new forms of socio-urban government (Hill 2000). In the immediate impact, however, this development has entrenched existing relationships, strengthened neo-conservatism at policy level and confirmed the most iniquitous postmodern cultural trends. ‘The use of increasingly scarce resources to capture development meant that the social consumption of the poor was neglected in order to provide benefits to keep the rich and powerful in town’ (Harvey 1989:272). In other words, the collapse of the economic bases of old industrial towns and cities led to a novel politics of redistribution, one which transferred wealth and resources to the already wealthy and powerful. Naturally, regeneration would proceed on terms favourable to – since determined by – business interests.
These developments impact upon the culture as well as upon the economies of the city. Zukin (1995) emphasises the extent to which culture is a powerful means of controlling cities, symbolising who belongs and who does not belong in specific places, defining the image of a city through heritage and tourism. It follows that the nature of regeneration is important not merely in the sense of economics and material interests but also in terms of the factors which shape the lived everyday character of the city. Zukin argues that ‘the cultural power to create an image, to frame a vision, of the city has become more important as publics have become more mobile and diverse, and traditional institutions – both social classes and political parties – have become less relevant mechanisms of expressing identity. Those who create images stamp a collective identity (Zukin 1995). That controversy over the nature and orientation of regeneration concerns culture as well as economics is a particularly important point to make given the overarching ethico-political concern with the public sense of well-being. Are all groups and interests catered for by such regeneration? If not, then how can such regeneration be sustainable?
Zukin proceeds to define the symbolic economy. ‘With the disappearance of local manufacturing industries and periodic crises in government and finance, culture is more and more the business of cities – the basis of their tourist attractions and their unique, competitive edge’ (Zukin 1995). The expansion of cultural consumption (art, food, fashion, music and tourism) is driving the symbolic form of the city, expressed in its visible ability to produce symbols and space. Zukin underlines the extent to which a substantial number of new public spaces owe their particular shape and form to the intertwining of cultural symbols and entrepreneurial capital. The manipulation of symbolic languages of exclusion and entitlement combine with the traditional factors of land, labour and capital in the building of cities. This development has two aspects. Cities have always possessed a symbolic economy in the sense that the look and the feel of a city reflects decisions about what and who should be visible – and what and who should not. A further point of importance is the increasing abstraction that results from cities being based more and more upon a symbolic economy. This abstract symbolic economy is devised by ‘place entrepreneurs’, officials and investors who generate ‘real’ results in real estate development, new business and employment through their ability to deal with the symbols of growth: ‘What is new about the symbolic economy since the 1970’s is its symbiosis of image and product, the scope and scale of selling images on a national and even a global level, and the role of the symbolic economy in speaking for, or representing, the city’ (Zukin 1995).
Although the expansion of the symbolic economy in finance, media and entertainment has not changed the way that business is conducted, it has forced the growth of towns and cities, created a new labour force and altered the way that employees and consumers think. Employment in entertainment and recreation has been one of the main areas of growth. The facilities where employees work are not just workplaces but places of creation and transformation which reshape the urban geography and ecology.
Zukin is concerned to revalue the reality of everyday life against the abstracting processes which remove urban space from urban dwellers.

I also see public culture as socially constructed on the micro-level. It is produced by the many social encounters that make up daily life on the streets, shops and parks – the spaces in which we experience public life in cities. The right to be in these spaces, to use them in certain ways, to invest them with a sense of our selves and our communities – to claim them as ours and to be claimed in turn by them – make up a constantly changing public culture. People with economic and political power have the greatest opportunity to shape public culture by controlling the building of the city’s public spaces in stone and concrete. Yet public space is inherently democratic. The question of who can occupy public space, and so define an image of the city, is open-ended. 
Zukin 1995

Whilst many theorists focus upon the new public spaces being formed by the ‘transactional space’ of telecommunications and information technology, Zukin is more interested in public spaces as physical geographical and symbolic centres, points of assembly between individuals. Whilst many accept shopping centres as the pre-eminent public spaces of our time, the fact of their private ownership raises questions of public access and the terms of this access. This question remains even if one considers that hotels, post offices etc on shopping centres shows that public institutions can function on private property. ‘Defining public culture in these terms recasts the way we view and describe the culture of cities. Real cities are both material constructions, with human strengths and weaknesses, and symbolic projects developed by social representations, including affluence and technology, ethnicity and civility, local shopping streets and television news. Real cities are also macro-level struggles between major sources of change – global and local cultures, public stewardship and privatisation, social diversity and homogeneity – and mid-level negotiations of power’ (Zukin 1995).

For all of the superficial newness of the high technology industries restructuring the global economy and generating product innovation, there is a good deal of continuity with the industrial age. The application of new technologies is part of a process of reindustrialisation. Part of this process is a deep de-skilling, the routinisation of monotonous, low wage labour, casualisation with new systems of outwork, subcontracting and home work. And behind this reorganisation of the production process lies sophisticated systems of communication and control. The centralisation of command and control functions are combined with the decentralisation of production and of bargaining systems so as to render collective organisation and class consciousness amongst the working class increasingly problematic. Behind the celebration of the emergence of the ‘post-industrial’ city lie sharp class realities which derive from the old industrial capitalism, the reindustrialising or the newly industrialising city. The evidence points to continuity rather than discontinuity. Further, the inequalities of the old industrial city are becoming entrenched and intensified. Harvey writes of cities presenting such a ‘glamorous and dynamic face’ to the world, with urban renaissance based upon a mix of office developments, entertainment centres, shopping malls and the gentrification of the old living environments ‘that it is hard to credit some of the realities that lie within’ (Harvey 1989:52). These continuities and their intensification demand further analysis, both in terms of reindustrialisation and the emergence of new metropolarities out of the old.

The dissolution of the fordist mode of accumulation and the emergence of a new economy of flexible specialisation can be characterised in terms of the deindustrialisation of older forms but also as the reindustrialisation of the new. This new economy is characterised by new labour-management relations and reorganised production processes and new technologies. These changes enable clusters of small and middle sized firms to assume the leading role in economic innovation and in the creation of ‘possibilities for prosperity’ in new industrial spaces which are completely distinct from the old large scale agglomerations of fordist mass production.

For Piore and Sabel, these developments are a reindustrialisation. The facts of new industrial activity have tended to be over-shadowed by the dramatic nature of industrial decline in the old cities. For Piore and Sabel, the ‘Third Italy’ is a paradigm of the new industrial space.

This new industrial space is characterised by the wide dispersal of industries, often of a craft-based nature. As against mass production concentrated in big cities, production is on a smaller scale and is clustered in a number of industrial districts. There has been a ‘Great U Turn’ from an era of mass production to an era of flexible accumulation. This approach draws upon the French Regulation School (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz in Scott and Storper 1986:16/40). From the regulationist perspective, the crisis of fordism expresses the breakdown of the fordist mode of regulation and the emergence of a new, flexible, regime of accumulation (Harvey and Scott in MacMillan 1989:217/25).

Flexibility is the key term which dominates the discourse on contemporary capitalist urbanism. References to flexibility pervade the literature. Flexibility is a buzzword which promotes the view that a derigified, less regulated approach to production, investment and employment is crucial to economic growth and prosperity. In the transition from fordism to post-fordism, flexibility is characterised by the expansion and multiplication of the new technopoles, the dispersal and generation of craft based industrial districts, finance-insurance-real estate (FIRE) stations.

The transition from fordism to post-fordism has altered perspectives on the character and direction of regeneration. Nevertheless, ‘post-fordist’ regeneration ought not be understood uncritically. The collapse of fordism has had a powerful disciplinary impact upon the three partners in the social contract, capital, labour, and the state. ‘Big’ business, ‘big’ labour and ‘big’ government have been radically ‘downsized’ so as to become ‘lean and mean’ (Harrison 1994). Yet this so called downsizing has not occurred on an even basis. The emergence of ‘post-fordism’ is characterised by the even greater dominance of the corporations on a global scale, the disengagement of the state from economic regulation/regulation of capital in the social interest and the weakening of the power of organised labour. Capital, labour and the state have assumed different forms in the ‘flexible’ mode of production, the uneven impact on the three partners being expressed in the unequal distribution of costs and benefits. The point is that the new postfordist economy and geography, rather than equalising these costs and benefits to realise the general good, is actually intensifying them in what appears to be a vicious cycle of metropolarities, exacerbating as well as entrenching existing inequalities of class, race and gender.

Postfordism, then, has a negative side. As a neo-liberalism it is characterised by an obsession with getting ‘lean and mean’ through cutting labour costs and reducing trade union bargaining power. There has been an expansion of part-time and casual workers, of multi-job families and households, a growing participation of women in the labour market, a widening income gap, social polarisation, relocation, investment flight, increasing homelessness, government deregulation and the corporatisation of government business, the expansion of less labour intensive technology industries. Focusing upon the negative side of the new geopolitical economy (Harvey 1996) raises important issues with respect to the ends and means of urban regeneration. It raises the question of what the ideal urban space actually looks like, what its purposes are and so on. As the chapter on Manchester will show, the results of a ‘post-fordist’ regeneration strategy have been mixed. For all of the excitement generated by postfordism in academic circles and in urban practice, it is worth emphasising that the socio-cultural life of the majority living in urban areas continues to be lived out in the ‘old’ world, however much this world has been altered by new forces. The urban environment of the future will involve a complex amalgam as cultural products generated in media and communications factories penetrate the old world, being mediated through and consumed within the urban spaces of the old world.

The question concerns the implications of post-fordist regeneration with respect to old industrial cities. Such regeneration is predicated on the view that older manufacturing towns and cities can emerge as towns and cities of initiative and enterprise, overcoming their historical role in a previous mode of accumulation (now exhausted). The evidence with respect to Manchester is superficially positive but actually very ambiguous on closer inspection. Manchester is known for its dynamic approach to economic redevelopment but also for crime and violence, for high levels of ill health, poverty and housing need. Manchester remains a city of extremes, of riches and poverty, affluence and deprivation. As in Engels’ day, areas of extreme poverty exist alongside areas of private affluence.

It remains to examine the cultural and economic implications of post-fordism for urban regeneration. The reformist tendencies and totalising visions of modern urban planning are no longer tenable. Urban planning once sought to regulate capital and balance social interests with a view to securing the good of the whole of society. This is no longer the case. The objective now is to overcome the problems of society by creating ever wider circles of economic growth. Urban regeneration connected to social reform and redistribution has been replaced by an economic development which frees rather than regulates capital. The overriding objective is to attract investment capital and, hence, as a consequence, to boost employment. Urban regeneration has been subordinated to economic development. Planning now proceeds according to an entrepreneurial model. Urban planners have become property developers and deal makers as opposed to being regulators of urban space (Fainstein 1988). Advocates of urban policies to expand local urban economies seek to conduct their affairs outside of the sphere of political deliberation, control and scrutiny. This throws the trend towards public-private partnerships in sharp relief, serving to isolate development policies and projects from a democratic politics. Decisions concerning industrial investment, infrastructure development, subsidies of private property are presented as technical issues which are the province of experts rather than of the general public. This (non) politics of development is the preserve of growth oriented individuals who have graduated from business schools and management courses to become professionals in quasi-public economic development agencies.

The restructuring of capital has undermined the politics of urban regeneration and planning and altered the character and dynamics of the city so that the principles which once sustained urban planning are no longer tenable (Cooke 1988; Simonsen 1988; Soja 1986; Zukin 1988). The assumption that underpinned modernist planning, that local actions determined local conditions, thus offering a partial justification of local urban planning, can no longer be justified. The intensified spatial mobility of capital has served to give large scale property development and industrial investment a regional, national and even a global scope. The local determinants of investment seem relatively unimportant in comparison.
It follows from this that the character and orientation of urban regeneration has shifted. In seeking to attract capital investment, public officials have come to interpret regeneration in terms of civic boosterism and economic development in terms of attempts to commodify the ‘particularities of place’ through public spectacles (Harvey 1987).
 Local communities which come to rely upon cultural conditions and amenities to generate economic growth are even more vulnerable to the control that capital exercises over consumption and lifestyles. The process of accumulation and consumption has become ‘flexible’ and hence less bound by place. With the state disengaging from its interventionist role, replacing modernist planning with the entrepreneurial model, planners find themselves lacking the legal capacity and political scope to restructure the investment prerogatives of capital.

These developments impact upon the public sense of well being and the possibility of constituting the good city in the interests of all. The reduction of the role of the state and the increasing subservience to capital investment and accumulation have intensified the negative consequences of economic growth and uneven development (Smith 1984). Fuelled by the globalisation of economic relations and hence the hypermobility of capital, cities have come to benefit from increased growth whilst also differing increased social and environmental costs (Feagin 1988). Growth is not free of implications as regards the whole urban environment. The path leading to the good city is not without obstacles, particularly since the city comes to operate as a centre of ceaseless conflict around the benefits and costs of growth, as well as over its often negative impact.

Its fundamentals, the meta-narrative of the good city as the end of modernist urban planning cannot be reconciled with a spatially complex and flexible urban form whose basic expressions are essentially confrontational and conflictual and whose most fundamental activities increasingly centre around the ephemeral ones of consumption. As a result, the meta-narrative of the good city lacks social relevance. In truth, the good city requires the adoption of an integrative framework which the postmodernist celebration of fragmentation and otherness makes impossible. The total rejection of ‘master’ narratives opens the path to neo-liberalism.

The debate over post-fordism and postmodernism possesses profound implications for planning theory (Smith 1987). A certain wing of postmodernism is apolitical and fits easily with the flexible forms of late capitalism. The celebration of otherness, fragmentation and multiple discourses is accompanied by a devaluation of progressive social and political reform. The postmodern critique of the unitary assumptions of planners in pursuit of the rational city can be accepted in part (Boyer; Coleman 199). The notion of a conflict free unity of interests in the city cannot be accepted given endemic asymmetries of power pertaining to class, race and gender. But this does not justify the rejection of the meta-narrative of the good city, only that the universal ethic has to be more adequately formulated than it has been.

The implications for urban regeneration are most important. There has been a switch in the focus of regeneration schemes away from reformist and redistributive projects towards an entrepreneurial model. This model adopts a post-fordist frame which involves regeneration through the production of post-industrial infrastructures (convention centres, waterfront developments, consumer landscapes, leisure facilities, office blocks). The old industrial cities have adopted an entrepreneurial model of regeneration that privileges private forces concerned with the profit motive and the accumulation of capital. The problem is that the model can privilege the very forces responsible for the crisis and continual decline of towns and cities in the first place. Private companies and agencies possess systemic priorities which are not place bound and which entail no necessary commitment to the urban geographical area. Further, the adoption of the entrepreneurial model has intensified patterns of inter-urban competition as well as creating patterns of inequality within their own population.

In addition to entrenching and intensifying an existing pattern of socio-spatial inequality and injustice, ‘post-fordist’ regeneration can also be criticised for accepting too easily the facts of a necessary deindustrialisation, ignoring the potentiality of a truly regenerative reindustrialisation.

The tendency to overrate the postindustrial thesis is evident is Saskia Sassen’s argument that the restructuring processes generate distinct modes of economic organisation and corresponding uses of space. Sassen paints a picture of ‘the postindustrial city of luxury high rise office and residential buildings located largely in Manhatten; the old dying industrial city of low rise buildings and family type houses, located largely in the outer-boroughs; and the Third World City imported via immigration and located in dense groupings spread all over the city’. ‘Each of these three processes can be seen to contain distinct income occupational structures and concomitant residential and consumption patterns, well captured in the expansion of a new urban gentry alongside expanding immigrant communities’ (Sassen quoted in Cassells 1989:215).

Sassen subscribes to the postindustrial thesis in focusing critical attention upon the production of services. This ‘postindustrial’ conception exalts the ‘power holding organisation’ of the FIRE stations – finance, insurance, real estate. For Sassen, these financial, banking and producer services are the primary ‘postindustrial production sites’ and occupy a commanding role in the global economy, ordering the economic activities constituting global cities and shaping a ‘new urban regime’ of capital accumulation. The research focus upon growth in the FIRE sector in an enabling city like New York has coloured urban perspectives in a particular way. The impact of telecommunication and information processing technologies, the transformation within global capital markets and the emergence within local economies of an elite of urban professionals composing brokers, bond sellers, security dealers has been emphasised to such an extent that it tends to overshadow the other side of what New York researchers call the Dual City. The ‘other side’ comprises the underground or informal economy and an underclass which is dependent upon welfare and which is struggling simply to survive in a hardened urban landscape.

The question is whether these developments represent a genuine post-industrialism or simply represent a new industrialism. To answer this question requires that manufacturing is located in the process of global urbanisation. With respect to New York – whose example tends to dominate – there is a tendency to downplay the significance of manufacturing industry and hence to underplay the basic principles of industrial urbanism. The bias alters perspectives on the emerging geopolitical economy of urban space and is important in shaping a ‘post-fordist’ urban regeneration. The loaded conception of the ‘global city’ tends to dominate projects of urban regeneration, a concept which betrays too close a focus upon the New York model, exhibiting an almost exclusive focus upon the FIRE stations and the command and control functions in relation to global flows of capital investment and labour migration.

As indicated, Saskia Sassen shows a pronounced tendency to accept deindustrialisation and postindustrialisation as givens. In Cities in a World Economy (1994) she makes reference to manufacturing industry only to confirm its seemingly inevitable demise. Sassen largely ignores the growing literature which shows the continued importance of manufacturing. As a result, Sassen is deaf to the argument that contemporary developments, far from expressing an irreversible deindustrialisation, actually amount to a substantial process of reindustrialisation, an industrial restructuring that ought to be placed at the heart of projects for urban regeneration. The extent to which the FIRE stations dominate urban discourse has had the effect of condensing the processes of globalisation and localisation around Wall Street and its sphere of influence. This overwhelming emphasis upon the commanding FIRE sector is apparent in the studies of global cities in general (Fainstein 1994; Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe eds 1992). But the crucial question is whether a national economy can survive on the basis of FIRE stations, services and command and control functions. Some cities, a few, could sustain regeneration on this basis. But this simply begs the question as to the long term viability of the other cities.

There has been in the past decade something of a reaction against the assumption that there is such a thing as a shift from fordism to postfordism, certainly against the view that any such shift is to be identified with the end of manufacturing and the exclusive dominance of services. A number of industrial urbanists have been concerned to affirm the view that ‘manufacturing matters’. The continued centrality of industrial production to the overall economy stems from a view of manufacturing as the central dynamic of economic development, as the ‘real’ economy where productivity gains are made and value is added and upon which all other economic activity depends. Manufacturing produces wealth whereas the tertiary sector merely processes wealth. Such a view possesses great relevance with respect to urban policy and raises the question as to what the ideal urban space looks like.

The idea of the postindustrial society rests on the assumption that advocated economies evince a clear shift away from industrial production to service based production and employment, organised primarily around consumption and consumerism. The entry of the information society into urban studies is a particularly appealing development given the extent to which the seemingly irreversible process of deindustrialisation was making the problem of regenerating the old industrial cities intractable. The crisis of the capitalist city thus comes to be interpreted as a process of restructuring of urban space, causing the demise of the industrial city and seeing its re-emergence as the post-industrial or information city. This perspective rejects the central thesis of industrial urbanism that industrialisation processes are the very foundation of urban life. Allen Scott subjects the post-industrialism thesis to close critical scrutiny. ‘The postindustrial hypothesis strikes me as seriously misleading in several of its major implications, and utterly wrong insofar as it points to the latent transcendence of capitalism by a sort of new information-processing mode of economic organisation’ (Scott 1988:7). Scott justifies the renewed emphasis upon industrial urbanism by emphasising that the information and business services crucial to the postindustrial thesis are themselves manufactured commodities and are thus ‘produced’ every bit as much as cars, steel, and coal. Scott further argues that the provision of personal services (household, finance, health and education) and of public and semi-public goods (collective consumption) are ‘important components of and/or adjuncts to the basic structures of production and work in modern capitalism’ (Scott 1988:8). Scott further erodes the distinction between manufacturing and services by arguing that specialist sectors like corporate administration, banking, accounting, marketing, insurance, advertising etc form the ‘inner motor of the entire capitalist economy’ (Scott 1988:8) and therefore represent in the contemporary, supposedly ‘post-industrial’ economy precisely what they have always represented - essential functions in managing, directing and controlling the global system of industrial production. 

In fine, the question of urban regeneration needs to be considered in the context of the globalisation of economic relations and the functions that the old industrial cities may carry over as they become global cities. Geographical association, minimising the frictions of distance, serves to reduce the costs of transactions and thus encourages vertical disintegration and re-agglomeration. ‘In these ways, intensely developed clusters of producers develop on the landscape, and with the growth of markets the clusters themselves grow in size and become increasingly internally differentiated’ (Scott 1986:29). This re-agglomeration is most intense and dynamic in high technology based production, particularly electronics, aerospace and biomedicine. These generate new terms like technopoles, technopolis and silicon landscapes. It is also apparent in craft based industries, design intensive and often labour intensive. Examples here include the production of clothes, furniture, jewellery. And finally there is the FIRE section consisting of finance-insurance-real estate firms and extending to related activities in advertising, marketing and legal services. In both theoretical and empirical terms the contemporary literature has shown the centrality of these ‘cutting edge’ sectors of the ‘post-fordist’ urban-industrial space economy.

In the contemporary literature on deindustrialisation it has become apparent that manufacturing production still matters. The assertion of a necessary postindustrialism rests on empirically and theoretically shaky foundations. In this light, contemporary developments look less like deindustrialisation as the decline of a particular, fordist, era of industrial production. The deindustrialisation experienced by old towns and cities applies to an older outmoded form of production and is accompanied by a new industrialisation which is constituted by new forms. The restructuring of industrial forms is manifested as a postfordist reindustrialisation in which the most dynamic and profitable sectors are characterised by ‘flexibility’ in spatio-economic practices. New information based technologies (electronics, computers, robotics), corporate, structural, managerial and organisational innovations, transactional economies of scope replacing economies of scale, the expansion of local and regional networks of enterprises and entrepreneurs form the content of this ‘flexible’ mode of accumulation. These developments in greater flexibility generate an increased ability to combine the diversity of production characteristic of craft based industries with the greater returns to scale available in fordist mass production. Whichever way this is described one thing is certain – this is not a deindustrialisation.

Proceeding from the argument that manufacturing remains central to the contemporary economy, the notion of ‘flexibility’ may be conceived as a new form of industrial urbanism rather than as a path beyond it. This chapter has addressed this development in terms of the related spheres of technology (new information and electronic technologies), organisation (corporate structures and the restructuring of production and employment and investment relations) and space (the geopolitical economy of urban space). These developments shape the formation of the post-fordist industrial city. The new city may be ‘post-fordist’. But it is industrial none the less.

5 POSTFORDISM AND THE NORTHERN CITY

Manchester deserves a special status in the literature on the city. As the ‘first industrial city’ in the ‘first industrial nation’. Manchester exhibits all the problems associated with the declining old towns and cities. Manchester suffers from the classic urban problems of poverty, unemployment, inequality, crime and disorder, ill health, physical decay. But other factors also serve to make Manchester a special case. For, as the first industrial city, Manchester is accustomed to being on the cutting edge of change. The local culture welcomes innovation and change and this is expressed in the attempts to regenerate the city since the 1980’s. The extent to which this regeneration has succeeded remains debatable, despite the impression of dynamism and newness given by the most obvious developments that have taken place. There is another side to the ‘postfordist’ regeneration that has taken place in Manchester and this other side shows clear continuities with the class ridden, conflictual, iniquitous industrial past.

The problems facing Manchester are easily grasped. No more than any other old industrial town or city in the North has Manchester been able to avoid mass unemployment. In northern towns and cities the transition from fordism to postfordism has taken the form of a transition from mass production to mass unemployment. The most basic aspect of socio-economic change since the late 1970’s has been the massive loss of jobs, particularly those in the old manufacturing industries. What made this job loss so devastating, turning towns and cities into urban wastelands, is the fact that these manufacturing industries dominated local labour markets. Many towns and cities found that they had lost their major employers. ‘In the decade from 1979 .. 94% of all job losses occurred north of a line drawn from the Wash to the Severn. Of the manufacturing jobs lost, 70% were in the North’ (Dickinson 1990:76). This apocalypse in the local labour markets of the North was made even worse by the systematic withdrawal of the institutions of the local and national state from earlier commitments to economic regulation and social provision. The result was not only mass unemployment but a rise in poverty, deprivation, crime and homelessness, the effects of which were soon visible on the streets of all towns and cities.

As has been argued, the collapse of the local manufacturing labour market was accompanied by a series of other transformations which could be grouped under the heading of ‘postfordism’. These transformations issued in a number of changes to the physical layout and infrastructure of towns and cities, in terms of shopping and leisure developments but also in terms of transport. The changes in urban form and organisation are common to the older industrial towns and cities and have been discussed under the rubric of ‘post-fordism’ (Hall and Jacques 1989). Nevertheless, whilst theorists are apt to refer to a global process of reorganisation, the extent to which the impact of postfordism varies according to location is clear. There is no necessary or inevitable ‘postfordism’ which expresses itself in homogeneous fashion in every industrial town and city. Rather, the local experience and appropriation of global processes differs, making the local culture a creative factor in the character of change.

Post-fordism in Manchester, it follows, assumes a particularly Mancunian form. Manchester boasts significant ‘up-market’ shopping in St Ann’s Square and King Street, the first light rail urban transit system since the war, and a range of cultural facilities which build upon the city’s heritage and sports facilities connected with the city’s bids for major sporting events.

To fully understand the character and impact of post-fordist regeneration in the North there is a need to comprehend the industrial North in terms of its specific material landscapes, embracing both physical and social factors. The towns and cities of the industrial North are quite distinct and cannot be considered as a generic phenomenon. Their social and cultural fabrics and geographical locations distinguish them and their problems as particular. Their experience of and reaction to the same general problems like unemployment and deindustrialisation will be different. The sprawling character of Manchester as a large industrial city serves to exacerbate the urban problems it faces. But this, in turn, may be attributed to Manchester’s readiness to create and recreate its own particular landscape, overlaying a complex, multifaceted physical environment upon the national endowment of place. Manchester was the site of the opening of the first passenger railway in the world in the early nineteenth century (1830). The Manchester-Liverpool railway in 1830 established Manchester as a transport interchange in the North. Even more important in establishing Manchester as a significant city was the opening of the Bridgewater Canal and the Ship Canal. Manchester thus became a central site for trade and commerce throughout the whole of the industrial North at a time when Britain was ‘the workshop of the world’.

Industrial development has bequeathed an unavoidable legacy which forms a necessary part of any future of the industrial city. That material landscape shaped by industrialisation cannot be simply dissolved and reinvented but exerts a powerful and permanent influence upon existing activities. As far as Manchester is concerned the material landscape consists of canals, railways, warehouses, mills and other buildings relating to the factories and offices of the industrial past. This also has a cultural and architectural aspect pertaining to the evolution of a Victorian civic or public arena. Manchester city centre boasts a number of fine Victorian buildings from the Free Trade Hall (1846) to the Barton Arcade (1871). But behind the civic dignity and commercial power of Manchester there is another side, the poverty which forms the other side of riches. In terms of the material landscape, this is expressed in terms of a legacy of inadequate, dilapidated housing for the poor.
The divisions between rich and poor, between civic dignity and social squalor, articulates the hierarchical and iniquitous character of the old industrial city and shows evidence of a local culture and social structure that forms a permanent feature of the urban environment. This is to value the point that ‘architecture structures the system of space in which we live and move. In that it does so, it has a direct relation – rather than merely a symbolic one – to social life, since it provides the material conditions for the patterns of movement, encounter and avoidance which are the material realisation – as well as sometimes the generator - of social relations (Hillier and Hanson 1984:ix). The physical layout and civic design that a city articulates presents a material structure for the everyday life world of the city as a site of human interaction. The industrial city of the North expresses a distinctive material legacy in terms of physical layout and civic design as well as in terms of the built and social infrastructure. This chapter seeks to defend the proposition that there can be no such thing as the deindustrialised city given the permanent legacy of the industrial past as expressed in terms of the local culture, infrastructure, material landscape. Any ‘post-fordist’ redevelopment proceeds on a basis laid in the industrial past and that basis is as cultural as it is physical.
Theorists, policy makers and academics tend to neglect the everyday appropriation and use of the city location by the urban residents. This gives a superficial ‘newness’ to their comments and recommendations, giving the impression of a radical break with the past. There can be no such radical break. It follows from this observation that it is important to grasp how everyday common sense interprets the given material landscape of the city, from the factories to the offices, the housing to the shopping centres, the high rise buildings to the municipal parks.
A major concern of this study has been to comprehend the extent to which the industrial city is no mere physical entity to be discussed in terms of the rise and fall of economic forms but is a lived experience whose character is shaped and modified by the socio-cultural practices of the different publics constituting the city.
Manchester is the city of railways, canals, cotton and free trade. It is also the city of the ‘two nations’. The legacy of industrial Manchester carries on into the shape of a regenerated post-fordist Manchester. Manchester has boosted its national and international profile as the city of initiative, dynamism and enterprise. Although two Olympic bids failed, Manchester succeeded in bidding for and hosting the Commonwealth Games (2002). This ‘go-ahead’ and ‘can-do’ aspect of Manchester’s regeneration is well known and celebrated. But there is a dark underside to Mancunian redevelopment, one which betrays the legacy of a divided city. Manchester is known also for its crime and its violence and also for the scale of its poverty and deprivation. The prevalence of drugs has added an incendiary factor to these elements. As real community and real identity withers and dies, so there is increasing resort to the substitute communities and identities of gangs, leading to murders and shoot outs. The empirical evidence also shows well above average levels of ill-health and housing deprivation in the Greater Manchester region. In Manchester, the pursuit of private success and wealth is accompanied by seemingly immovable slabs of social deprivation. Commentary celebrates the dynamism and affluence of the regenerated Manchester but the facts associated with the decline of the industrial city seem entrenched. In these attributes, Manchester remains the city observed by Engels in the 1840’s, the city of riches and of poverty.

Manchester is not a singular experience or a unitary city. There is a city for each of the different publics composing the city. These publics create different and discrete mental maps which are developed as particular versions of the city in the practical consciousness of the groups involved. These mental maps are capable of challenging and, in certain instances, even subverting the dominant map of the city as expressed in redevelopment schemes, local growth coalitions and local heritage industries.

The interconnected processes of globalisation and localisation are transforming everyday social practices and altering the urban structures of class, age, ethnicity and gender. These local structures of social practice and routine have come to assume a centrality in the reorganisation of labour, capital and culture in the last two decades. But the evidence of the past industrial landscape remains, culturally and physically.

The late twentieth century and the early twenty first century is dominated by means of mass communication. The local structures of the city are being systematically connected to national and international processes of transformation. This would seem to imply that urban experience cannot be understood merely in terms of the given local environment. Nevertheless, the local culture persists as a rich cultural resource upon which the local identities of citizens continue to draw in comprehending their urban experience.

As far as Manchester is concerned, this local culture and local structure betrays Manchester’s past as the ‘first industrial city’. Manchester is Cottonopolis, the city of capital, commerce and trade. But it is also the city of labour, of the organised working class, the site of the Peterloo massacre. Whilst Manchester embraced the future with a post-fordist redevelopment, it also became a legitimate venue for the National Museum of Labour History. Indeed claims have been made for Manchester as being a ‘labour city’. These claims have to be treated critically. Without denying Manchester’s labour heritage – and recognising the unity of capital and labour as two sides of the same coin – the promotion of Manchester as a ‘labour city’ is quite without political significance and is instead part of a very capitalist tourism and heritage redevelopment project. The nostalgic recreation of labour’s past proceeds firmly within the hegemony of capital. The point is of importance. Not only does it point to past divisions within the city it also emphasises the persistence of history in contemporary regeneration. Manchester remains a city of social division and segregation. This continuous interplay of visions of social justice and solidarity from organised labour and of visions of urban fortunes through private initiative and enterprise defines the essentially contested terrain of Manchester’s urban experience. Whilst this means that the claims that Manchester has reinvented itself as a post-industrial or post-fordist city are to be subjected to close critical scrutiny it also means that the city is equipped, culturally and socially, to escape a nostalgic relation to its industrial and working class past.

Against postfordist notions of a radically reinvented and new city, bearing no relation to its past, the contemporary schemes of urban regeneration are engaged in reworking and re-representing the facts of local identity and culture, preserving and symbolising local structures, in however modified a form. The old industrial city cannot simply consigned to the past or written off as an obsolete form. And nowhere is this more evident than in Manchester. Postfordist regeneration has assumed a particular form in Manchester which cannot simply be identified with the key general elements of postfordism in the contemporary literature. The character of regeneration in Manchester is determined by a particular reappropriation of local culture and structures as evolved over time. The opening of the first light transit system since the war makes Manchester a pioneer but to locals this was understood as ‘bringing back the trams’. This makes the point that Manchester has a past and that this past is very much in evidence in the present.

Over the last quarter of a century the industrial cities of the North have been rent by a process of deindustrialisation. As noted, this has been set within the theoretical matrix of a shift from a ‘Fordist’ mass production and mass consumption to a ‘post-fordism’. ‘In economic terms, the central feature of the transition is the rise of “flexible accumulation” in place of the old assembly line world of mass production. It is this, above all, which is orchestrating and driving on the evolution of this new world’ (Hall and Jacques 1989:12). The evolution of the postfordist forms of organisation and production has initiated a series of profound transformations in employment structures and the local labour market. The notion of jobs for life went with mass production, bringing insecurity to the labour market. The phenomenon of mass unemployment affected men in the main. The skills appropriate to mass manufacturing industry were rendered obsolete. This was not merely an economic phenomenon but affected the social and cultural fabric, the entire associational space of the industrial city. The demise of manufacturing industry hollowed out urban society, with the associated demise of trade unions, working men’s clubs, traditional and local labour parties, co-ops. The massive loss of manufacturing jobs was also a massive assault upon the solidaristic and communitarian mode of urban life which bonded urban society together at the level of everyday experience. The industrial towns and cities of the North didn’t just lose their industrial base, they lost their social glue.

The bare facts alone indicate scale of the catastrophe that befell northern towns and cities. Between 1979 and 1989 some 70% of the manufacturing jobs lost were lost in the North. Manchester has been particularly affected. Between 1972 and 1984 Manchester lost at least 207,000 manufacturing jobs in the Greater region. Three quarters of these losses occurred after 1978 (Peck and Emmerich 1992a:2). In the last three decades Manchester has lost more than half of its industrial jobs. The 1980’s saw Manchester lose 18.2% of its manufacturing jobs in the Greater region. These figures were well above the national average. The new jobs created did not come close to making up these numbers. Manchester showed an increase of just 10.9% in the total number of jobs available in the service industries.

In this period, Manchester has shown a transformation in its employment structure. The banking, insurance and building services sectors have shown the biggest absolute increase in employment (34,900), followed by hotel and catering (17,400). These increases, however, do not compensate for the substantial losses recorded in the manufacturing sector. In 1986, the official measure of unemployment stood at 16%. The most worrying pieces of evidence concerns the patterns of job loss and growth between the ‘peaks’ and ‘troughs’ of recent economic cycles: ‘during the years of economic buoyancy in the late 1980’s, Greater Manchester was continuing to carry two-thirds of the unemployment which it had accumulated at its 1985 high point, in the wake of the previous recession. At the low point in 1990, unemployment in Greater Manchester was 126% higher than it had been at the previous low point in 1979. The conurbation is consequently carrying a ‘hard core’ of at least 144,000 unemployed people (88,000 on the partial, official count) which a cyclical upturn alone is extremely unlikely to return to work (Peck and Emmerich 1992a:24).

Around one third of the unemployed, some 30,000 individuals, had been unemployed for at least a year. Long term unemployment was increasing amongst the young in particular (Peck and Emmerich 1992a:31). The evidence also showed a clear concentration of the worst levels of unemployment in central Manchester and Salford. The official figures showed unemployment as standing at around 30% (Peck and Emmerich 1992a:31).

The empirical evidence reveals a fundamental structural weakness at the base of Manchester’s local economy. The figures on unemployment give a far more worrying picture than the public face that Manchester presents to the world would suggest. The regeneration schemes which have been backed by the City Council in its role as a partner in private led development accentuate the positive. The City Pride bid by Manchester, Trafford and Salford councils in 1994 produced a Prospectus which projected a positive vision of the future. ‘Despite two recessions in the last fifteen years, the City Pride area continues to be a comparatively strong manufacturing centre, with some 43,000 jobs in the City Pride areas in this sector. It is no longer, however, dependent on heavy industry or any other sector of the local economy. It is an important regional banking and financial services centre and has experienced growth in services, in high technology and in tourism over the last decade. Manchester is the most important centre in the North of England for media and cultural industries whilst, in the public sector, its Higher Education institutions and hospitals are very significant players in the local economy. At times of considerable economic change and new challenges, Manchester City Council presents ‘the diversified nature of the economy’ as ‘an important strength’ (Manchester City Council 1994:14).

The view of the City Council is striking for the extent to which it downplays the significance of manufacturing industry to regeneration. The emphasis falls heavily upon ‘post-fordist’ aspects of redevelopment. At best, it ventures a claim to a ‘comparatively’ strong manufacturing centre, being quick to deny any dependence upon ‘heavy’ industry. The question is begged, ‘comparative’ to what?

Without question, particular areas in the Greater Manchester conurbation and the ‘travel-to-work region’ are in robust economic health. Between 1965 and 1989, the Borough of Stockport increased employment by 18.5%. This compares markedly with the 32.5% employment loss recorded by Salford and Manchester in the same period (Peck and Emmerich 1992a). The critical question, however, is whether the mix of service industry, media, culture, and education and high technology that has been put together in Manchester can generate employment and drive economic growth to the extent that is needed in the old industrial towns and cities.

Manchester City Council adopted a pragmatic approach to urban regeneration and sought to engage local business in its strategies. The City Council and the Chamber of Commerce entered into a series of joint initiatives which sought to bring business and community interests together.

This study has addressed the depth of the urban crisis that has confronted the local economies since the 1970’s. Reference has been made to the crisis of Fordism and to the transition towards post-fordism. Reference has also been made to the globalisation of urban space and economic relations and to the rise of the global city. Manchester has attempted to respond to the industrial crisis by recreating itself as a post-fordist city but also as a ‘headquarter city’ in tune with global developments and requirements. This was clearly in evidence in the City Pride bid of 1994. The investment of £570 million in a new terminal for Ringway Airport, proclaimed the ‘fastest growing airport’ in Europe, indicated an attempt to secure Manchester’s place as a major European and international city. The ‘global’ perspective was also evident in the city’s two Olympic bids and in its hosting of the Commonwealth Games in 2002. These developments can be partially explained in the availability throughout the region as a whole of a relatively large number of highly skilled workers and professionals. For Victor Keegan (1993), the ‘economic correction’ that took place in Manchester in the 1990’s showed the advantages that larger regional economies possess in respect of capital investment and human skills in adjusting to the new global competition.

A later chapter will examine Manchester’s ‘global’ pretensions more closely. For now it is enough to acknowledge the remarkable developments that have indeed taken place in Manchester since the 1980’s. The Greater Manchester Council has launched ambitious schemes for the transformation of the urban environment. Central Station was turned into the G-Mex whilst the Greater Manchester Exhibition Centre functions as both a massive open exhibition space and as a concert hall. At the same time, there were major developments in Salford. 160 acres of land around the old Manchester Docks were turned into Salford Quays by local businessman Edward Hyams. Hyams took advantage of the Enterprise Zone status of the area to help create major office block developments, restaurants, a multi-screen cinema and waterside apartments. Between 1984 and 1991, these initiatives attracted £330 million worth of investment to the area.

In the southern suburbs of Manchester, major developments were initiated with a view to upgrading and extending Manchester International Airport. Reference has been made to the building of a new terminal at a cost of £570 million. A new rail station was also built in the airport itself. When these new facilities were opened in 1993, the airport declared that it was now the thirteenth largest airport in the world when measured in terms of patronage.

At the opposite end of the global perspective, the opening of the Metrolink light transit system in July 1992 was possibly the most visible feature of 1990’s regeneration, one which had the greatest impact as far as urban residents were concerned in their everyday life.

A good deal of these regeneration initiatives in Greater Manchester have been launched by local entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to overlook the key role that public authorities have assumed in the development process. The heavy involvement of the Greater Manchester Council in the initiatives of the early to mid 1980’s was crucial to their success. This was certainly the case with respect to projects reclaiming derelict ground and waste land. From the late 1980’s and into the 1990’s, the City Council played a positive role in boosting the profile of Manchester as a go-ahead city willing and able to create a future for itself. The fact that two Olympic bids were lost is, in the long run, less important than the pride and confidence that the campaigns generated.

6 URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY
This chapter begins with French urban theory before proceeding to discuss the views of urban geographer David Harvey. This chapter examines capital as the architect of urban spatial structure and investigates the implications of this in terms of capital’s contradictory dynamics. To expand its values, capital must create urban infrastructures which count as ‘rational’ in corresponding to the narrow aim of valorisation and accumulation. The chapter, therefore, traces the connection between capital flows and urban infrastructures. The chapter seeks to locate urban planning and regeneration in the context of the political economy of urban processes, emphasising the need for a mutually beneficial urbanism.
This chapter proceeds from the view of capital as the architect of urban spatial structure. French urban theory has done particularly good work in this area, generating an urban political economy which critically appropriates the marxist conceptual apparatus and applies it to urban processes. An urban political economy is thus founded upon the following:





From a marxist perspective the capitalist city is conceived as a built urban environment constituted by eco-urban processes which facilitate the process of private accumulation. This involves the concentration of the means of production and the development of infrastructure facilitating the transfer of surplus value through space. The city is a built urban form that develops the concentration and circulation of capital (Lojkine 1976:127). Above all, the city is the medium for the circulation of capital. The functional specialisation of circulation, further, leads to ‘fractions of capital’ coming to emerge – industrial, commercial, financial and property capital (Lamarche 1976:88). Even within the sphere of capital, the city is composed of a variety of interests which means that the policy of regeneration for urban regions is never obviously ‘rational’. Lamarche identifies the ‘planning’ role of property capital in respect of the way that it selects sites, and the ‘equipping’ role of property capital in the way that it develops types of building (Pickvance 1976:12). Lamarche is referring to urban planning when commenting that ‘the more property capital extends its control over urban space the more it is able to create and dictate the conditions for its own profitability’ (Lamarche 1976:102).

The central dynamic of the capital system is accumulation, ‘an increase in the generalised wealth controlled by capital’ (Edel 1981:29). The coercive laws that compel capitalists to accumulate are expressed through ‘free’ competition, the competition of capitals which defines the capital system: ‘one accumulates or one gets accumulated’ (Heilbroner 1980:153). Capital has to expand its values and reproduce itself if stagnation is to be avoided. Capitalism expands or it is in crisis. Expansion or collapse are the alternatives. There is no guarantee ‘that growth will be either continuous or tranquil under capitalism’ (Edel 1981:32). Competition generates growth but is also involves bankruptcy, deskilling and unemployment, increased social polarity and dislocation, and urban degeneration.
David Harvey invokes the ontology of internal relations in attempting to obtain the theoretical grasp of the dynamics of urbanism (Harvey 1973:288/96). Capitalism is organised around an inner logic of ‘transformation which is sufficient to shape the parts so that each part functions to preserve the existence and general structure of the whole’.
The problem with this conception lies in the way that it seems to privilege structure over agency. Further, its apparent economic bias seems to exclude human action and non-economic agencies (Duncan and Ley 1982:38/40). Hence the criticism that marxist urban geographers ‘have been preoccupied with theoretical structuralisms of such forbidding abstraction that they leave scant space for human agency’ (Gregory 1982:256). Nevertheless, although Gregory criticises marxist structuralism, his own conception of the ‘boundedness of human activity’ recalls Marx’s own theorisation of the interactive relationship between structure and agency: ‘if men make history they do not do so entirely under conditions of their own choosing – hence the significance of boundedness, which ensures that the production of social life coincides with the reproduction of social structures’ (Gregory 1978:71).
David Harvey develops the conceptual framework laid down by French urban theory by tracing capital flows through a series of connected circuits within the urban economy. Surplus value created in the production process has to be channelled somewhere. If the incentive to invest in the primary circuit (production) is lacking, then surplus value is channelled into the secondary circuit via the capital market. With the production of the built environment capital is fixed in place and extra value is generated. Beyond this, surplus value is channelled into the tertiary circuit of capital investment in science and technology promotes advances in productive capacity. This circuit also consists of social expenditure which is undertaken by the state in order to ensure the reproduction of labour power. Harvey’s analytical concern is with the relation between these three circuits (Harvey 1978).

The three circuits of capital merit closer analysis in being crucial to the economic viability of urban space. Harvey purports to show the circuits of capital within the processes of capitalist development as they shape urban spatial patterns, the bureaucratisation of the state and urban consciousness. The great merit of this approach has been to underline the centrality of the process of the private accumulation of capital to the process of urbanisation and regeneration. The successful urban region is one that evolves the right mix of life styles and cultural, social and political forms to fit with the dynamics of capital accumulation… Urban regions racked by class struggle or ruled by class alliances that take paths antagonistic to accumulation .. at some point have to face the realities of competition for jobs, trade, money, investments, services, and so forth’ (Harvey 1989:158). Harvey’s focus upon the three circuits of capital indicate the extent to which the city is not an autonomous entity whose processes can be considered in abstraction from the wider social and economic forces which operate upon it. The city operates within a structured context of external constraints and systemic imperatives.

Harvey investigated the implications for urban structure of capital investment in land. This investment is crucial for the functioning of the capitalist economy and shapes the process of capitalist urbanisation. A substantial part of capital is invested in constructing and maintaining the built environment, leaving a relatively permanent physical legacy. The built form that such investment produces can help facilitate the process of accumulation, but only if it is a profitable route for capital investment. For the built form can also obstruct accumulation to the extent that its relatively permanent features render it outmoded and obsolete. Harvey’s approach reveals the potentially contradictory character of capital investment in the built environment. Harvey thus develops his analysis on the role of land in accumulation through the examination of the three circuits of capital. Harvey shows how accumulation through the exploitation of labour is contradictory, leading to an overproduction of goods that cannot be consumed given insufficient purchasing power. As a result, profits fall and capital lies idle. This crisis of accumulation results in capital being switched into the second circuit. In this second circuit, capital is fixed in the built environment, money is shifted from the primary to the secondary circuit, provided that a supportive framework has been provided for this investment. The tertiary circuit of capital refers to the reproduction of labour power through scientific knowledge and expenditure. This investment is often a consequence of struggle rather than being a direct avenue for capital to pursue accumulation.

For Harvey, capital investment in the urban form can resolve crises in capitalism only in the temporary sense. For, over a passage in time, this investment also becomes a problem which is only addressed by switching investment to other sites. Harvey avoids being committed to a seemingly inexorable cycle concerning the rise and fall of cities by introducing an element of social struggle. Groups within the community can mobilise against the withdrawal of capital investment, thus acting to preserve an urban infrastructure. The rise and fall of cities is not merely a question of capital investment but also of political struggle and social organisation. Social groups can organise to block disinvestment and hence preserve an existing urban form.
The great achievement of Harvey’s political economy approach is that it makes it possible to investigate the range of urban processes within advanced capitalism. Of particular importance is the way that investment is switched in the built environment in relation to the tendencies of capital to move between circuits.
In fine, Harvey shows the ways in which the built environment can both facilitate and obstruct the process of accumulation, explaining the changes which constitute urban growth and decline. Harvey’s urban political economy is based upon objective processes of capitalist urbanisation whilst also assigning a creative role to human agency, to urban politics. Relating the urban process to the contradictory dynamics of capital shows urbanisation not as some evolutionary process through which all cities and spatial units pass but a contradictory process of growth and decline in relation to crises of accumulation, the dynamics of the national and international economy, the cycles of investment and disinvestment in the built environment and to corporate restructuring.

The study of urbanisation forms part of a larger study of capital as a process that unfolds through the production of physical and social landscapes. The study of urbanisation ‘should be concerned with processes of capital accumulation; the shifting flows of labour power, commodities and capital; the spatial organisation of production and the transformation of time space relations; movement of information; geopolitical conflicts between territorially-based class alliances and so on’ (Harvey 1989:7).
Harvey critically examines the role of urban processes in the geohistory of capitalist development, proceeding to scrutinize the ways in which the surpluses of capital and labour power are produced and used in producing the physical and social infrastructures of urban life. Harvey focuses particularly upon the circulation of capital (and value) through the production and use of the built environment. The geographical landscape of capitalism expresses the flows of capital. These flows can switch directions, sectorally and geographically, and can be involved in the formation and resolution of crisis (Harvey 1989:12). The point applies to urban issues of regeneration, deindustrialisation and suburbanisation. The critical perspective of marxism is useful in showing how the spatial organisation of the city is produced through the interaction of capital flows into land development and the need to reproduce labour power and class relations (Harvey 1989:12).

In sum, the different moments and transitions within the circulation of capital expresses a geographical grounding of that process through the patterning of labour and commodity markets, of the spatial division of production and consumption, and of the hierarchically organised structures of financial coordination. The flows of capital require tight temporal and spatial coordination in conditions of increasing specialisation and fragmentation.

The whole process requires what Harvey calls a ‘rational landscape’ (Harvey 1989:22/3). A landscape qualifies as being ‘rational’ in establishing the conditions which facilitate the accumulation of capital. Such a notion indicates the transformation in the character of ‘reason’ as it loses its anthropological dimension in connection with the human ontology and the meta-narrative of the ‘good city’ and comes instead to be subordinated to the process of accumulation. The accumulation of capital and the production of urbanisation proceed in close association. ‘Building a capacity for increased efficiency of coordination in space and time is one of the hallmarks of capitalist urbanisation’ (Harvey 1989:22/3).

Harvey establishes the connection between city formation and the production, appropriation and concentration of an economic surplus (Harvey 1973:216/26). The circulation of capital also presupposes the prior existence of surpluses of capital and labour power. Once set in motion, however, capital circulation produces capital surpluses along with relative labour surpluses produced through labour saving innovation in the socio-technical conditions of production. At the heart of capital’s contradictory dynamics is a tension between the requirement to produce and absorb surpluses of both capital and of labour, is impacting upon the character of capitalist urbanisation.

A built environment which enhances capitalist production, consumption and exchange is the condition of capital accumulation through production. The coercive power of the state, in legal and political terms, employed so as to promote primitive accumulation, capital mobilisation and labour surpluses, ensuring the emergence of and reinforcing the material basis for capitalist development. The rise of urban centres under the protection of an acquisitive ruling class was the crucial factor in the rise of capitalism (Harvey 1989:24). The point is important with respect to the loss and recovery of the meta-narrative of the good city. The state can no longer be presented as the embodiment of reason but expresses a coercive function that severs the connection between reason and freedom.

David Harvey conceives the urban environment in terms of a conflict over ‘production, management and use of the urban built environment’ (Harvey 1976:265). For Harvey, the term ‘built environment’ comprises physical infrastructure of roads, railroads, sewerage, networks, parks and housing, which are collectively owned or consumed or which, as with private housing, have their character and location regulated by state policy. The politicisation of these entities follows the conflict that arises out of their collective ownership and control or as the result of the ‘externality effects’ of private decisions concerning their use. The crucial question concerns whether these facilities should be produced by the state or by the market, how they should be managed, used, by what groups and for what purposes. State intervention in the urban development process is explained by the fact that the market system is incapable of maintaining and reproducing immobilised fixed capital investments in the built environment (bridges, roads, sewerage networks) which are used by capital as means of production (Harvey 1978:120). The role of the state is not merely limited to maintaining this system of ‘urban use values’ but is to coordinate these use values in space (Preteceille 1976:70).

Capital embodies its power or has its power expressed in a physical urban landscape created in its own image, creating an infrastructure which facilitates the progressive accumulation of capital. The physical landscape thus expresses the sum of capitalist development. From a marxist perspective, the urban landscape articulates the power of dead labour over living labour and, by extension, of the dead city over the living city. The accumulation process is situated within a dialectic of physical landscape. Capitalist development is subject to the tension between having to preserve the exchange values of an existing urban built environment and having to devalue the value of this investment so as to take advantage of emerging opportunities for accumulation.





Marxist theory takes a critical approach to urban planning and regeneration by relating both, even in progressive forms, to capital. Urban planning and regeneration is conceived in terms of having to serve the fundamental needs and interests of capital as part of the ideological project of the state. It was this focus upon the role of how planning and regeneration shaped the built environment through the provision of housing, transportation, social services that has kept political economists close to the spatial specificity of urbanism (Soja 2000:98). The dynamic of capital accumulation provokes continuous revolution in production processes. This innovation in production also requires innovation in consumption and in social and physical infrastructures, spatial forms and social processes of reproduction. The ferment of urban politics, comprising social movements, forms part of this innovation. Urbanisation is a process which has no necessary fixed spatial boundaries, though always being articulated within and across a particular space. ‘To the degree that the processes are restlessly in motion, so the urban space is itself perpetually in flux’ (Harvey 1989:127). Groups within the community can mobilise against the withdrawal of capital investment, thus acting to preserve an urban infrastructure that no longer functions efficiently for capital accumulation. The rise and fall of cities is not just a matter of capital investment but also of political struggle.

‘The reproduction of both capital and labour power requires a wide range of physical and social infrastructures. These infrastructures may be embedded in the land as a built environment of roads, bridges, sewers, houses, schools, factories, shopping centres, medical facilities, etc. They cohere as a spatially specific resource complex of humanly scaled assets to support production (fixed capital) and consumption (the consumption fund). These infrastructures absorb large quantities of long term and geographically immobile capital investment, requiring further capital investment over time to meet maintenance needs’ (Harvey 1989:145). Harvey therefore theorises the infrastructure for capital accumulation. This infrastructure contains the general conditions for capital accumulation. The dynamics and contradictions of the capital system possess large implications for the urban process. 
These become clear through the analysis of the principal forms that these contradictory dynamics take. These have several forms.

One contradiction arises within the capitalist class. In the realm of exchange the capitalist operates within a sphere of the individual, freedom and equality. Nevertheless ‘free’ competition generates coercive external laws which have power over each individual capitalist. The inherent laws of capitalist production are imposed upon all as external coercive laws. Thus the surface world of individuals, freedom and equality is substantially a world of standardisation, coercion and inequality.

The way that ‘free’ competition generates external coercive laws operates to block the emergence of a collective consciousness amongst the capitalist class. The process of exchange under capitalist relations presupposes the individual character of action and behaviour whereas the law of value is always socially expressed. The result of this is a situation in which individual capitalists, acting in their own immediate self-interest as individuals create an aggregate outcome which conflicts with the collective interest of capitalists as a class. The collective result of individual capitalist action can thus undermine the social conditions of the process of accumulation (Harvey 1978).
Capitalist crisis expresses underlying contradictions within the process of accumulation. The potential to achieve ‘balanced growth’ is denied as a result of the social relations of production prevailing under capitalism. These relations create objective structures which compel individual capitalists to act in such a way that, in collective terms, the outcomes are antagonistic to the capitalist class as a whole.
Harvey illustrates this point by arguing that the capitalist class has a tendency to generate states of accumulation within the primary circuit of capital with the result that either the accumulation process breaks down or new investment opportunities are discovered as capital flows through various channels into secondary and tertiary circuits. With respect to fixed capital and the consumption fund, crisis tendencies are expressed in terms of a crisis in the valuation of assets. Overproduction results in the devaluation of fixed capital and consumption fund items, something which has an impact upon the urban built environment (Harvey 1978).

Defining the built environment as an infrastructure for accumulation generates a number of issues. The examination of fixed capital in the accumulation process reveals a contradiction. Fixed capital increases the productivity of labour and hence facilitates the accumulation of capital. At the same time, fixed capital functions as a use value and hence requires that exchange values be converted into physical assets. The exchange value contained in this physical use value can be recovered only by fully employing the use value throughout its lifetime. Fixed capital as use value is not easily altered and so evinces a tendency to freeze productivity at a particular level. With the emergence of new fixed capital, increasing productivity, results in the devaluation of the exchange value locked up in the old fixed capital. Opposition to this devaluation has the result of obstructing increased productivity and, therefore, blocks the accumulation process. Nevertheless, the pursuit of new forms of fixed capital determined by the imperative of relative surplus value accelerates the devaluation of the old fixed capital.

These same contradictory dynamics operate with respect to investment in the built environment. Exchange values are invested so as to create efficient configurations for spatial movement. There is an impulse towards spatial equilibrium, but there is also continuous disturbance as accumulation for the sake of accumulation generates transformations in technology and creates a constant impulse to overcome spatial barriers. The result is a perpetual undermining of the existing spatial configuration.

There is a contradiction at the heart of this result. Spatial structures are created to overcome spatial barriers but, in time, become new spatial barriers. Spatial structures are manifested in transport facilities and anciliary facilities are embedded in the urban landscape. This applies to the built environment as a whole. Capital is thus physically expressed in an urban landscape that is the product of capitalist development. It is a capital infrastructure designed to facilitate the process of accumulation. Capital is dead labour which dominates living labour. This urban infrastructure expresses this character of capital as the domination of a ‘dead’ physical environment over an emerging one. That is, it constrains the accumulation process within an already existing and increasingly obsolete physical environment. This constraint can only be overcome through the substantial devaluation of the exchange value contained in the physical assets.
There is, then, a continuous tension between the concern to preserve the exchange values locked up in the built environment through past capital investment and the need to devalue the exchange value of this capital investment so as to create new opportunities for accumulation. There is, then, a continuous struggle as capital creates a physical landscape facilitating accumulation at a specific moment only having to destroy it later on, also in order to generate conditions conducive to accumulation. The transitory character of capitalist spatial forms in the built environment is to be comprehended in terms of a process of creation and destruction. The consequences of the contradictory dynamic driving this process, when embodied in the specific context of fixed investment in the built environment.
At the heart of urban studies is a concern with the spatial structures and functions of cities, the dynamics of urban expansion and degeneration and the fundamental causes of urban crisis. Marxist theory addresses the question of the nature of the urban environment in relation to capitalist processes of production, consumption and exchange. Marxism also makes a commitment to the development and realisation of an alternative vision of urban life, one concerned to identify the social arrangements and participatory structures of social control that enable urban residents to exist as self-determining citizens.
The plight of cities which are subjected to processes of urban degeneration expresses the existence of contradictions within the larger political and economic order. This study has adopted the view that the crisis of the urban environment and possible alternative futures can only be grasped by locating the city within a perspective that connects urbanisation with the key themes and concerns of political economy. But this perspective also possesses a moral dimension which seeks to locate political economy within the meta-narrative of the good city. And this means addressing the inequality at the heart of the contemporary city through a politics of social justice.

Harvey traces the history of urban development in order to show how the capitalist labour process generates inequalities, how these inequalities are spatially expressed and then how spatial structures reinforce inequality and exploitation in their turn.





The key question which this study has sought to pose in relation to the old industrial towns and cities concerns the health and vitality of the whole city. The meta-narrative of the good city plays an essential part in this, requiring that a universal ethic which connects the good of each and the good of all in a public sense of well-being be embedded in urban space. The question concerns the realisation of a naturally and mutually beneficial socio-spatial structure.

In his critical focus upon the capitalist property market, Harvey demonstrates that spatial arrangements are used to increase the profitability of property capital at the expense of residents in urban areas. In consequence, urban regeneration schemes come to repeat the failures of the initial situation. Harvey’s reasoning is that, under capitalist relations, inequality and exploitation is a permanent part of the system. Further, the built urban environment both expresses and contributes to the dynamic of capitalist accumulation, regardless of the aims of policy makers in regeneration schemes (Smith 1979:538/48; Smith 1992). The ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre 1974) requires that urban residents assert their rule over the rule of capital. Regeneration schemes which are primarily concerned with the accumulation of capital at the expense of the urban residents stand condemned from this perspective. The logical development of Harvey’s view leads to an evaluation of attempts on the part of urban residents to reclaim urban life from the rule of capital. This means identifying alternatives to capital in examples of meaningful community organisation and action, examples which contain the potential to challenge large scale regeneration schemes under the aegis of government and business. Such an approach supports activities undertaken by residents for the benefit of and in the interests of residents, thus extending the realm of the public sphere from within the urban community itself.

The urban political economy defined in this chapter focuses upon the substance of regeneration and avoids an exclusive focus upon the form. The outcomes of activity are evaluated according to the extent to which they enhance the control of community interests and groups and contribute to the generation of equality. The general thrust of this tradition is towards a participatory conception of the structures governing urban life. This is because the only legitimate alternative to elitist decision making in regeneration schemes is for residents to cooperate and participate themselves in urban schemes and movements. Under the capital system, society is structured in the interests of the economically dominant. Regeneration schemes looking to regenerate society must necessarily work in the interests of capital; resident participation can only participate so far without challenging capitalist mechanisms of valorisation and accumulation. The only alternative to this is provided by the organisational efforts of the class of non-owners determining to reclaim the city from capital.

In fine, programmes generated by the mass of non-owners is the only basis for overcoming the rule of capital and the class of owners (Fainstein in Merrifield et al 1995:22). Urban political economy thus contains a tendency to a participatory conception of urban life and its governance. The recognition of external and systemic constraints imposed by the capital system does not imply that human agency is powerless and lacks a creative input of its own. ‘Those who misuse structural theory will inevitably fall victim to a sense of helplessness in the face of predestined social forces’ (Campbell and Fainstein 1996:3/4).

Nevertheless, the question as to the role played by urban regeneration and town planning in the development of the city must acknowledge the constraints of capitalist political economy (Campbell and Fainstein 1996:1). Planning and regeneration proceed in a context and must be conceived in an interactive sense. This is the old question of structure and agency, the city as a physical phenomenon and its reproduction as a conscious human activity. Human agency transforms the city and adapts to transformations in the city. Planners, developers, national and local politicians, community groups and ordinary citizens all engage in activities which shape the urban environment. This interactive process is inherently political. Planning and regeneration activity cannot be neutral in the context of the capital economy and the state (whose power derives from the accumulation process). In these circumstances, the end of planning and regeneration is to shape the urban environment into a ‘rational landscape’, rational in the sense of facilitating the process of private accumulation.

This chapter closes by offering a bridge between the last couple of chapters concerning post-fordist regeneration and urbanisation and the next chapter on local growth coalitions by drawing out some implications of the political economy approach to regeneration. With the collapse of Fordism and the accompanying process of deindustrialisation, urban regeneration can take a number of forms.

Urban regions can look to improve their competitive position within the global division of labour. There are various routes that may be taken to that end. There is a need to distinguish strategies aimed at increasing the rate of exploitation of labour power to generate absolute surplus value from the application of superior technologies and organisation to generate relative surplus value.

This argument seeks to affirm that the use of superior technology and organisation offers the more fruitful option, in terms of economic efficiency, social justice and in enabling urban regions survive intensified competition. Nevertheless, this option can just as easily suppress employment as create it. The expansion of output and investment is perfectly compatible with a decline in employment (Massey and Meegan 1982).
Those with responsibility for implementing regeneration strategies need to be attuned to the fine details of the urban organisation so as to treat cities as workshops for the production of relative surplus value. This can be achieved in a number of ways. Improving the physical infrastructure improves the capacity to generate relative surplus value, as does investment in the social infrastructure (education, science, and technology), making the urban region a centre of innovation (Harvey 1989:45/6).

Intensified competition between urban regions generates problems. The continuous leapfrogging of one area over another through the constant innovation of technological and organisational forms further intensifies competition as urban regions set out to attract investment and employment from highly mobile corporate capital. This has a destabilising influence and has a tendency to devalue the assets and infrastructures of older urban regions which employ increasingly outmoded technological mixes in industry. Further, increasing technological innovation at the expense of growth, whether measured in terms of output or employment, works to subvert the process of accumulation and hence generates crises in the global economy.

In recent decades, there has been an obsession with creating a ‘favourable business climate’ in order to attract capital investment. To the extent that this has involved a ‘competitive devaluation’ which trades off the social wage as corporate grants and subsidies, this is a politically risky strategy. Urban politics conducted in these terms rests upon a latent class politics that could be inflamed by class conscious political mobilisation against capital.

There are a number of checks upon such transitions proceeding directly. In the first place, it is the corporation which, in the main, exercises control over technology rather than the innovative character of the urban mix. The transfers of technology between urban regions, then, is more the province of corporate decision making and power. In this sense, the social dimension of the division of labour dominates over the spatial dimension. This does not, however, apply to the provision of infrastructure. Here, the state acts as entrepreneur (Goodman 1979), attempting to attract corporate capital by offering a number of inducements.
The alternative to the strategy of relative surplus value is that of absolute surplus value. This is pursued by increasing the rate of exploitation of labour power and implies an assault upon the real wages of labour through increased unemployment, job insecurity, the reduction of the social wage (especially welfare spending) and the creation of a reserve army of cheap labour. It also implies an assault upon the agencies and organisations of the working class, with all that that implies with respect to the destruction of the social fabric through the loss of working men’s clubs and societies, traditions and cultures, the rich connections between the generations. It also implies a systematic assault upon the utility of skills and education in employment. It forms the absolute antithesis of the strategy for increasing relative surplus value.

Other alternatives involve less confrontation. It all depends upon the relation of the rate of exploitation to the qualities of labour power. The different packages of qualities that each urban region may offer to attract mobile corporate capital implies interurban competition over quantities, qualities and costs and also exerts a disciplinary effect upon a labour force desperate for employment at a time of crisis and competition. The danger of loss of employment, of corporate flight and disinvestment, the need to exercise fiscal probity and rectitude all underline the shift in urban politics away from social justice and equity towards a capitalist model operating around purely economic notions of profits, efficiency and innovation.
In conclusion, there are a number of channels through which economic power may be redistributed so as to increase the competitive capacity of urban regions. There are private systems of redistribution – church, unions, professional associations, charitable bodies. Most interurban competition is however focused on the redistribution to be obtained from higher order levels of government. During the Keynesian-Fordist era such expenditure grew and remains substantial, though under assault (Harvey 1989:50).







7 LOCAL GROWTH COALITIONS

This chapter examines the notion of the local growth coalition, identifying their composition and objectives and evaluating their success in leading urban regeneration. Local growth coalitions identify the urban environment as a site for economic activity, seeking to create a ‘rational landscape’ for the accumulation of capital. The chapter criticises the notion of the local growth coalition for the narrowness of its aims, arguing instead for a much broader purpose, taking into account urban citizens’ attempts to define and control urban space.

The chapter proceeds from a distinction between exchange value and use value. The city has throughout history been the site of a wide range of human activities, performing a whole number of essential functions in the process. The city has provided shelter, security and protection, has been the site of human association and interaction and has been the focal point for the exchange of goods and services. The city cannot be reduced to its purely economic function. The market place at the centre of city life has always been much more than an economic mechanism and has been fundamental to the extra-economic exchange between individuals. The ancient Greek agora was the birthplace of democracy and was both market place and citizen assembly.

The relative weight of these various activities and functions of the city has changed throughout history, some assuming greater importance than others, coming to dominate others. This is most apparent in the way that the economic factor has come to form the central determining factor in the capitalist city. This expresses the domination of exchange value over use value. This chapter seeks to explore this distinction between exchange value, as determined by the imperatives of economics, and use value, as shaped by urban dwellers as citizens. This approach targets the contradiction within the city as split between its economic functions and its social/political/human functions. It opposes the anthropological dimension of the city as integral to the good life to the reduction of the city to economics as narrowly defined. In the ancient Greek perspective, the city is the location for the everyday social functions of living, working, relaxing. The city is the location of a communal modus vivendi. It is a solidaristic and associative order which offers a structured environment for connecting the well-being of each individual with the well-being of all individuals. But the city is also the site of self-interested economic activities. There is, then, a distinction between the use of the built environment for everyday human activity and interaction and as a site of self-interested economic activity. This can be summarised as the difference between use value on the one hand and exchange value on the other (Fainstein 1994:1).

Whilst different uses may co-exist throughout history, this distinction indicates the tendency under capitalism for exchange value to dominate over use value. There is under capitalism a conflict within the urban environment as the location for human activity and as the location for business activity. This conflict is to be resolved by the proper ordering of urban activities.

The urban environment develops and changes over time in response to new demands and problems. The capital system, by its very nature, continually generates crises in the existing infrastructure as well as opportunities for its improvement. At all times there is a battle and an interplay between antithetical conceptions of the city as use value and as exchange value. This represents a struggle on the part of urban citizens for conscious human control over abstract or external powers – their own social powers in alien form. For Lewis Mumford ‘in the city, remote forces and influences intermingle with the local: their conflicts are no less significant than their harmonies’ (Mumford 1940:4). It is possible to argue more than this by pointing out that these remote forces and influences conflict with local demands are the powers of human beings in alien forms. Human beings gaining control of their powers and subjecting their relations to control would strike the most powerful blow in favour of the reconstitution of the classical concept of the good city as integral to human self-determination.

The problem of the city and its regeneration is to be addressed in terms of a conceptual apparatus drawn from urban political economy as modified by humanist themes drawn from marxism. The revaluation of use value as against exchange value reinstates the everyday lifeworld of human reciprocity, interaction and solidarity against systemic processes and impersonal priorities in the conception of urban space. Taking this approach makes it possible to conceive the ‘urban’ and the ‘local’ in socio-spatial terms and makes it possible to go much further than the postmodernist play of excess and desire in the post-industrial city. The argument places a very heavy emphasis upon the everyday practical sense of urban dwellers, recognising that whilst this consciousness may be untheoretical or pretheoretical, requiring much greater elaboration, this practical urban sense nevertheless is true for those living in the city. That practical sense is more true for urban residents than, for instance, the global priorities of regeneration professionals and the consumer and leisure paradises projected by the postmodernist mind. The city for the overwhelming majority of people is a living environment encountered on a daily basis, not a postmodernist pleasure zone or business enterprise zone. The question is how to bring the city back to its roots in everyday life.

Raymond Williams is full of insight on this question. For Williams, culture should attempt to comprehend ‘the nature of the organisation which is the complex of these relationships’ (Williams 1965:61) as well as the socially structured relationships that proceed within and between these practices. The analysis of culture is concerned to grasp the various interactions and interconnections between the practices and patterns composing the urban sphere as a process, articulating urban space as a lived experience. Williams proposes the term ‘structures of feeling’ to go beyond more formal concepts of ‘world view’ and ‘ideology’. ‘It is not only that we must go beyond formally held and systematic beliefs, though of course we have always to include them. It is that we are concerned with meanings and values as they are actually lived and felt, and the relations between these and formal or systematic beliefs are in practice variable… over a range from formal assent with private dissent to the more nuanced interaction between selected and interpreted beliefs and acted and justified experiences’ (Williams 1977:132). Williams suggests that ‘structures of experiences’ may in fact be the better and wider word, were it not for the fact that one of its senses has that past tense which obstructs recognition of the area of social experience which is being defined. ‘We are talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating community. We are then defining these elements as a ‘structure’: as a set, with specific internal relations, at once interlocking and in tension’ (Williams 1977:132). The emphasis is upon urban society as a process and as a culture that is lived and experienced by people on the inside. Regeneration is worthless to the extent that it fails to locate itself within this ‘living and interrelating community’.

Contemporary schemes for urban regeneration are based upon the necessity to attract mobile multinational capital and to facilitate the process of private accumulation. There is a recognition of the economic necessity of the capital system and, further, of the global dimension of this systemic imperative. This overarching constraint shapes the character of the regeneration activity undertaken, leading to a domination of tourist developments, office blocks, commercial openings. None of these quantitative developments, measured by money, address the qualitative dimension of the urban experience. The quantitative aspects addressed by regeneration schemes are the necessary but not sufficient aspect of urban renewal. They are exclusively concerned with the city as a site of exchange value. The qualitative dimension, the city as use value, is essential in infusing the quantitative dimension with its life and meaning, with its existential significance. This goes to the very heart of the city as the crucial entity in growth and development, answering the question of what living in the city entails for people, what existential qualities of life and opportunity are made available to city dwellers that would not be available without the associational space of the city. The rest of the chapter examines the dialectic of exchange and use value insofar as it applies to the city.

Under the capitalist mode of production, the dominant interests are concerned above all with the mechanisms of valorisation and accumulation. The city is restructured to facilitate these processes, giving a particular character to the city, determining its meaning. The capital city is the city as governed by exchange value. In socio-spatial terms, the capital city is defined by the concentration and centralisation of the means of production within the larger unit known as the metropolis. This concentrates units of managerial control, labour power and means of consumption (Hall 1966; Hall ed 1977; Duncan et al 1964; Harvey 1978:101/32). Spatial location is specialised according to the interests of capital, with the infrastructure of production, distribution and transportation being developed accordingly (Pred 1977). In turn, the city is commodified, opening up construction and transportation markets and generating a form of household conducive to individualized patterns of consumption (Harvey 1975). This model of the capital city as dependent upon exchange value is based upon the assumption of population mobility, with people moving to places where they were required for processes of accumulation. Such an approach entails social dislocation, the disruption of communities, the weakening of local cultures, uneven regional development, spatial unbalancing between existing physical stock and the need for housing and public facilities and an urban growth that spirals beyond the limits of collective balance and urban efficiency (Sawyers and Tabb 1977). This model is one of power out of control, leading to urban crises in social, cultural and political aspects.

The question that ‘quantitative’ exchange preoccupied regeneration seeks to address is that of how social and political innovation can be made ‘rational’ with respect to the accumulation process. This perspective conceives the urban region as a centre for social and political innovation within which ‘the search for some appropriate mix of life-styles, social provision, cultural forms and politics and administration parallels the perpetual thrust toward technological and organisational dynamism in production. The autonomy of the urban region’s ruling class alliance and of its politics is vital to this kind of social and political dynamism’ (Harvey 1989:158).

Further, the freedom that individuals and groups have to intervene and participate in this politics is as fundamental as that of business to innovate and change. ‘The social ferment and conflict of urban social movements born out of class struggle, possessive individualism, community rivalries, and segmentations and segregations based on labor qualities and life style preferences can be mobilised into creative processes of socio-political innovation. The successful urban region is one that evolves the right mix of lifestyles and cultural, social and political forms to fit with the dynamics of capital accumulation’ (Harvey 1989:158).

This begs the question of knowing when the right mix has been achieved. The urban region is to be conceived as a competitive collective unit within the global dynamics of capitalism. As with individual capitalists, the urban region has the autonomy to pursue its own course whilst being constrained by external coercive laws of competition. The industry of any particular urban region has to compete within an international division of labour. The competitive strength of urban industry depends upon the qualities of labour power, the social and physical infrastructures, the level of class struggle, geographical location and natural resources, political processes.

Urban regions need to make the right decisions. Growth coalitions or partnerships need to develop policies which are ‘rational’ in the sense of facilitating accumulation, an approach which acknowledges the realities of trade, money, employment, investments, services and so on. Urban regions can stagnate and decay whilst others expand. Acknowledging the realities of capital accumulation does not preclude different mixes of specialisations, coalitions and political processes. Capitalist imperatives do not extinguish the unique character of urban regions. Various combinations are possible with a particular social, geographical and historical context. ‘The combinations, arrived at through voluntaristic and autonomous struggles, are in the end contingent upon processes of capital accumulation and the circulation of associated revenues in space and time’ (Harvey 1989:159).

This argument needs to be set in the global context developed elsewhere in this study. The urban region is a geographical entity situated within the uneven geographical development of capitalism. The power of the capitalist class within the urban region depends upon the competitive position of the region. Power is not evenly distributed but is deployed within an hierarchical structure. There is a hierarchy of size and a hierarchy of function. There is the power of innovation, in social and political affairs as well as in the production of goods and services. Political leverage is also an important factor. ‘Power, in this case, depends largely upon the coherence and legitimacy of the local ruling coalition in relation to national politics’ (Harvey 1989:159).

Molotch conceives ‘the city as a growth machine’ (Molotch 1987). This analysis proceeds from the political economy approach, the central dynamic of accumulation as entailing the conversion of surplus capital into new commodity production through combining surplus means of production with surplus labour power. Accumulation also requires the previous production of the fundamental prerequisites of production, particularly of social and physical infrastructures. This production of necessary preconditions requires that previous speculative investment meet the requirements of further speculative growth. It is in this respect that the notion of the ‘growth machine’ is important. The growth machine speculates on the production of the necessary preconditions for accumulation, socialising the risks of this speculation through finance capital and the state. Further, the growth machine is a capitalist organisation in which certain interests achieve a dominant position. Banking, finance, property, developers, builders as well as representatives from the ‘official’ sector of politics have the initiative. These are the dominant interests and act to ensure that the city as exchange value takes priority over the city as use value. 





The growth coalition seeks to mobilize internal and external forces to create an upward spiral of local development. During economic crisis, it attempts to prevent the devaluation and destruction of urban social and physical infrastructures, productive capacity, labour power. It can seek to mobilize competitive and geographical power to export the danger of over-accumulation and prevent the import of such problems (Harvey 1989:161).
The growth coalition has to operate as a collective capitalist and possesses a double edged role. Competition between urban regions and coalitions helps coordinate the political and social landscape ‘rationally’ from the perspective of facilitating the process of accumulation. Competition helps to discipline geographical variations in accumulation and class struggle so as to confine them within capital’s dynamic. It also opens up new possibilities and spaces within which this dynamic may flourish. The various coalitions become key agents in the uneven geographical development of capitalism, becoming indispensable insofar as this uneven geographical development is an outlet for capital’s contradictions (Harvey 1982: chs 12 13).





The main purpose of this point in the discussion is to identify the implications for urban regeneration contained in the concept of ‘the local growth coalition’ as developed in Molotch and Logan’s taxonomy of urban futures.

Analysing the conditions of U.S. cities in the mid 1980’s, Harvey Molotch and John Logan argue that ‘there are two distinct sets of urban interests (and local political agendas that follow from them) in any .. urban area. Some people seek wealth through the development, sale or rent of land and buildings; others’ primary interest in place is as a setting for daily life and production. These two corresponding sets of purposes, often in direct conflict with one another, correspond to the Marxian description of commodities as providing for both exchange and use value’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144). This distinction sets up the debate in such terms as to make it possible to conceive an attempt by the citizen community to reappropriate urban space as a use value from the capitalist reduction to exchange value. In the US, however, urban regeneration has been almost exclusively focused upon exchange value. Dominant in the redevelopment and gentrification of US cities have been ‘a set of actors who push for local growth maximisation to increase returns from real estate manipulation and other business activities specifically dependent on local growth – collectively making up the “growth machine”’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144). The focus upon the activities of ‘local growth coalitions’ in the US underlines the extent to which these coalitions are dominated by restless and aggressive commercial interests. The policies that such coalitions pursue are often ‘environmentally destructive, fiscally damaging and socially regressive for urban populations’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144; 1987).

These are important conclusions. In the very least, analysis suggests the need to exercise caution in identifying urban regeneration with economic growth, selecting participating members accordingly. Molotch and Logan present a fundamentally polarized conception of the interests comprising the urban environment. This argument shows that the interests of urban growth coalitions dominated by commercial interests not only does not necessarily coincide with other urban interests, still less the urban interest in general, but may well conflict with the interests of others in the urban locality. This is particularly the case in the sense that citizen interests are primarily ‘oriented towards use values of urban space’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144). This orientation towards use values puts local citizens against those commercial interests whose focus is almost exclusively upon the exploitation of exchange value. Urban space is thus characterised by a latent tendency towards conflict and divergence between the users of urban space and the exploiters of urban space, between those who conceive urban space as a living environment for citizens and those who conceive urban space as a site of commercially exploitable economic activities. This implies antagonism between citizen interests and commercial interests, community groups concerned with living space and growth coalitions concerned with exchange value.

The intention of applying this approach to the regeneration experience of Manchester is to expose the organic culture of a city which is connected to an urban political economy and which may be theorised in terms of the contemporary direction of urban renewal in this city. The intention of this argument is to employ the notion of Molotch and Logan’s ‘local growth coalition’ to examine the character and identify the prospects for contemporary schemes for urban renewal. Molotch and Logan’s distinction between use value and exchange value points to the existence of an immanent conflict between the users of urban resources and the exploiters of urban resources. This points to a division between the self-interested and socially and environmentally iniquitous politics of the growth coalition on the one hand and the citizen interest mobilised by those concerned with the use value of urban space.

Yet Molotch and Logan also cite evidence for the view that those cities which were most successful in positioning themselves in the reorganised national and international economy – as ‘headquarter cities’ at the heart of the new, post-fordist, global economy – possessed local growth coalitions which had substantial local support and hence which had extended beyond the narrow circles of commercial exploiters.

It remains to apply these insights and observations to Manchester. Previous chapters have indicated the scale of economic catastrophe that befell northern cities, particularly with respect to the collapse of the old industries. No more that any other northern industrial town or city was Manchester able to insulate itself from these developments. The initial response to economic collapse was driven by the urban development corporations established by national government in 1987.These development corporations were created to side step local authorities for their ‘political’ concerns and bureaucratic nature and instead engage in market and property led regeneration. Manchester had two development corporations leading regeneration on these terms. Both the Central Manchester Development Corporation and the Trafford Park Development Corporation have had a substantial impact in the city. By 1993/4, the CMDC had reclaimed some 29.4 hectares of city centre land and some 9.4 kilometres of canal, had constructed 1,270 new housing units and opened up nearly 1.4 million square feet of new commercial space. This was all brought back into urban use. Further, some 26 kilometres of lighting had been installed and some 16 kilometres of walkways have been built, especially along city centre canals. As a result of these developments, the CMDC claimed to have attracted £340 million worth of capital investment to Manchester and to have created 4,677 jobs (CMDC 1994:6).

Trafford Park Development Corporation had responsibility for the regeneration and development of an old, 2,500 acre, working class residential and industrial area next to the Manchester Ship Canal. By the end of 1994 the Trafford Park development area boasted an increase of 8,845 ‘fulltime equivalents’ (FTE’s or jobs). 18 kilometres of motorway had been built by 1994 as had 37 kilometres of walkway. In addition, 638,000 trees and shrubs had been planted (TPDC 1994).

The two development corporations have transformed the physical fabric of Manchester. Throw in the developments on the Salford side of the canal with Salford Quays and it is apparent that there has been a profound transformation of urban space. However impressive this transformation has been in a physical sense there is some doubt as to it significance insofar as the use of the city by the actual residents is concerned. The waterside walkways of central Manchester are certainly impressive to look at. But they rarely seem to be patronised. This applies in other areas. The Castlefield area, rebuilding a reclaimed basin of the old canal system as a small open air theatre for public gatherings and concerts, is popular at certain times in the year. Nevertheless, either side of the summer period the area is deserted. Mancunians make little use on a daily basis of the regenerated buildings and spaces and this reclaimed and reused territory has very little profile in the practical urban consciousness. One reason for this pertains to the ‘post-fordist’ character of the new developments, having little to do with the industrial past and culture of the city. The developments taking place are opening up wine-bars, restaurants and health clubs which appeal to – and can be afforded by – a small, affluent public, in the city.

Whatever the need to recognise the existence of differential publics in the city, the fact remains that the development corporations have had a profound impact on the material structure and urban space in the city. The key developments taking place in Manchester have been supplemented by a series of complementary initiatives which are perceived, locally, as specifically Mancunian enterprise. The list of local successes is impressive – the transformation of the Central Station into the Greater Manchester Exhibition and Conference Centre (G-Mex), the opening of the Metrolink System, the relocation from London of the headquarters of the British Council, the opening of the new Terminal at Manchester Airport, the recognition of Manchester as the City of Drama in 1994, the opening of the new International Concert Hall, the two Olympic bids and the hosting of the Commonwealth Games as confirming Manchester’s ‘global’ profile. A number of glossy brochures continue to promote Manchester as a major European and World City. This projection of a global image comes with some ambitious claims. In 1993 the City Council pointed to the city as the most important financial centre outside of London and claimed that the airport was the fastest growing in Europe, making it the eighteenth largest in the world. This report, concerning the economic prospects of the city, cited a survey by DATAR, the French government’s agency for regional development. This survey identified Manchester as ranking 11 out of 165 cities across Europe in terms of economic importance. The City Pride prospectus of 1994 examined Greater Manchester’s potential for establishing itself as a ‘peer’ city within Europe to Barcelona, Milan, Frankfurt and Lyon (Manchester, Salford and Trafford Councils 1994:6).

The prospects for Manchester obtaining a global profile depend upon the strength of the city and regional economy, the provision of an appropriate infrastructure in the urban area, the existence of economic and community capacities, centres of innovation which locate industrial activity in post-Fordist developments, the creation of recreational and lifestyle facilities that appeal to national and international companies seeking to relocate. This underlines the need to reconstruct and refashion the old industrial towns and cities into viable post-industrial/post-Fordist sites. But the character of this project of reconstruction is not simple, discrete or homogeneous. It makes a great deal of difference whether the regeneration of the urban region proceeds in an organic fashion, as rooted in a local culture and structure of feeling and hence connected to an earlier industrial experience, or whether it occurs as a result of policies laid down by growth elites governed by the imperatives of a global competition. This is the difference between ascending and descending conceptions of regeneration, between a regeneration that proceeds from the bottom-up in the community and seeks to restore city space to the citizen users, and a regeneration that is imposed from the top down upon the urban dwellers.

Of the utmost importance in evaluating the success of post-Fordist regeneration of an urban region is whether a particular urban area possesses the infrastructure and capacities facilitating the production of services and encouraging innovation. The danger is that, seduced by ‘post-industrial’ imaginings, the old industrial towns and cities become too dependent upon and oriented towards the financial services sector, uncritically accepting the presentation of this sector as the engine of growth in a ‘post-industrial’ economy in consequence, regeneration can express a contradiction between the ‘post-industrial’ objectives of the development strategy and the health of the local labour market. Robert Fitch has shown how New York City’s dependence upon the FIRE sector has led to that city becoming the ‘headquarters’ only of employment loss, with 400,000 payroll jobs being lost between 1988 and 1993 (Fitch 1994:17). New York City has the lowest ratio of manufacturing employment to employment in the FIRE sector of any major metropolitan area in the US. In fine, successful regeneration requires the optimal balance that any locality may achieve in a global environment with respect to investment in FIRE sectors, manufacturing, construction, trade and service industries.

The claims made for the successful post-industrial regeneration of Manchester need to be subjected to close critical scrutiny. The City Council claims that Manchester is the biggest centre for financial services outside of London, something which gives Manchester a profile distinct from its industrial past. The facts read otherwise. True, some 111,000 individuals are employed in ‘business services’ across the region and a small Stock Exchange does operate in the financial district of the city. Nevertheless, these facts alone do not make the city a major centre of what Fitch calls ‘fictitious capital’. In 1993, manufacturing industry employed some 282,699 individuals as compared with 38.3% of the 738,309 individuals employed in the broadly defined services in the FIRE sector. ‘Services’ here refer primarily to distribution, hotels and catering (220,391 in Manchester in 1993), transport and communication (59,504), construction (53,906) and ‘other services’ (293,156) (Manchester City Council, Economic Initiatives Group 1993:11).

Of great importance with respect to the strategies pursued by local/urban growth coalitions is whether the delivery of services, by managers and workers, knowledgeable of local circumstances can be effectively and profitably developed in respect of intensified competition across the single European market and in a more global context. This challenge is certainly understood by those working in local high technology and ‘cultural intermediary’ industries, especially in the rapidly changing media, music, leisure and communication sectors in the pioneering high technology industries which comprise the Trafford Park Development Area and other city edge industrial parks.

Another aspect of the growth coalitions which needs to be subject to critical analysis is the attempt to position urban areas as headquarter cities. Redevelopment from this perspective is oriented towards capturing key command and control functions in government and finance for the city. These functions tend to be highly centralised and possess considerable power over a whole range of activities and spaces. The objective of regeneration in this conception is to reshape cities with the intention of making them centres of finance capital, information control and government decision making. This approach demands a particular strategy to provide the appropriate infrastructure. Achieving centrality within a global network of communications and transport is crucial and requires substantial public investment to provide airports, rapid transit systems, communications etc. A public-private partnership to provide the necessary office space and linkages puts the interests of property, finance and developers first. The strategy is risky.





These points are directly relevant to the range of developments that have been taking place with a view to positioning Manchester as a ‘headquarter city’. This had a peculiarly cultural dimension. Manchester was chosen as the City of Drama for 1994, constructed the Concert Hall as a home for the Hallé Orchestra and projected itself in terms of the art galleries, museums, restaurants and night life offered by the city. Behind this was an explicit determination to switch the image of Manchester from that of being a former industrial giant suffering from intractable urban problems to being a future oriented site of play, pleasure, consumption, media and communications. In 1994, Regional Railways collaborated with the local council to produce ‘It’s Magic in Manchester’. This glossy brochure projected a different image of Manchester to counteract the view of Manchester as a declining industrial city suffering from poverty, deprivation, dilapidation, inequality and crime. These developments point to a struggle over the image of the city, over its representation by the growth coalition and the way that ordinary urban citizens experience it on a day-to-day basis.
There is a class aspect to this differential experiencing of the city. The perspectives of working class Mancunian living at or near the heart of the city and of suburban Mancunians who travel into the city for work or leisure or shopping may diverge quite markedly. Suburban Mancunians have more interest in supporting local growth coalitions in the attempt to position the city strategically within the global economy. This can imply the ruling of the city and the direction of the city according to a fairly narrow set of priorities, not only ignoring the daily implications of industrial collapse but spurning positive solutions to urban problems. Suburban Manchester conceives the urban problems of working class industrial Manchester as a police and control issue. The violence, criminality and disorder which is extending outwards from the inner city forms the dark underside of Manchester, an underside which glossy regeneration brochures conceal. Suburban growth politics seeks not a reorientation of growth purposes but extra surveillance to suppress the consequences of social inequality. Suburban Manchester remains wedded to the vision of commercial development through the agency of the local growth coalition. This biases the regeneration of the city in the interests of some but against the interests of others. On a symbolic level, there is a struggle for the definition of the city. The daily preoccupations of the commercial suburban middle class and the industrial inner city dwelling working class conflict in terms of what both groups need, demand and expect from the city.
It is at this point that the loss of the meta-narrative of the ‘good city’ is felt most deeply. For what this loss represents is the loss of an overarching ethical framework capable of integrating the particular life projects and worldviews of the differential publics composing the city. And the effect is the diminution of urban possibilities available to all, the affluent as well as the poor. This is apparent in the systematic narrowing of life-options available in the city after regeneration. Regeneration, that is, has a peculiar character when viewed through the post-industrial and post-fordist lenses. The solidaristic and associative conception of the city as a communal modus vivendi gives way to a privatised, atomised, career orientated, money obsessed, consumerist and lifestyle dominated mode of existence. Such an existence is characterised by a disengagement from collective urban space, the dissipation of urban unity and the rise of individualised pursuits. There is evidence from both the affluent suburban middle class and the impoverished and unemployed working class of withdrawal from the use of the city. The remark needs qualification. Whereas the middle class have a casual and transitory relation to the city, particular sites attracting its active patronage at particular times – in terms of shopping and leisure – the poor have no option but to withdraw. Such a city divides from within and no amount of ‘exploitative’ regeneration concerned with exchange value can restore content and substance.

The argument concerning the need to recover the meta-narrative of the good city thus returns to the distinction between exchange value and use value. The focus upon the one to the exclusion of the other generates an ill-balanced regeneration that issues in a less than optimal growth of the whole city. Schemes for economic regeneration promoted by local growth coalitions suffer from the deficiency of quantitative empiricism. Such an approach is justified only if the city is conceived exclusively in terms of exchange value. But it ignores the human factor, the city as a use value. Regeneration needs to take into account what city dwellers think about where they live and about how they live. Regeneration needs to consider ‘structures of feeling’. There is a need to revalue the city as it is lived and experienced by individuals in their everyday urban life as a condition of strengthening the urban public realm. This makes the point that the urban environment is more than the sum of its quantitative components and can, with the overthrow of the tyranny of exchange value, become a qualitative experience in terms of political, social and cultural well-being.

8 THE CITY OF USE VALUE

To argue for the revaluing of use value against the tyranny of exchange value requires some understanding of Marx’s critique of the capital system. The domination of the exchange principle plays a key role in Marx’s critique of capital’s fetishised social order. Marx contrasts the exchange value of commodities under capitalism with their use value to the consumers and the value per se contributed by the labour of the producers. Under the capitalist mode of production, commodities are exchanged through money as the abstract medium of equivalence. Through a process of alienation, the qualitative differences between commodities, whether expressed in terms of their use to consumers or in terms of the creative contribution of the specific producers, are extinguished through being reduced to the purely quantitative and abstract measurement of their worth in terms of exchange value.

This development in the economic affairs of human beings has major consequences in terms of the extension of the quantification, standardisation and homogenisation of social life. Whereas formerly the relations between individuals in society and between society and nature were socially mediated, the domination of the exchange principle means that these relations are mystified into the form of objective relations between things. This fetishism is all the more pernicious in that, concealed behind the apparent equivalence of the process of exchange is a substantive inequivalence which is systematically generated by the capitalist mode of production, a mode of production which is reproduced only through the extraction of surplus value from the working class.

The origins of the domination of exchange value and the way that this develops into the tyranny of abstraction thus lies in a system of alienated labour. To get a proper grip of the extent to which regeneration schemes depart from urban dwellers and produce urban spaces which are remote from the lived experience of these dwellers, there is a need to grasp the process of abstraction at the heart of rationalised capitalist modernity. Marx’s argument reveals the extent to which individuals in their everyday life are ruled by abstractions. The fundamental problem that Marx identifies as lying behind the tyranny of abstraction concerns how forms of human life come to assume an independence of the human beings who have created them in the process of producing their social life. It concerns the reification of the forms of social action. This is the paradox of how human agency comes to be transformed into human enslavement, how autonomy generates bondage. This inversion of means over ends results in 'the transformation of human agency into human bondage' (Dawe 1971:47). The penetration of abstract money relations into all aspects of social life is a condition of human alienation, and expresses the reification of social relationships in a capitalist system. 

The argument therefore comes back to money as the expression of the reified character of the forms of social life. It is in this respect that Simmel describes money as:





The reification of relationships needs to be set in the context of a wider process of abstraction in which the structure of society is alienated from human beings on the basis of monetary exchange.

The intention of this argument is to employ the dialectic of exchange value and use value so as to revalue the everyday terrain of sensuous material reality. This involves arguing against the quantitative orientation which dominates contemporary schemes of urban regeneration in order to reinstate the qualitative dimension at the heart of the lifeworld.

This perspective makes a distinction between the system world and the life world. In the modern world ‘the economy’, organised around the central dynamic of capital accumulation, is structured in such a way as to be functionally enmeshed with the state. The monopoly of economic power merges with the monopoly of political power. Both the economic and the political become semi-autonomous spheres which are abstracted from society and exist as a value-free unity imposed upon the everyday reality of individuals. This abstract collectivity takes the place of the communal modus vivendi which the process of abstraction dissolves. The unity of each individual and all individuals which people need to realise themselves as social beings is displaced from the real to the legal-institutional-systemic world, an artificial world and exists as a substitute commonality. This differentiation of the spheres of human action is accompanied by the extension of instrumental rationality into all areas of life, generating a pervasive substantive irrationality as a consequence. The system world of the state and capital imposes its own functional imperatives over against the substantive rationality of the life world, the real society of individuals.

The opposition of exchange value and use value at the heart of this chapter derives from the dialectics of labour within the capital system. The systemic imperatives of capital are imposed upon the lifeworld, causing substantive irrationality in consequence. This pertains to a conflict between dead labour and living labour, between abstract labour and concrete labour. By conceptualising the capital system as an alienated system of production, Marx is able to show how the life world which is lived and experienced daily by urban residents is subjected to an increasing regulation according to systemic imperatives arising within an alienated mode of production.

For Marx, the capitalist mode of production was accompanied by a process of abstraction which had the effect of removing the world and its imperatives from everyday human control and comprehension. Nevertheless, as a self-made social order, this world remains subject to the substantively rational praxis of creative, constitutive human agency. The subjective factor can be alienated but it can never be extinguished. Abstract and impersonal forms and forces may become independent of human control but they cannot autonomise themselves from human subjects. The systemic-institutional apparatus has achieved an independence from human control and comes to impose its objective imperatives on the lifeworld. The crucial question, then, is one of restoring this apparatus raised over the lifeworld to rational human control. Society, the everyday lifeworld of human actors, has been rigidified under the law of value. The human values of spontaneity, creativity and autonomy are being systematically eliminated through the extension of formal and instrumental rationality. These human values need to be recovered by society, to be recognised, reclaimed and reorganised as alienated social powers whose proper location lies in the everyday lifeworld of human beings. The associative principle at the heart of urban space is thus invested with its own social power.

The increasing subjection of the social world is the rational calculation of capitalism demonstrates how capital’s colonisation of social life is the central agency of modernisation. This calculation penetrates the relationships between human beings and forms the means connecting individuals. Capitalism and its alien rationality is constitutive of the forms of sociality and subjectivity in the modern world.

It has been argued in this study that the city as use value is the everyday lifeworld of real individuals and forms the sensuous-relational terrain for embodied experience. This is the material foundation for dissolving the abstracted rationalism divorced from human life.

The concept of an urban public sphere revaluing the city as an associative space renegotiates the boundaries between the public and the private by combining federal or central states with local and civil associations and communities. This generates an active citizenship which undermines the bureaucratic regulation of urban space. Associationalism has become relevant again after a long period of eclipse by state socialism and liberal democracy (Hirst 1994:2).

The key activities of the urban sphere are to be conceived as having public significance. Through the renegotiation of the boundaries between public and private spheres the concept of an urban public realm emerges against the abstract unitary public of the state.

If core activities of central concern to the life of the citizen like welfare, public services and economic production are not to remain dominated by top-down administration and if policy is not to become the prerogative of a marginal elite, then the whole of society and not just the state needs to be viewed politically, as a complex of institutions that require a substantial measure of public and popular control over their leading personnel and major decisions. That is, civil society must no longer be viewed as a ‘private’ sphere, it needs to take on elements of ‘publicity’ in the original sense of the term. We require a constitution for society as much as we do for the state.

Hirst in Hirst and Khilnani eds 1996:101

Such an approach aims at the redefinition of the nature and scope of ‘the political’, seeking to constitute ‘governing institutions’ (Middlemas 1979) within civil society as organs of social and democratic control. This political investment of civil society goes beyond the officially ‘political’ concentrated at the centre. The notion of associationalism needs to be related to the civic conception of the city and defined as an alternative to the economic reductionism which characterises the individualist liberal tradition. This articulates the city as an urban public which recovers ‘the political’ on the material terrain of the everyday life of social practices and purposes.

This position has affinities with the Nietzschean case that Stauth and Turner make for the centrality of the lifeworld as a reciprocal and solidaristic reality upon which the larger reality is parasitic.

The final level of the social world is the reality of regulating institutions which attempt to organize the inter-subjective world and the world of social embodiment. We treat these institutions as social bodies which, through an intellectual stratum (the professional men of learning and taste), seek legitimation over the world of communal reciprocity and individual embodiment. This 'higher' social world can be conceptualized as a form of institutionalized resentment which requires intellectuals, professional men and priests to smooth out its operation; they exist to render the world either acceptable or efficient. This culture of resentment stands in opposition to the human world of sensualism, practice and feeling.

Stauth and Turner 1988:14

Constructing the city as an urban public realm opposes the life world of communal reciprocity to the abstracted institutionalised world presided over by intellectuals, professionals and ‘priests’ of all kinds, mediators claiming knowledge and monopolising power in elitist fashion apart from the social body.

The everyday life world of real individuals is the sensuous material terrain for the embodied experience which provides the basis of the urban public into which abstracted rationalism is dissolved. With the definition of the city in terms of use value, the everyday world of interaction and reciprocity is affirmed against the abstracted rationalism of knowledge and politics. This reformulation of the city is an attempt to restore the city to its origins, back from the objectivism, impersonalism and alienation which accompanies the domination of exchange value towards the urban life world of reciprocity, interaction and sensualism.

This deconstruction of the alien collectivity imposed by exchange value seeks to reconstitute the public realm in such a way as to articulate multiple identities via universal reasoning. The point to be established here with respect to the social connections of the urban public is that multiple identities are rooted in existing relationships and hence forms a ‘real’ collectivity as opposed to an abstracted political sphere. By rooting politics in the multisided activities and identities of individuals connected in relationships, the city as an urban public is no longer extraneous to everyday life but is embodied in the everyday experience of real individuals.

The conception of the urban public subverts the conventional definition of the public sphere and proceeds to locate publicity beyond the institutional conception confined within the state. Whereas the conventional state public is elitist and hierarchical and disembodied, the city as use value is the site of true fulfilment, the sensuous everyday terrain of individual reciprocity, interaction and exchange.

In emphasising the sensuous nature of the city as an urban material terrain, the argument can profit from Simmel’s aesthetic notion of totality in dealing with the interactions between individuals and society. “The totality of the whole ... stands in eternal conflict with the totality of the individual. The aesthetic expression of this struggle is particularly impressive because the charm of beauty is always embedded in a whole, no matter whether it has immediate distinctiveness or a distinctiveness that is supplemented by fantasy as in the case of a fragment. The essential meaning of art lies in its being able to form an autonomous totality, a self-sufficient microcosm out of a fortuitous fragment of reality that is tied with a thousand threads to this reality (Simmel 1978:494/5).

Simmel packs his texts with those fragments of human existence, apparently superficial social phenomena which nevertheless comprise the totality. This implies that the aesthetic totality may itself exist as a fragment, something which Simmel developed into a universal principle in his later philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie).

The human subject plays an active role within this totality:





Simmel’s sociology adopts an aesthetic approach to social reality and emphasises social interaction over ‘system’ and ‘structure’. These concepts occupy a subordinate place in Simmel’s work, concerned as he was to avoid the reification or hypostatisation of ‘society’. Simmel insisted that ‘society is not an entity fully enclosed within itself, an absolute entity, any more than is the human individual. Compared with the real interactions of the parts, it is only secondary, only the result' (Simmel quoted in Frsiby). Simmel’s perspective is thus crucial in defining the relational conception of urban space, a conception which defines the associational character of the public. Simmel proceeds from 'a regulative world principle that everything interacts with everything else, that between every point in the world and every other force permanently moving relationships exist' (Simmel in Frisby 1995:28/9). Social interaction and forms of sociation, ‘the phenomenological structure of society’ constitute key elements of Simmel’s sociology and are directly relevant to determining the sensuous material terrain of the urban public as a relational concept.
Since modern social reality is conceived to be in a condition of ceaseless flux, then the concepts which best express this fluid reality are relational. Simmel makes interaction and sociation key concepts. Society comprises a web or network of relationships in which individuals and groups intersect, something which underlies the ‘fundamental interrelatedness of the most diverse phenomena’ (Kracauer 1920:314).
These points subvert the quantitative empiricism of regeneration schemes. The investigation of the interrelatedness of all things generates a ‘deeper and more accurate’ understanding of society than does the study of ‘objective’ structures and institutions. To grasp ‘the web of society according to its productive, form-giving forces’ it is necessary to consider ‘the delicate, invisible threads that are woven between one person and another’ (Simmel in Frisby 1995:30). Simmel’s ‘public’ is not political but sensory. And it is directly relevant to the revaluation of social bonds, of fellowship and reciprocity and exchange within the life world as opposed to the official-abstracted world of institutionalisation and intellectualisation. The reciprocal public that emerges emphasises the fundamental significance of sociability, of material and symbolic exchange as social attributes forming the basis of society itself as a lifeworld of mutual exchange and interaction.

The reciprocal public is aimed against an abstracted rationalism in politics. Such a rationalism is divorced from real life and is concerned with the regulation of real individuals in pursuit of external objectives in the official world. Rationalisation is the assertion of the artificial world of the fetish systems and institutions of politics and production over the reality of everyday interaction and reciprocity. This whole argument, in fine, is motivated by a concern to bring the public sphere and public life back to its origins in the life world of real individuals in their interaction and association. This has profound implications with respect to the regeneration and the representation of the city.

9 URBAN SPACE AND EVERYDAY LIFE

This chapter returns to the symbolic economy approach to regeneration, as defined in relation to post-fordism, and applies its central concepts and themes in light of the attempt to revalue the everyday life world. The symbolic economy approach focuses upon the relationship between the dominant representations of the city as expressed in urban lifestyles, civic design, architecture and advertising.

Sharon Zukin distinguishes the symbolic economy approach from the political economy approach. Whereas political economy focuses upon investment shifts among different circuits of capital, its basic terms being land, labour and capital, the symbolic economy approach focuses upon representations of social groups and the visual means of excluding or including these representations in public and private spheres. From this perspective, the continuous negotiation of cultural meanings in built forms (buildings, streets, parks) is inextricably connected to the construction of social identities.

Zukin poses the question ‘whose city?’ to raise the issue of the right to the city. This goes further than the politics of ownership to address the issue of who has a right to inhabit the dominant image of the city. 
This pertains to geographical struggles and strategies undertaken by social groups as they contest access to the centre of the city and over symbolic representations of the centre. It is not only real estate fortunes that are at stake but ‘readings’ of those social groups which have hitherto been excluded from the city and whose presence in the city conflicts with dominant representations – ethnic minorities, immigrants, women, sections of the working class, the homeless. At every level, occupation, segregation and exclusion – in the streets and neighbourhoods, in the buildings – and institutionalised in architecture, conventions of use and zoning laws. Visual artefacts of material culture and political economy therefore have the effect of reinforcing or expressing the social structure. In making social rules legible, visual artefacts re-present the city.

A vigorous and expanding symbolic economy succeeds in attracting investment capital from the global portfolios of real estate investors, banks, property developers and large property owners. There is continuity with the past, with global cities such as London and New York coming to create a role for themselves beyond their imperial and commercial past. These developments also issue from the concern to obtain comparative advantage over competitors. The symbolic economy of global cities generates a lingua franca of the global elites and facilitates the circulation of images that come to shape climates of opinion and investment.

Global cities share with regional urban centres a common cultural strategy that generates a new way of perceiving urban landscapes, globalising them, abstracting a legible image from the service economy and connecting it to consumption as against production. The difference is that in global cities the processes of producing space for cultural hegemony have a greater intensity and effect than in regional urban centres.

The critical analysis of space, symbols and power requires both a short and a long term perspective. In the long term, vacant and undervalued space is likely to be drawn into the vernacular landscape of the poor and the powerless, coming to be replaced by a new landscape of power. In recent times, the economic value and image of urban industrial factories were reduced by the rise of service production only to recover in the spatial form of living lofts. The social and cultural critiques that have identified the polarised expansion of cities since the 1980’s articulate four factors in this growth:

1.	the exit of the middle class;
2.	the undermining of place identities for major businesses;
3.	the standardisation of consumption experiences;
4.	the reassertion of centrality as a landscape of power as the countervailing strategy of elites.

For Zukin (1996), these conditions define the legibility of urban space.

This legibility is emphasised by design. It makes it easier for cities to attract people with money, employers and consumers in the private markets. The new significance of people with money is accompanied by a decline in the importance of urban planning as concerned with an ideal vision of the good city. Urban planners have been struggling to find answers to questions raised by deindustrialisation and the shift to the post-industrial city. How can the city survive the loss of its industrial base and how can a post-industrial be brought within the scope of urban planning? How does urban planning relate to the symbolic economy? How are the purposes and objectives of urban regeneration refashioned in response to the symbolic economy? How does this affect the right to the city? How is it possible to plan the urban economy when telecommunications mean that large businesses create their own footprints in the suburbs and exurbs? There are problems which follow these developments, particularly with respect to producing public goods for low income, unemployed and even homeless groups when the rich refuse to pay for them. Given these material conditions and constraints it comes as no surprise for Zukin that the landscape of cities has been re-organised for visual consumption, abstracting an image of freedom and power that commands, in its abstraction, a degree of consensus.

The analysis proceeds from the observation that the regime of flexible accumulation represents a capitalisation on the cultural developments of the 1960’s. Particularly important from this perspective are the concern with individuality, autonomy and difference, implying the rejection of mass culture and standardisation. The ending of the Fordist-Keynesian long boom brought deindustrialisation but also encouraged the exploration of product differentiation. The repressed market demand to acquire symbolic capital could be captured through the production of built environments (Smith and Lefaivre 1984).
The shared attribute of these symbolic spaces pertains to the blending of public and private uses and commercial and non-commercial functions. These symbolic spaces are structured through governmental incentives to include public uses but they are shaped in the main by the fact that individuals are more active as consumers than as citizens, defining themselves more in terms of their activity in the private economic market than in the public domain. Whilst public space is centrally located, individuals are increasingly averse to gathering in large numbers. Commercial complexes policed by private security guards increase apace. The result is that usable public space is in decline, certainly in terms of safe streets and parks. Not public goals but the satisfaction of private wants increasingly propels the construction of significant spaces of public life. This has the effect of displacing the locus of emotional attachment in the city from the home and the local community to the commercial complex. This undermines support for commercial space which is oriented towards local consumption and instead generates greater support for larger, more diversified but also more standardised spaces of consumption. This causes consumption spaces to incorporate symbols of public fantasy, particularly fantasies of public life.
This expresses a conflict that is proceeding within public space as between two symbolic economies, the global and the local. The legibility of central command complexes contrasts with the identity negotiated in neighbourhood streets. Yet, despite the problems, streets generate and sustain a quality of life that inhabitants prize, a space that is genuinely public in an associative sense, making neighbourhoods liveable and generating attachment to place. 
The experience of economic decline and deindustrialisation creates problems with respect to the economic base of a city but also offers an opportunity for inhabitants to think creatively – and publicly – about representations at a time when economic crisis makes large scale projects prohibitively expensive. Renewal can be explored in a more than economic sense, bringing politics, culture and morality back into the shaping of urban life as a public space.

At the heart of the post-fordist regeneration of the urban environment is the image of the city and its use as a site of play, leisure and consumption – not a realm integral to daily life but a site of casual acquaintance. A great deal of postmodern writing on the city exhibits a preoccupation with image. This is expressed, for instance, in an interest in the casual affluent shopper cruising the fashionable shops of a downtown gentrified by a process of development which has been concerned principally with the post-fordist image of the city. Images of this kind dominate contemporary advertising. The city is imagined and reconstituted not as a place of everyday living but as a site of playful activity, of consumption, of aesthetic pleasure. Images point out the bright city lights, the arcades and squares, the clubs and restaurants.

This discursive reconstruction of the city in the imagination as a site of play and pleasure does underscore actual changes taking place and has had a real impact on most cities in the old industrial world, but there is a fracture at the heart of this development which hobbles the whole project of redevelopment. Presently, the city as a site of play and pleasure systematically devalues the real lived experience of city dwellers, inhabitants who reside in the city. The exaltation of the city as a site of pleasure and of casual resort comes with the corollary that everyday life is systematically devalued as boring and routine. The imaginative presentation of the city as a site of play and pleasure involves the systematic devaluation of other, more essential, aspects of cities as living environments. The actual lived experience of city dwellers becomes less accessible in postmodern theories of pleasures. What comes to be neglected is the unavoidable daily necessity of the urban population to travel, work and live in urban space.
The imagining of the city as given in advertising portrays the city as a consumer paradise. Those behind such imagining have a commercial and/or professional interest in the projection of such an image. This is also an image that appeals to sections of the academy, particularly those engaged in cultural studies and who are concerned to present a celebration of consumer culture. Against this, the argument developed in this study challenges the idealist imagining of the city by reference to the everyday lived experience of its inhabitants. From this perspective, post-modernist imagining is revealed as an ideological project to the extent that the presentation of the city as a site of play and pleasure conceals the substantial existence of poverty and deprivation in the city. Although shopping and consumerism figure prominently in postmodernist projections of the city there is little attention given to the way that social inequality structures the patterns of shopping for the urban population. The ideological reconstitution of the city bears only a partial relation to patterns of use, neglecting the specifics of how urban populations appropriate their environment.
This point is worth examining more closely with respect to developments in Manchester since the 1980’s. Such an examination penetrates further that the presentations of the city as a consumer paradise to address the city as a lived experience. The celebratory projection of consumer culture is far more problematic than those working in commercial advertising and media and, indeed, urban regeneration would have us believe. This is particularly the case with respect to industrial towns and cities in the North of England. This kind of imagining of the city stands condemned for concealing the everyday reality of the city as it is experienced in all of its specifics, however routine and mundane, by those who live and work there. This is most clear with respect to shopping. The celebration of consumer culture conceals the extent to which shopping is not a leisure activity engaged in by the affluent but a daily necessity. Postmodern writing on the city too easily presumes shopping as a leisured and playful activity and is deficient when it comes to differentiating between the types of shopping activity engaged in by different class and income groups. There is no such thing as an homogeneous shopping public only a divided social formation with different attitudes towards and patterns of shopping. Nothing reveals the division between middle class and working class images of the city than shopping.

The point is important with respect to the existence of public space in the city. The public sense of well-being originated in the agora of ancient Greece, the open space which combined market place and citizen assembly. The agora was the birthplace of democracy and emphasises the need for associational space to buttress the public realm. The agora was the place for selling daily necessities but also a place of association, of everyday interaction and contact fostering dialogue, the exchange of ideas, creating cultural resources which nourished the whole city. The individual made contact with others and learned to take account of activities, interests and ideas of a wider, more public, scope. This dual role of the urban marketplace needs to be considered when dealing with the approaches to shopping in regeneration schemes. Do those schemes respect and encourage public culture?

Lurking in the background of discussions concerning regeneration was the anxiety about the potentially deleterious consequences for trade of shopping centre development in the secondary retail towns throughout the Greater Manchester area. Various interest groups released a number of reports to the local television and press concerning the long term viability of Manchester City Centre. The problem is that the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of various regeneration schemes has been almost exclusively conducted on the narrow terms set by those commercial interests and direct interests possessing a vested interest in the development of these terms. Aside from some periodic intervention by the local councils, the orientation has had an almost exclusively private bias. Yet, as the debate concerning the expansion of Manchester Airport showed, the local growth coalition articulated not an essential unity of purpose but fundamental differences of opinion. These differences were most clear with respect to the collision between those who emphasised the short term profitability of out-of-town shopping centres and those who predicted long term economic decline in city centre business as a result, with all that that implied with respect to the image of the city and to the need to attract inward investment. Evidence from the USA suggests that short term solutions tend to become long term problems, urban problems returning on a large scale. Local politicians and developers in the US have had to concentrate their efforts upon regenerating depopulated and economically devastated inner cities whose problems were either caused by or exacerbated by the malling of America. The emphasis now is upon the ‘de-malling of America’ (Matthews 1994). The US experience offers a salutary lesson for those whose idealist and celebratory approaches to shopping and consumer culture are not tempered by socio-economic realities.

Manchester exhibits a variety of shopping practices related to differential class publics. These practices structure daily and weekly shopping patterns in the city. There are between these different sections, different experiences of shopping. Whilst for the affluent there may be a culture of consumption, for many, shopping remains firmly within the realm of economic necessity. This point is not always recognised by those reshaping the city as a site of consumption. Regeneration may in many instances be predicated upon attracting the casual affluent shopper but for the vast majority of people who live in towns and cities shopping is primarily a function concerned with the provision of the necessities of daily life. That function has historically provided the underpinning for the neighbourhood corner shop, the co-op, the local high street but also, in later developments, new markets, the department store and the mall. There is a distinctive social pattern to the provision, patronage and the use of these spaces. Advocates of the shopping mall are more concerned with the patronage of the affluent and are inclined to dismiss the historically evolved consumer outlets as relics. The point to be emphasised is that these older facilities, far from being ‘dated’, remain integral to the experience of most people. Advocates of the malling approach to regeneration suffer from too narrow a focus upon the affluent shopper and ignore different types of shopping in conditions of social inequality.

Given the persistence, indeed the intensification, of social inequality, it is less than clear that the pattern of local shopping represented by the corner shop, the co-op and the covered markets are as redundant as some allege. For the same reason, the same logic of intensified social inequality makes the expansion of new clusters of expensive high fashion leisure goods and sportswear rational only in the sense of a narrow appeal to the most affluent section of the shopping public. That forms a narrow basis upon which to rest regeneration. The future of Manchester cannot rest upon being turned into a site of consumption for those who live in the more affluent suburbs (Wilmslow and Alderley Edge).
Shopping exists as an essential human activity that spans the realms of necessity and pleasure. Any successful regeneration must acknowledge the place of both aspects in the reconstruction of the city. However appealing in terms of projecting the image of the city, the city as a site of consumption is always more than a matter of play and pleasure. For most people, consumption exists in the realm of economic necessity. The image of the city does, however, underline the extent to which shopping patterns manifest the city as a socio-cultural resource. The conclusion to be drawn is that it is essential to comprehend local fears and pleasures in socially and culturally specific terms, focusing upon actual social patterns and practices as against the abstractions projected in self-interested regeneration schemes. Shopping in the city is far more than the leisured and consumerist activity engaged in by the affluent and it is extremely risking to ground regeneration upon such a narrow basis. There is every need to acknowledge that for most people in the old industrial towns and cities like Manchester, shopping falls within the realm of economic necessity and possesses a routine and recursive character. This does not preclude shopping for pleasure, only emphasises the folly of privileging it.
There is in this observation as awareness of the distinction to be drawn between the middle class city and the working class city. This division has translated into the approaches taken to the city. A sharp split has developed in which issues of work, travel and life are left to urban planners whilst social theorists pursue the cultural dimensions of city life, as though these two dimensions can be held apart from each other. 
Anthony Giddens is clear on this point. For the vast majority of their users, cities remain places of work and schooling, encountered repetitively throughout the working week (Giddens 1984:144 154). Most people encounter cities in terms of mundane, routinised activity, captured in the metaphor of the daily grind.

The class division concerns location as well as patterns of use. The working class live in and around the centre of Manchester, extending north into the old cotton towns. The five mile radius of the city centre has very much been a working class world, a world of economic necessity embracing the house, the street, the corner shop and the factory. In contrast, middle class Manchester focuses in and around the private houses in the residential suburbs in the south of the city, extending outside of the boundaries of the city. This separated relation to the city has implications with regard to regeneration. Not only are images of regeneration too closely modelled upon the leisured and consumerist sensibility of the suburban shopper, too many of those who dominate in local growth coalitions live on the periphery or even outside the city of Manchester itself. If the question concerns the ‘right to the city’ there is a need to question by what right do those who live in Trafford, Stockport, the Cheshire towns and villages and even West Yorkshire and Derbyshire have to determine the character of the city of Manchester? The needs and aspirations of those who live and work and experience the city as a matter of daily necessity must take priority if regeneration is to create anything more than a hollow shell.
A genuine regeneration requires that the city of consumption is reunified with the city of production. It requires that class structured social inequality be overcome so as to unify the culture of the city at the level of experience. Only then can the economic conception of the city be integrated within the philosophical-anthropological dimension, relating social life to a civic life and culture to reconceive the city as an associative civic public. This approach affirms the city as more than an economic concept concerned purely with the production and consumption of goods and services for profit. Reunifying the philosophical and social conceptions of the city is crucial to the constitution of a new urban public realm out of civic activities, institutions and forces.

A sceptical attitude towards American models of urban regeneration is encouraged by an awareness of the contemporary trend towards the de-malling of America. Towns and cities in Britain have more to gain through establishing and extending connections with their counterparts in Europe than by importing US models of urban regeneration which privilege private economic interests. These private interests are the forces behind the decay of the urban fabric and the civic culture in the first place.
The European model has its historical and philosophical roots in the autonomous polis tradition of Athens and in the local and regional democracy practised by the free cities of the Middle Ages. By way of contrast, the US model is tailored precisely to the domination of capital and to the imperative of private accumulation, making a virtue of capital’s necessity. Choosing the European/philosophical model of the American/economic model recovers the meta-narrative of the good city and challenges the leading role assumed by private capital in regeneration schemes. An urban regeneration dominated by financial and commercial considerations cannot, in the long run, generate a sustainable urban life. A sustainable urban regeneration requires the creation of an active producer-citizen identity which rests upon freedom in the production of space and in the conscious collective regulation of that space.
Blocking that citizen-producer identity is the existence and entrenchment of social inequality, resulting in income and class based differences in the uses of the city. The reshaping of the city according to the consumption demands of the affluent is part of the post-fordist imagining of the city discussed earlier. This has induced greater product differentiation under the mode of flexible accumulation. This has implications with respect to the image projected by the city and with respect to the way the city is shaped. Under the regime, producers need to be more responsive to taste and preference. This requires the adoption of a more differentiated approach than was required under the fordist regime of standardised accumulation through mass production. As a result, they have come to restate a central aspect of capital accumulation: the production and consumption of ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu 1977:171/97; 1984). This affects the production and transformation of the urban spaces of the affluent.

With the domination of middle class perspectives over working class perspectives, consumption over production, the symbolic economy approach dominates over the political economy approach to regeneration schemes. This point is important in that it is related to the concealment of social inequality. The symbolic economy identifies the city as a site of consumption, of play and pleasure, of casual acquaintance on the part of the affluent. Bourdieu defines ‘symbolic capital’ as ‘the collection of luxury goods attesting the taste and distinction of the owner’. Such capital is a transformed form of money capital but ‘produces its proper effect inasmuch, and only inasmuch, as it conceals the fact that it originates in “material” forms of capital which are also, in the last analysis, the source of its effects’. The ideological character of these developments is clear in that these developments serve to conceal, through the sphere of culture and taste, the real basis of economic distinctions (Bourdieu 1977:189).

It is useful to apply Bourdieu’s critical comments to the production of affluent communities and their built environments through regeneration schemes. This approach reveals a good deal about the processes of gentrification, of the production of history and heritage and of exclusive communities, raising issues of the real, the imagined, the projected and the packaged (Simmel 1978; Jager 1986). Phenomena of embellishment, ornamentation and decoration have grown markedly in recent years. This has an ideological aspect in that it projects a favourable image of the dominant order whilst serving to conceal its asymmetrical power relations in the interests of preserving the status quo. Since the most successful ideological effects are those which have no words, and ask no more than complicitous silence’, the production of symbolic capital serves an ideological function since the mechanisms through which it contributes ‘to the reproduction of the established order and to the perpetuation of domination remain hidden’ (Bourdieu 1977:188).

The facts and their implications of the social inequality and diremption that have been concealed, reinforced and entrenched under the post-fordist regeneration of the city and the subject of the next chapter.

10 THE NEW METROPOLARITY

Empirical evidence has increasingly confirmed the scale of social inequality that has become entrenched in Britain since the collapse of the Keynesian long boom. The events that have been taking place since the 1970’s have been discussed in terms of a transition from a fordist to a post-fordist mode of accumulation. The politics associated with this transition have put into sharp reverse the long, slow trend towards progressive redistribution. The increasing inequality of wealth is apparent (Walker 1990), something which impacts upon towns and cities. By the end of 1994 it was estimated that nearly one third of full time workers in Britain (five and a half million) were earning less than the ‘threshold of decency’ as determined by the Council of Europe. Both the old industrial towns and cities, and the new ‘headquarter’ cities are characterised by inequality. The inequality is apparent in the social patterns and practices that prevail in the city, something which affects the capacity of the city to realise and sustain the notion of the good life via the exercise of a full and active citizenship on the part of the inhabitants. In Manchester there is evidence of withdrawal on the part of the poor and marginalised sections of the old industrial working class. Replacing collective approaches have been individualised patterns focusing upon career and consumption. For those in work, that is. Manchester also reveals the extent to which the mass employment of fordism has been replaced by mass unemployment, poverty and deprivation.
Economic restructuring combined with the telematics based globalisation of cities has been accompanied by profound urban social and cultural change. The ending of the welfare-Keynesian approach and the rise of neo-liberal approaches has transformed the character of the urban environment and its regulation. A social and geographical polarisation has emerged within cities as a result of neo-liberal capitalist restructuring, reinforced by new telematics and telecommunications.
 Affluent groups orient themselves to the Internet and home informatics and telematics systems whilst others lack access owing to price or deficient skills. Those excluded may even come to be exploited at home by the new technologies. Whilst the affluent experience the world as a single global system, the poor and excluded are trapped in information ghettoes. This has profound consequences for the social life of the city.

The growing divisions between affluent and poor areas can lead to rising fear of crime, the “fortressing” of neighbourhoods through electronic surveillance systems, and an increasingly home-based urban culture where people’s working, shopping, access to services and social interaction may become mediated more via telematics than by social interaction in the public spaces of cities. The parallel shift towards market-based telecommunications regimes has added further momentum to this polarisation and growing unevenness in the social landscape of cities.

Graham and Marvin 1996

A new socio-structural division has emerged, involving the extension of inequalities on a global scale. There is a new division of labour which is based not so much on product, as in the old industrial towns and cities, but on process, as in global financial centres like London and New York. If any economic activity can be decentralised to a lower cost location, it will be. Manufacturing comes to be transferred from the advanced economies to low wage regions whilst services move out to suburban and provincial locations. Remaining and expanding is a cluster of highly specialised activities dependent upon access to privileged information – specialised business services requiring face-to-face communication, financial services of a speculative character, medical services and such like.
Behind these developments is the globalisation of economic relations. The reduction or abolition of barriers to the free movement of goods and services is an important part of this process. But this process impacts differently upon goods and services.
 With the expansion of telecommunications, costs have fallen and barriers of distance have been reduced. This facilities the movement of information around the world at the push of a button. The Internet and the World Wide Web, with their zero changes for distance represent the pinnacle of this process.

The paradox is that this development has served to increase the appeal of the few key cities where special information is exchanged. And in the process it has generated a set of multiple polarisations within and between cities. Cities like London and New York have gained but cities like Detroit and Birmingham have lost. The municipal administrations of the old industrial towns and cities need to shift the urban economic base away from manufacturing towards informational services according to the post-industrial thesis. The problem is that even if the post-industrial thesis can be accepted – and there are good grounds for affirming a local industrial urbanism – this shift does nothing to remedy urban inequality. On the contrary, a new inequality replaces or builds upon the old inequality. Even the key global cities, assuming pivotal positions within the new economy, generate a massive set of polarities within, particularly between the minority who are information rich and the majority who are information poor, between the symbolic analysts and the casualised service workers (Reich 1991). The intensification and multiplication of these new polarities proceeds on the basis of older polarites that have never been remedied despite decades of redistributive policies. The argument that the inequalities associated with the old capital-labour dualism will be remedied by the new information economy is facile. The evidence is that the money poor tend to be the information poor, confined to housing estates and suffering health and education systems marked by poor service. What is truly alarming is the accumulating evidence that the production of an ‘underclass’ may not simply be the product of deregulated neo-liberal economies. If the problem was that simple then it would be possible to propose the Rheinish-Scandinavian social market model as a solution. The problem is that the ‘underclass’ is becoming increasingly present in all advanced capitalist economies and their cities, regardless of social and historical specification. Peter Hall expresses extreme pessimism on this point:









Hall’s ‘fear is that polarisation might remain the heart of the contemporary urban problem, and thus of the world that urban planning has to deal with’ (Hall 1996:408). The problem is that if this scepticism is justified towards urban planning, it is even more justified when applied to urban regeneration reconceived as economic development. The evidence with respect to regeneration in Manchester confirms this. So-called post-industrial or post-fordist developments have generated a new poverty and inequality without ever having overcome the old. The old industrial towns and cities have added layers of new poverty upon the old and are increasingly populated by impoverished citizens. The systematic destruction of traditional full-time paid employment in manufacturing industries in the towns and cities of the North, along with the expanding number of part-time or temporary jobs in the service sector has profoundly transformed the local labour market. The promise that new jobs would replace old has been very imperfectly realised. Indeed, by the 1990’s, the new service industries were themselves experiencing the same difficulties that had afflicted the old industries, as workers were made redundant, starting salaries fell, part-time positions replaced full-time position and short term contracts took the place of permanent jobs. The result has been not just inequality but poverty: ‘the majority of the jobs on offer would not lift a family above benefit levels’ (Manchester Metropolitan News 2 Dec 1994).

It came to be increasingly acknowledged that the transformations of the 1980’s had not so much created the post-fordist city as layered new divisions upon old. ‘The largest economy is becoming increasingly divided. Development booms in parts of Greater Manchester are going hand in hand with some of Europe’s worst poverty levels in inner city areas’ (Greater Manchester Research and Information Planning Unit 1992:3). The local labour market is generating new polarities in the city, entrenching and extending inequality.

The most visible expression of the new poverty in Manchester is in the increasing presence of beggars on the city streets. The public spaces of the city centre are increasingly occupied by the homeless. By the mid 1990’s the local press was christening Manchester ‘the beggars capital’. There is no mystery as to what has caused this level of poverty and inequality. The economic restructuring that has taken place since the end of the long boom in 1973 has been characterised by deindustrialisation, globalisation and liberalisation. There has been a substantial increase in poverty and a widening of the gap between rich and poor. These facts are given visible expression in the presence of large numbers of the poor and homeless on the city streets. This poverty and inequality are the social effects of ‘free’ market policies (Walker 1990), policies which have a profound effect upon the character of urban life.

The important point to grasp is that this poverty and inequality is not simply the product of an old industrial structure and its dissolution but adds new and distinctive elements. The transition from fordism to post-fordism adds new polarities to the old. Manuel Castells thus argues that the informational economy possesses the structural tendency to generate a polarized occupational structure according to the informational capabilities of different social groups. The Informational City is thus the Dual City. Information at the top generates structural unemployment at the bottom as well as the downgrading of social conditions for labour. This is particularly the case if trade unions and the welfare state are subject to systematic political assault.
‘The necessary mixing of functions in the same metropolitan area leads to the attempt to preserve social segregation and functional differentiation through planning of the spatial layout of activities and residence, sometimes by public agencies, sometimes by the influence of real estate prices. There follows a formation of cities made up of spatially coexisting, socially exclusive groups and functions, that live in an increasingly uneasy tension vis-à-vis each other. Defensive spaces emerge as a result of the tension’ (Castells 1993). For Castells, this generates the ‘fundamental urban dualism of our time’.
As has been argued, a crucial part of this dualism refers to the split between the globally oriented elite in control of urban functions on the one hand and the local rooted mass subjected to extraneous forces on the other.





Hence the fundamental dividing line in contemporary cities is the inclusion of the cosmopolitan elite in the making of the new history and the exclusion of the local mass from the control of the global city. The Global City, the Informational City and the Dual City are thus closely interrelated and constitute the background to urban processes taking place in the major metropolitan centres of Europe. The crucial issue is the increasing lack of communication between the information elite and the directional functions in the economy which it performs on the one hand and the locally oriented population that is subject to external processes and suffers from an identity crisis as a result on the other hand. ‘The separation between function and meaning, translated into the tension between the space of flows and the space of places, could become a major destabilising force in European cities, potentially ushering in a new type of urban crisis’ (Castells 1993).

The concept of the Dual City indicates the tendency to ‘urban dualism’ at the heart of the post-fordist postmetropolis. There is a dualism at the heart of the process of urban industrial restructuring, threatening to reinforce asymmetries of power and resources and confirming the urbanisation of injustice on a global scale. With respect to post-fordist restructuring, this process relates to the corresponding processes of growth and decline of industries and firms. Castells relates this process to the rise of the information economy leading to the ‘Information City’, noting the processes ‘taking place most intensely at the nodal points in the economic geography, namely, the largest metropolitan areas where most of the knowledge – intensive activities and jobs are concentrated’.





Castells thus conceives the Information City as a Dual City, a city that is polarised and fragmented by the restructuring process and by the rise of information technologies which assert the space of flows over the space of places. Castells deals with the profound social and spatial consequences of this stratification within the new postmetropolis:





Transformations taking place within the city have played a significant role in fostering flexible accumulation. This has involved the widespread destruction of the mutual aid mechanisms that have filled the associational space mechanisms which have enabled communities deficient in power and resources to exercise some controlling capacity within urban space. The capacity to exercise control over space through communal solidarity and mutually supportive associations has been eroded at precisely the moment that urban spaces have been exposed to the encroachment and occupation by external forces a conflict has opened up between the unemployment suffered by workers in traditional industries and the employment opportunities available to those living in urban environments benefiting from downtown revivals based on financial services and the organisation of spectacles. A newly affluent generation of professionals and managerial workers came to occupy a dominant place in entire zones of inner city urban space. This generation came to demand product differentiation in urban environments, improved quality of life and the command of symbolic capital.

There are some profound social and spatial conflicts embedded in this conflict. Increasing class polarisation is manifested in the massive and the increasingly visible contrast between urban poverty and conspicuous affluence. This contrast encourages dangerous comparisons. The capacity for community construction available to the poor makes it possible to envisage growing racial, ethnic and religious tensions. ‘Fundamentally different class mechanisms for defining the spatially of community come into conflict, thus sparking running guerrilla warfare over who appropriates and controls various spaces in the city’ (Harvey 1989:273).

The evidence exposes a massive contradiction at the heart of the post-fordist city. Intensified inter-urban competition generates socially wasteful investments that add to rather than resolve the initial problem of overaccumulation that lay behind the transition to flexible accumulation (Harvey 1988). There is a limit to the number of convention centres, sports facilities, waterfront developments, leisure complexes that an urban space can have. Success can be short lived, soon exhausted or rendered obsolete by alternate innovations elsewhere. And overinvestment in things like shopping malls and various cultural and leisure facilities renders the values embedded in urban space vulnerable to devaluation. Urban regeneration which is preoccupied with FIRE stations, where people process loans and conclude real estate deals, for people employed in financial services and real estate, actually succeeds only through the massive expansion of personal, corporate and governmental debt. And this points to an even greater crisis in the future. The serious over-investment in urban redevelopment risks serious financial devastation.

The co-existence of the new poor on city streets and in other public spaces with the conspicuously affluent rich has come to characterise the urban experience ‘governed’ by free market economies. Since the late 1980’s there has been an anxious public discussion over homelessness and beggars on the city streets. A visit to the town or city routinely involves an encounter with the new poor. In 1993 a national newspaper cited Canon Richard Parkinson’s view of Manchester as given in 1840: ‘There is no town in the world where the difference between rich and poor is so great’. The newspaper suggested that this view was as true of Manchester in the 1990’s as it was in the 1840’s. This throws the post-fordist regeneration of Manchester into sharp relief. The reinvention of the city as a site of play and pleasure, of conspicuous consumption, forms a stark contrast with the reality of urban poverty. Conspicuous affluence and consumption contrasts with the visibility of beggars, the homeless and the new poor. Indeed, it is significant that the key sites of conspicuous consumption have increasingly attracted beggars. Up market shopping streets and theatres are populated by those with money to spare and it is this that attracts the beggars. Further, the promotion of the city as a place for tourism and for a lively night life have rendered it an appealing place for those seeking to make a living on the streets. The extremes of riches and poverty join together in a most visible sense, sites of conspicuous affluence bringing out the poor. Poverty is no longer concealed, put in its place as a result of design, confined to estates and inner city areas shielded from the rest of the community. On the contrary, the new poverty is characterised by its very visibility. The new poverty is as conspicuous as the new affluence.

The conflict over the visibility of the poor and the existence of poor areas is formative of the local consciousness that has emerged in the urban areas of the deindustrialised North of England. This conflict pertains to the distribution of public resources available to urban areas. The notion of desert, raising a number of social and moral questions, increasingly replaces the old redistributive policies. This development unfolds against the context of a history of political failure to arrest industrial decline or offer public provision above and beyond restricted and uneven programmes.

The evidence indicates that the poor and the long term unemployed experience the city by withdrawing from its use. The use of the city, as conceived in terms of well-known shops and routine sites of urban association and interaction, means little to those whose poverty and lack of function excludes them from their use. An alternative city emerges constituted by new uses, or the old uses in new forms. The new facilities made available in the new city are prohibitive for the new poor. To the new poor, this city of conspicuous consumption is not for them but for those who can afford to take advantage of its facilities. The poor are effectively confined to their own areas and never encounter the city in terms of use.

11 THE URBAN FUTURE

The emergence of a new postmetropolitan mode of urbanisation has a number of significant impacts upon the city, many of which have been the subjects of previous chapters, particularly with respect to inequality. This concern is developed further in this chapter with reference to the carceral city. This points to the emergence of a postmetropolitan mode of social and spatial regulation.

The extension and entrenchment of socio-economic inequalities has had the result of multiplying the points of conflict in the urban area. There is an ever present possibility that the postmetropolis may erupt into violence and disorder.

To check such tendencies there has been a move towards the increased regulation of society. The intensification of social inequality has provoked the intensification of social and spatial regulation through a variety of developments in policing, surveillance, design, privatisation and governance within the urban environment.

The result of the new metropolarities is that the political geography of cityspace exhibits a tendency towards increasing violence and disorder and its regulation. The urban context takes on a repressive aspect. Urban fear has become endemic to the postmetropolitan landscape, characterised as it is by a plethora of protected and fortified spaces, isolated and exclusive enclaves protected against the real and imagined threats and dangers of everyday life.
Influenced by Foucault, the postmetropolis is to be articulated as a collection of carceral cities, an archipelago of ‘normalised enclosures’ and fortified spaces which, voluntarily and involuntarily, barricade individuals and communities in urban enclaves. These enclaves are shaped by restructured forms of public and private power, from enforcement and enclosure to the manipulation of imagery. The meta-narrative of the good city has dissolved, fractured by the contrary pulls to which it has been subjected to by social inequality.
Mike Davis has subjected the inherent metropolarities of the emerging city to close critical analysis, focusing upon the experience of Los Angeles. Davis projects a nightmarish vision of the future. The significance of this analysis is that it extends beyond the local example of LA to embrace the leading cities of the world. What makes the experience of Los Angeles so important is that it possesses universal implications with respect to the emergence of the postmodern city of the future. Los Angeles exhibits features which are increasingly present in new cities reshaped and refashioned according to ‘post-fordist’ and postmodernist imagery. Beneath the ideal projected in such developments is a dark and iniquitous reality.
In City of Quartz (1990) Mike Davis documents in considerable detail the extent to which public spaces in Los Angeles have come to be reshaped through the extension of surveillance systems and security procedures. The affluent are in the grip of an urban fear and this fear is being institutionalised and embedded in an increasingly carceral society. Mike Davis thus portrays the postmetropolis as a ‘Carceral Archipelago’ , presenting a compelling picture of the ‘proliferation of new repressions in space and movement’ and of the ‘security-obsessed urbanism’ that is generated by the pervasive ‘ecology of fear’. This ecology of fear is self-perpetuating in that it feeds off itself, the profitable provision of ‘security’ on the private market serving to generate its own demand through increasing paranoia. The poor and the powerless learn to ‘read’ the signs embedded in urban design and come to exclude themselves from the city. This shows how the urban built environment contributes to exclusion, reinforcing the divisions between the affluent, who form the ‘legitimate’ part of the community – ‘their’ community – and the poor whose presence in the community is resented and feared (Davis 1990:223/6).

Manchester exhibits the ecology of fear as much as any large city. The fear of crime is the major local issue, as revealed by a number of research studies. The fear of crime dominates the public imagination and scars the public psyche. The greatest fear is that the crime and violence which is associated with Cheetham Hill, Whalley Range and Moss Side may well extend far beyond its city centre environs and engulf the whole reader. Issues of crime, violence and disorder cannot be confined to areas suffering the greatest levels of poverty and deprivation and this awareness only serves to further increase the fear of crime. The constant recycling of the crime-ridden imagery of inner city Manchester through the local and national media exacerbates the urban fears of the affluent and intensifies the demand for urban repression and regulation. The demand for the urbanisation of social justice lags far behind this ecology of urban fear.
The tendency towards the militarization of city life was analysed by Mike Davis in terms of ‘Fortress L.A.’, portraying the dark side of the postmodern metropolis in terms which have general application. Davis picks out the essential features of an urban environment which both articulates and builds upon the ecology of fear. Surveillance cameras, gated communities, windowless hotel walls which face out onto streets, all point to the emergence of the carceral city. This projects a nightmarish vision of the future for postmodern cities the developed world over.
Davis highlights the obsession with physical security systems and with the architectural policing of social boundaries. This has become the master narrative in urban restructuring and represents the ‘militarisation of city life’ (1990), a ‘programmed hardening of the urban surface in the wake of the social polarisation of the Reagan era’. And the Thatcher era, one may add, in light of the UK experience. Existing trends point in the direction of urban incarceration. For Davis, we now live in ‘fortress cities’ which are brutally divided between ‘fortified cells’ of affluent society and ‘places of terror’ where police battle the criminalised poor. The old liberal paradigm, which combined repression with reform, has given way to outright repression. A social war is taking place in which the affluent middle class and the urban poor are locked into a zero sum game.

This social war is expressed in the built environment. The ‘neo-military syntax of contemporary architecture insinuates violence and conjures imaginary dangers’. ‘Today’s upscale, pseudo-public spaces – sumptuary malls, office centers, culture acropolises, and so on – are full of invisible signs warning off the underclass ‘Other’. Whilst architectural critics fail to see how the built environment contributes to social segregation, the poor and excluded read the meaning clearly (1990). Examining the architectonics of contemporary security obsessed urbanism, Davis focuses upon what he calls ‘Sadistic Street Environments’.





Davis is concerned with the ‘urban cold war’ which is waged to confine the poor and homeless in Skid Row, employing ‘architectural policing’ so as to create a controllable ‘outdoor poorhouse’. Many ‘ingenious design deterrents’ work to keep street people out. This takes extreme forms in the shape of barrel shaped and even metal spiked benches so as to make sleeping impossible. Parks have sprinkler systems designed to go on randomly throughout the night. Armed guards, locked gates and security cameras protect urban buildings and their inhabitants, keeping them hermetically insulated from the real world (Flusty 1994).

Perhaps the most important part of Davis’ argument with respect to the critical concern of this study with recovering the meta-narrative of the good city pertains to the impact of these developments upon public space. ‘The universal and ineluctable consequence of this crusade to secure the city is the destruction of accessible public space’. Public spaces are devalued as urban redevelopment converts vital pedestrian streets into ‘traffic sewers’ and public parks into ‘receptacles for the homeless and wretched’. The city is being turned ‘outside in’. ‘The valorised spaces of the new megastructures and super-malls are concentrated in the center, street frontage is denuded, public activity is sorted into strictly functional compartments, and circulation is internalised in corridors under the gaze of private police’ (Davis 1990:226/7).

The privatisation of the architectural public realm is accompanied by parallel restructurings of electronic space, ‘as heavily policed, pay-access “information orders”, elite databases and subscription cable services appropriate parts of the invisible agora’. Both processes reflect the deregulation of the economy and the reduction of non-market settlements.
This implies the destruction of public space and, indeed, of the public sense of well-being so crucial to the concept of the ‘good city’.





The term ‘social imprisonment’ applies not merely to the carceral features of the modern city but to the service proletariat who work for the affluent but live in increasingly repressive ghettoes.

A genuine democratic space accessible to all is well nigh extinct in the modern city, rendering the public sense of well-being obsolete. Public amenities are in rapid decline and streets are becoming desolate. Municipal policy takes its lead from the middle class demand for security and for increased spatial and social insulation. There has been a shift of financial resources from traditional public space and recreation to corporate defined redevelopment priorities. The result is a massive privatisation of public space and the subsidization of new, racist enclaves. These overbearing aspects of ‘counter-urbanisation’ and ‘counter-insurgency’ are ignored in the contemporary celebrations of ‘postmodern’ LA. A triumphal rhetoric hailing the ‘city of the future’ and ‘urban renaissance’ ‘is laid over the brutalization of inner city neighbourhoods and the increasing South Africanization of its spatial relations. Even as the walls have come down in Eastern Europe, they are being erected all over Los Angeles’ (Davis 1990).
There is a new class war being waged at the level of the urban built environment. This class war results in the urban form coming to follow a repressive function as a consequence of neo-conservative politics. ‘Los Angeles, in its usual prefigurative mode, offers an especially disquieting catalogue of the emergent liaisons between architecture and the American police state’ (Davis 1990).
These developments point to the need to urbanize justice, to restructure social relations so as to embed the unity of the well being of each and all.
Cities are the physical expression of the relations of power and control which structure society as a whole. The inhabitants of the city are varied, embracing a range of different identities and social divisions, rich and poor, young and old, men and women, black and white. These relationships are asymmetrical. Some are more advantaged or disadvantaged than others owing to the inequalities in power and resources. Different identities give rise to a diversity of needs, experiences and aspirations which do not receive equal weight within the city.

Whilst, from the perspective of the rich and powerful, some cities are better than others to live in, the urban experience of the poor and powerless is depressingly consistent. For poverty involves not just the relative lack of income but also exclusion and marginalisation. This implies a lack of opportunity to participate in urban processes and so as to influence their outcomes in any meaningful sense. The poor and powerless are alienated from the city, materially and spiritually, in the same way that they are estranged from civil society as a whole. Such estrangement is built into capitalist relations.

If power is the problem, then it is also the solution. Lord Acton is famed for the quote that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Not so. It is not power that corrupts but the lack of power. Behind urban poverty, hopelessness and decay is a lack of power. In developing their organisational, political and moral capacities, the marginalised and excluded can come to generate and exercise power.

There are many individuals who live in cities who have little opportunities to give voice to their concerns and aspirations. They exist in a city that is not of their making, a city that corresponds with the interests of other people. Ultimately, pursuing the universal agenda, there is a need to incorporate all voices. This is to generate a new, inclusive politics that overcomes the division of core and periphery. There is a need to urbanize justice, fostering the engagement and participation of all so as to create cities which embody the needs and preferences of all as citizens. If not, the city exists as an impoverished public domain that ignores the fact that real urban wealth is the collective and individual creativity of all as citizens rather than as consumers in passive relation to the city.

The alternative to justice in the city is the enlargement of current tendencies to urban militarization as a consequence of injustice. For Castells, the urban crisis has its origins in the conflict between the accumulation and legitimation needs of capital.
Castells is pessimistic in envisaging how this conflict may come to be resolved, referring to the possible emergence of ‘a new and sinister urban form: the Wild City’.





Neil Smith points to the emergence of this new kind of urbanism in the US. This conception follows the kinds of economic, cultural and symbolic transformations identified with the emergence of the ‘post-fordist’ city but, further, expresses a more political shift, a ‘trenchant repoliticisation of the city’. This represents the global extension of the US city in political terms. And with it comes a dramatic questioning and remaking of highly local identities. It also represents a ‘galvanation of global shifts and personal identities via a gathering and vengeful reaction that pervades an increasingly market-determined public policy – the advent of ‘the revanchist city’ (Smith 1996). Hitherto accepted notions of social justice and explicit concern with injustice, which had been central to progressive urban objectives in the 1960’s and 1970’s have fallen away, along with liberalism and socialism. ‘The new urbanism results from the political and cultural rush to fill this vacuum’ (Smith in Merrifield and Swyngedouw 1995:117).

The new American urbanism to which Smith refers has two aspects, internationalism from above combined with a revanchism from below. These two aspects are inextricably interconnected. The revanchist city is a direct consequence of the erosion of economic boundaries organised around the nation state. With the globalisation of economic relations causing a shift of power from nationally defined institutions to global capitals and institutions, the nation state has become less relevant. The nation state is increasingly having to act in a variety of arenas that had hitherto been confined within national definitions and boundaries .

The interconnected processes of globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation have been accompanied by the dismantling of national systems of social welfare and by the corporatisation of public functions. Governments are seeking to redefine their political role at a time when their economic functions are increasingly subordinated to the global economy. There is in this the outline of the contours of an international division of labour and an emerging global state. The ‘trickle down’ theory is associated with a deterioration of public institutions, its reduction to local level, sharpening economic and personal insecurity. These are the ‘progenitors of the revanchist city’ (Smith in Merrifield and Swyngedouw 1995:117).

Theorising neo-liberalism as an inevitable response to globalisation contains an implicit determinism. This translates into a passive acceptance of the power of neo-liberalised states and markets as overwhelming, reducing the hope for reform and inducing withdrawal or a passive wait for apocalyptic crises. This results in a failure to exploit ‘opportunities for progressive change built in to the fortressed and reterritorialized geographies of the postmetropolis’ (Soja 2000:302). What these possibilities may be will be discussed in the final chapter. This chapter concludes by emphasising the extent to which the politics of equal distribution comes to be thrown into reverse.
This study has focused upon the accumulating evidence concerning the scale of the social transformation that has taken place in the last quarter of a century. This transformation has altered perspectives concerning the nature of the city and its regeneration. This chapter has focused specifically upon the downside of these altered perspectives, emphasising the new poverty and inequality that affects the city to the core. The developments rationalised and concealed under the rubric of ‘post-fordism’ have put the slow and long development towards a more equal distribution of wealth into sharp reverse. ‘Post-fordist’ regeneration and postmodernist imagery stand revealed as a form of capitalist urbanisation that has abandoned any pretence to universalism.

If the question of distribution is placed upon the political agenda at all, it is in terms of restructuring material incentives to the enterprising and diminishing the power of labour in order to confront a sagging ability to produce rather than realize surplus value. From that follows the savage attack in some advanced capitalist countries (principally Britain and the US) upon the welfare state. But interurban competition, by concentrating upon subsidies to corporations and upper income consumption, feeds the process of polarisation at the local level in powerful ways.




This study began by emphasising the need to recognise the existence of differential publics in any attempt to reconstitute the meta-narrative of the good city. The point is well made. The city is composed of a variety of publics, something which makes the notion of ‘the good’ as a universal ethic highly problematical. But there is a need to establish the conditions for a genuine universalism. For there is a danger that in concentrating upon differential publics, the old politics concerned with emancipatory attempts to forge universal public bonds come to be neglected. This is the issue that Nancy Fraser addresses in delineating the shift in the political imaginary. The shift from socialism to postmodernism is expressed in terms of a shift from redistribution as crucial to social justice to recognition as a cultural definition. ‘The result is a decoupling of cultural politics from social politics and the relative eclipse of the latter by the former’ (Fraser 1997:2). The impression is given of an ‘old’ politics being extinguished rather than embraced in a more radical project (Fraser 1997:11). The case for a universal-emancipatory politics concerned with the good city needs to be made within a genuine pluralism which respects different agents and identities. Justice requires that both social injustice and cultural injustice be fought, something which implies the co-existence of the politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition (Fraser 1997:12). The concern to achieve equality whilst emphasizing difference has resulted in the neglect of economic equality as a condition of a genuine universalism (Coole 1996:19; Phillips 1997:144/5).
There is every need to recover the universal dimension. From this perspective, Fraser’s concern to reinstate the politics of redistribution alongside a politics of recognition seems reasonable (Fraser 1997:12), however much Phillips condemns this position for being close to the old socialist paradigm that, allegedly, reduced identity struggles to economic struggles (Phillips 1997:153). The critics of the ‘old’ socialist paradigm need to address the issue of universal values. Affirming the range of ethnic, sexual, cultural and ecological movements and identities is not equivalent to writing off those necessary universalistic political objectives that overcome the often uncooperative and outward looking aspects of identity politics (Fraser 1997:81).
Eric Hobsbawm expresses scepticism with respect to the politics of identity given that the political project of the Left is universalistic in its concern for all human beings. A genuine project of the Left cannot be based upon identity politics since the Left pursues a much wider agenda. What unites the Left and identity groups is ‘the hunger for equality and social justice and a programme believed capable of advancing both’ (Hobsbawm 1996:43/4). There is, then, such a thing as the general good which articulates universalistic values and hence cannot be reduced to a coalition of minority groups and interests (Hobsbawm 1996:44).

The case for reconstituting the meta-narrative of the good city is thus reinstated in terms of a universal ethic connecting the freedom of each and all whilst recognising the differential publics composing this unity. The decline of the universalising principles of the Enlightenment leave the Left struggling to formulate a common interest across sectional boundaries (Hobsbawm 1996:45). The necessity of the public realm as the locus of essential universal values is thus brought back in as of crucial significance to the project of the Left. For all of the dangers of formulating and imposing overly-moral, overarching and homogeneous conceptions of the common good, the Left has no option other than to develop a conception of community and public life which embodies universal values of social justice and equality. As Todd Gitlin has stated in The Twilight of Common Dreams: ‘What is a Left if it is not, plausibly at least, the voice of the whole people? .. If there is no people, but only peoples, there is no Left’ (Gitlin 1995:165). The question is how can plural social identities and differential publics be recognised without thereby abandoning universal values. How can the universal be constituted within an overarching public good which incorporates but also recognises plural groups and identities? The concluding chapter attempts to answer this question by revaluing the everyday urban experience of individuals at the level of the associative-solidaristic city, community and culture.

12 CITY, CAPITAL AND CULTURE
This study has examined the stresses and strains to which the city has been subjected as a result of profound socio-economic transformations and responses to them. This chapter seeks to recover the meta-narrative of the good city on the material terrain of the everyday urban life world. This perspective seeks to affirm the public sense of well-being through the interconnection of each individual and all individuals. This normative conception of the city is to be embedded in the ties and relations constituting urban life. 
This means revaluing local cultural resources, strengthening socialisation at the level of lived experience and reading the city in terms of contexts, cultures and histories made by urban inhabitants.
This chapter picks up the theme with which the last chapter closed, the need to integrate differential publics within the universal good. Practitioners and theorists of urban planning and regeneration need to be open to the diversity of constituencies, acknowledging that modern plural society exists and is experienced as a multiplicity of cultures and communities. There is a need to focus upon social theories which seek to explain current developments in terms of the latest phase of capital restructuring, tracing social conflict to source and emphasising social and cultural heterogeneity. ‘‘In these ways, the modernist project of planning can be partially reconstructed while its links to postmodernism are enhanced. In order to establish a state planning concerned with the humanity of the city, a clear practical and theoretical discourse must be combined with political conviction and a respect for democracy’ (Beauregard 1996:229).
The last chapter identified the trends pointing in the direction of the ‘wild’ or the ‘revanchist’ city. The all-pervasive ecology of fear which is gripping cities in the late capitalist world is generating a militarization of urban life. It is worth recovering the normative-philosophical roots of the city in order to project the ideal alternative city. And it is also worth connecting this normative ideal to the possibilities for an alternative society which are immanent in post-modern political culture. This would go some way towards reconfiguring the meta-narrative of the good city in terms which revalue the material practices of everyday life. In Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities (1998), Leonis Sandercock projects a personal-as-political ideal of cosmopolis as an achievable utopia.





Sandercock goes on to outline the ‘principles of postmodernist Utopia’, entailing ‘new concepts of social justice, citizenship, community and shared interest’, all of which suggest a new style of planning which helps create the space of and for Cosmopolis. Such an approach makes it possible to recover the universal ethic sustaining the good city whilst recognising difference, constituting the public sense of well-being out of differential publics. The recognition of difference is quite compatible with the recognition of the extent to which the fates of each and all are ultimately intertwined. There is such a thing as the common good and the well-being of each as well as all is expanded through the promotion of that common good. A utopia is not to be prescribed in any ideal sense that implies the absence of a popular input. The normative-philosophical ideal must, as Habermas argues, leave something over for people to do for themselves (Habermas 1992). People must fashion utopia for themselves, they must create the environment in which they must live. To this end, Sandercock defines her ‘normative cosmopolis’ as ‘a Utopia with a difference, a post-modern Utopia’ that ‘can never be realised, but must always be in the making’ (Sandercock 1998:163). In focusing upon a theory and practice of planning, Sandercock’s goal is a ‘paradigm shift’ from ‘modernist planning wisdom’ to ‘a more normative, open, democratic, flexible and responsive style that is sensitive to cultural difference’ (Sandercock 1998:204). Sandercock’s ‘transformative politics of difference’ promotes the transition from metropolis to cosmopolis so as to expand the horizons of urban regeneration in a progressive direction. Sandercock concludes with a ringing defence of the normative commitment of urban planning:





Sandercock’s approach makes it possible to conceive the planning profession as something more than an abstract and remote body, separated from the public most affected by its plans and exhibiting tendencies to bureaucratism. To contemporary critics like Boyer and Coleman, modernist planning is irrevocably ‘utopian’ and committed, by its very idealistic and unrealistic nature, to a bureaucratic practice. This is not necessarily the case. To a large extent modernist planning is being criticised for the failures not so much of its abstract ideals but for having to implement these ideals within structural and institutional constraints and parameters designed to frustrate those ideals. That said, there is a large degree of truth in the accusation that modernist planning has been too far removed from the people and from everyday social practices. From this perspective, Sandercock’s reformulation of the planning ideal in terms of uniting multiple cultures and spaces within a collective project offers a way forward. Her idea of normative cosmopolis as an ideal that is always in the making may be conceived as the democratisation of utopia, bringing utopia down to earth by being located within the ongoing social practices of the people.

Other studies point in this direction. Engin Isin’s offers a geohistorical analysis of ‘the metropolis unbound’ in order to reorient the contemporary discourse on global urbanisation in terms of the shift from the metropolis to cosmopolis (Isin in Caulfield and Peake eds 1996:98/127; Isin in Bell, Keil and Wekerle eds 1996:21/34; Isin 1997:115/132). Isin is concerned to develop questions of citizenship and the ‘rights to the city’ at the deepest level, tracing a Foucaultian genealogy of citizenship and cityspace in the ‘history of the present’. 

Isin emphasises the transition from the era of the metropolis - a dominant city core surrounded by several cities, towns and villages, socially and economically integrated with it – to the cosmopolis. ‘The twentieth century metropolis has become a polycentric urban region’ (Isin 1996a:98/9). The city of the future is thus the poly- or multi-nucleated city.





The cosmopolis mediates between the tendencies to localisation and globalisation identified early in this study. Isin’s conception reorients the discourse on postmetropolitan transition and on the globalisation of urban space towards new possibilities for the future city. This recentres the urban discourse by doing more than focus upon the negative aspects of new developments. Identifying the opportunities and challenges generated by the postmetropolitan transition in a global environment makes it possible to rework established and institutionalised conceptions of democracy and citizenship, the public realm and its connection to civil society, community organisation and development, cultural politics, social justice, moral ordr (Friedmann and Douglas 1998). 

The much vaunted principle - and fact - of globalisation need not necessarily imply that urban space – and those living in it – must be handed over to forces and processes external to it. An earlier chapter has argued that globalisation makes it possible to recover and project a stronger local identity. This notion can now be developed further. For Raymond Rocco, ‘the spaces created by the complex and multidimensional processes of globalisation have become strategic sites for the formation of transnational identities and communities and the corresponding emergence of new types of claims within these transformed spaces’. These claims to ‘associational rights’ and the ‘networks of civic engagement’ promoting them are grounded in and derive from ‘situated practices’ that are attuned to the particular geography of the globalised city-region, particularly to those ‘spaces of difference’ theorised as third space or margins. These claims, then, are essentially spatial claims, localised demands for increased rights to the city and for spatial justice and regional democracy. These generate new urban spatial movements, not merely social movements, especially amongst the marginalized and the excluded, the immigrant populations and the working poor. It is amongst these radically particularised and politicised spaces that geopolitical and critical discourses may join to further the comprehension of the emerging postmetropolis as a lived experience (Rocco in Isin ed; Rocco 1999:95/112).

Taking this approach makes it possible to mobilise and actualise emergent sources of solidarity in the postmodern political culture, developing novel strategies in the struggle for social and spatial justice. From this perspective the new social movements which have been the subject of much excited comment in post-marxist circles are also spatial movements. This has profound implications. ‘Increasingly allied with other movements, such as those for a living wage and for growth-with-equity, the now regionalised environmental justice movement is richly conscious of the restructured postmetropolitan geography, and uses its discordant inequities as a mobilisation strategy’ (Soja 2000:256).

The rest of this chapter seeks to critically appropriate the key insights of the normative cosmopolis thesis and apply them on the local urban terrain. The restructured postmetropolitan geography is still located in place. And place is to be defined in terms of its everyday relations and practices. People are a part of everything they see, touch and feel around them. ‘Utopia’ is democratised at the level of everyday reality.

The argument proceeds from the contemporary trend towards ‘partnership’ in urban regeneration schemes. ‘Partnership’ seeks to unite a variety of interests in order to pursue the regeneration of an area. The notion is unitary and presupposes the possibility of an harmony of interests. This is a questionable assumption given the overriding objective of economic development and the hegemony of business. This concluding section seeks to identify other possibilities within partnership with respect to fostering the self-governing autonomous community generating its own spirit. Capacity building from this perspective contains a radical possibility which transcends its role within regeneration partnerships. Partnership in urban regeneration involves a commitment to create new social infrastructures through the development of material, organisational and intellectual capacities within local communities.

Theresa Hayter adopts a highly critical view of regeneration partnerships. For her, partnership involves a consensus orientated local politics filling the space left in local socialisation by the withdrawal of the state from reformist welfare policies. Partnership seeks to provide the conditions and the collective mediation to facilitate the process of private accumulation at local level. A regeneration strategy which is fully resourced by public authorities comes to be replaced by a form of collective self-help at community level.

Hayter’s view exposes the conservative implications of partnership as conceived as a means of compensating for private failure and public entrenchment. Attempts to reduce regeneration to economic development stand condemned for ignoring the genuine socialisation crucial to a genuine and permanent regeneration. The evidence of community organising within grass roots partnership indicates a creative response to overcome lack of material power and resources. This points to the creation of social capital. This will be discussed further shortly. Before this, partnership will be examined from the perspectives of the creation of new participatory forms of social government.

Partnership contains an aspect of the participatory mode of democracy, creating spaces in which individuals may act as citizens involved in their own governance. Partnership is an approach to regeneration that pervades all sectors, from crime to health to various forms of community action. In this sense, partnership entails the changing of relationships between the state, civil society and the market. The regeneration of the boundaries between public and private points to a process of redefining democracy, with central government functions being increasingly undertaken by social agencies.

Conceivably, with partnership, a new form of social government is in the process of emerging. Whilst local authorities are required to maintain democratic accountability to the community as a whole whilst engaging in partnership with non-elected bodies, the partnership model threatens to transcend the formal sector of politics. Local councils now have to share responsibility over issues where they once possessed complete responsibility. Partnerships are potentially subversive of formal political institutions to the extent that non-elected bodies gain influence at the expense of the electors and their representatives. From another angle, however, partnership implies the expansion of democracy through fostering the active involvement of a wider range of stakeholders in policy and service delivery (Hill 2000:182).

But to be genuinely democratic something more is needed. There is a tendency for powerful interests to dominate in regeneration partnerships and for coordinating mechanisms to become institutionalised (Pierre 1998). The democratic structures of the formal sector of politics come to be bypassed in favour of ‘shadowy boards, in which business has a privileged position’ (Hill 2000:182). The ‘participatory’ conception cannot be accepted uncritically. The democratic credentials of the partners must be examined. If these democratic credentials can be guaranteed, local democracy is actually strengthened through the participation of a wider range of stakeholders in policy and service delivery. This system rests upon a functional conception of representation.

The wide cope of regeneration partnerships increases the possibilities for broadening participatory structures within the community, enhancing democracy by involving wider sections of the urban public directly in decision making. The argument against this view asserts that democratic responsibility and accountability is a matter of the relationship between locally democratically elected authority and the local electorate. Where non-elected bodies and members gain power at the expense of local politicians, there is the possibility of a democratic deficit, especially given the tendency of private business to dominate.

Nevertheless, where a rough parity in power and resources prevails it is possible to conceive of the redefinition of democracy in the direction of social self-government. Examples here would include residents’ association, area for a, the users’ committees of variety of facilities like leisure centres and youth and old peoples’ groups. These developments emphasise a shift within the conception of democracy towards working with rather than merely for local people (Hill 2000:182/3).

The problem is that there exist a number of structural and institutional constraints blocking the emergence of this functional system of social self-government. The existence of asymmetrical relations of power and resources in the community prevents the necessary parity between partners which is crucial to democracy. A functionally organised democracy grounded in existing relations will express a systematic bias in favour of those possessing greater power and resources.

The key question concerns whether parity in power and resources could ever be achieved to achieve the self-regulating communal order. In The Uses of Disorder (1970) Richard Sennett envisages a self-policing community in which affairs of common concern are regulated by internal dialogue rather than by external coercion.

Sennett’s work is, with Jane Jacobs’ Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), a pioneering text in post-structuralist urbanism. The distinguishing feature of this post-structuralist urbanism is an identification of the diverse bases of identity and the multiple roots of oppression which goes much further than the capital-labour relation and implies a celebration of difference:





The argument in this chapter seeks to identify and foster the culture of the city in all of its unifying diversity. It seeks to conceive of ways of creating the social glue that binds a community together in all of its diversity. This social glue makes it possible to conceive of the city as a community and as a self-policing order. 
Michael Taylor’s identification of the core attributes of community is useful in grounding the meta-narrative of the good city in everyday life activity. Arguing that community is an ‘open-textured’ concept, Taylor specifies that ‘relations between members of a community be direct and many-sided and that they practise certain forms of reciprocity’ (Taylor 1982:2/3). Existing collectives contain tendencies to oppression in being mediated by leaders, bureaucrats, representatives, by political institutions and legal codes, by abstractions and reifications (Taylor 1982:27/8).
Taylor emphasises the danger of reifying communal bonds: ‘The commitment of the community’s members .. to an abstract idea of the community, mediates the relations between them; they relate to it, rather than directly to each other; and in some degree they subordinate themselves to it … to that extent also is autonomy blocked’ (Taylor 1982:162/3). This points to the need to emphasise local structures of feeling so that the unifying bonds of community are supplied from within the everyday relations of local culture rather than being imposed from without or, indeed, being projected outwards. The quality of relations between individuals takes precedence over issues of ownership and distribution (Taylor 1982:2/3).

Importantly, Taylor emphasises that ‘the state tends to undermine the conditions which make the alternative to it workable’ ‘by weakening or destroying community’ as the ‘necessary condition for the maintenance of social order without the state’ (Taylor 1982:57/8). There is a need to delineate the conditions for the authentic public sphere detached from the alien control of the state and capital. The state and capital represent non-discursive/non-interactive institutional-systemic modes of control divorced from citizen activity. This is to argue that the points made by Taylor with regard to the conditions of community apply to the idea of the ‘good’ public realm, offering a viable alternative mode of social order. The alien control of the state and the market is replaced by a sphere of citizen discourse and interaction. The perspective taken on the urban community as a self-regulatory order as against the parasitism of alien publics will be organised around the themes of direct and many-sided relations, reciprocity, self-mediation, associative democracy, the dissolution of reified communal bonds.

Michael Hardt’s outline of an ‘horizontally’ organised politics is suggestive here in defining an urban public sphere organised according to the ascending theme of power (Hardt 1993:119ff). The focus upon the local structures and cultures of community seeks to overcome the vertical relationships presently constituting social order. Power is not to be conceived in unitary terms as emanating from the state or from capital but as heterogeneous. The concept of urban community conceives power in terms of the ascending theme, as flowing upwards from below. The concept of urban community realises a state of affairs in which public life is democratised to form an integral aspect of the lives of all people. This concept implies a complex social structure, pluralism and differentiation and a division of labour in which individuals engage in different social practices. The concept of community presupposes an empowered pluralist and democratic civil society, assuming governmental functions and affirming an associative conception of the public sphere.

To constitute a genuine community, there is a need to counteract inequalities in power and resources. This is something that is to be achieved through the creation of social capital.

In Coal, Capital and Culture, an analysis of changing conditions in former mining areas, Warwick and Littlejohn define a concept of ‘local cultural capital’ in terms of the strength that the community draws from social networks ‘based in kinship, friendship and neighbourliness in household and community settings’. These networks held the community together in a ‘period of change’ which saw the destruction of the local economy. They were the social cement and moral backbone of towns and villages across the land (Turner 2000:2).

The concept of ‘social capital’ defines the capacity of those lacking material power and resources to create their own capital through their organisation and activity. Community organising creating social capital has a direct bearing on the success and sustainability of regeneration schemes, offering a much broader view than those which concentrate upon ‘the economic’, upon quantifiable measures concerning how much land and how many buildings have been brought into use, how many jobs have been created and how many training places have been provided and so on.
‘Social capital’ generates cooperation, trust, self-discipline and strengthens the social bonds and relationships connecting individuals to each other and to the community. Unlike physical capital, which is measured in terms of products, and unlike human capital, developed through education and training, social capital possesses a cultural dimension in pertaining to ethical and behavioural norms within a community.
The concept of social capital is important in emphasising that psychology and culture, the ‘spirit’ of community, is at least as crucial a factor in regeneration as the levels of capital investment, employment opportunities, training places. The concept of social capital widens the scope of regeneration beyond that which can be quantified and measured. It overcomes the central deficiency of contemporary regeneration schemes - the overwhelming emphasis upon quantitative empiricism.

The concept of social capital is more rich and more expansive than that presented by Francis Fukuyama, who makes social capital a ‘factor of production’ like labour, machines and raw materials. For Fukuyama, business remains the bottom line. ‘If people who have to work together in an enterprise trust one another because they are operating to a set of ethical norms, doing business costs less’ (Fukuyama, Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity 1995).

Compared to the way that the concept of ‘social capital’ has been defined in this chapter, Fukuyama’s notion is narrow in the extreme. Conceived on the basis of local cultural capital, pertaining to the behavioural norms specific to a local community, social capital is a solidaristic notion indicating the collective resources that a community generates through developing its capacities for self-organisation and self-activity in order to compensate for the lack of material power and resources. Whilst urban degeneration is expressed most obviously in the deterioration of the physical environment, this is merely the external manifestation of a moral, spiritual and cultural degeneration within the community. It follows from this that strategies which concentrate upon the regeneration of the physical environment only have merely one aspect of the problem in view. It may be possible, with sufficient time and with sufficient resources, to regenerate urban areas. But regenerating the spirit of community takes much longer and requires the active and continuous participation of the community members themselves (Turner 2000:280).
Margaret Thatcher’s dream of fostering an ‘enterprise culture’ was never going to be easily embedded in the communities of the old industrial towns and cities of the North of England. These towns and cities upheld solidaristic conceptions of community and class. The members of these towns and cities constitute a counter-public. Excluded from the centres of power, they tend to develop ‘a sense of solidarity and reciprocity rooted in the experience of marginalisation or expropriation’ (Hansen 1993:xxxvi).




This study has been concerned to examine the challenges that lie before the towns and cities of the old industrial north of England, paying particular attention to the City of Manchester. These towns and cities have had to engage in regeneration activity in order to escape the seemingly inevitable fate of long term decline. The study examined the possibilities for these old industrial towns and cities as they attempt to position themselves through ‘post-fordist’ restructuring in the new expanding markets of high technology, media and communications and services. The study has argued that particular developments in Manchester indicate the co-existence of a headquarters or global style economy on the one hand and a local economy characterised by part-time and casual employment on the other. This points to the existence of divisions within the urban economy, divisions which tend to become permanent through being institutionalised and embedded in the urban form.

Manchester has made a bold and ambitious attempt to engage in regeneration as something more than an activity concerned with saving declining industries and areas. The notion of the local growth coalition was discussed in this context. Ultimately, the identification of urban regeneration with economic development was criticised for its tendency to quantitative empiricism and its tendency to subordinate urban activity to business interests and imperatives. For all of the suggestions of a ‘post-fordist’ regeneration, it is evident that business interests and the accumulative logic of capital prevails. That this now possesses a global dimension has profound implications for local urban space. The old industrial towns and cities of the north of England need to be located somewhere between emerging global realities and evolved local cultures. What is required in any regeneration strategy which hopes to succeed is some form of mediation, those Burkean ‘little platoons’ that bridge the gap between egoism and collectivism. Abstract models constructed on the basis of some academically or economically projected future, reading lines of development in deterministic fashion, will fail to strike roots in the community. Further, urban life cannot be built around a privatised and competitive individualism, least of all in communities which have evolved solidaristic and affective ties.

Academics have analysed local efforts at economic regeneration so as to determine how many and what kind of new jobs have been created. Training and Enterprise Councils have produced figures showing the number of training placements that they have provided; local authorities have circulated glossy brochures concerning the number of multi-agency partnerships that they have established; regeneration agencies have boasted about the call centres that they have established in shiny new industrial estates. But none of it has amounted to a genuine regeneration. What is missing is the ‘spirit’ of community, that elusive quality which this thesis has identified as ‘local cultural capital’ and as ‘social capital’. Regeneration efforts may provide training places and employment opportunities and self-employment starter packs in new priority areas. But the communities which stand in need of regeneration have historically been held together by a ‘spirit’ that can neither be quantified nor objectified. This refers to a ‘spirit’ which members of the community have developed over generations, a spirit based on collectivism, kinship and upon advancement by cooperation rather than competition, solidarity rather than individuality. The social institutions at the heart of community symbolised this collective spirit which now stands in need of recovery – the co-op, the miners’ welfare, the union, the club trip.

Lewis Mumford believed himself to have coined the phrase ‘urban regeneration’. Mumford was always clear that institutional, technical and economic regeneration would fail unless accompanied by "a moral and spiritual regeneration."

The towns and cities of the old industrial north are old places which betray their origins in the First Industrial Revolution. Local knowledge and practice express this history in a number of ways. Property or market-led regeneration, with the private sector as the lead agency, is inimical to this collective spirit prevalent in the old industrial communities. A regeneration which is oriented towards fostering an enterprise culture, where the dynamic is private effort and the motivation is private gain, falls short in failing to address what is really at issue – the true spirit of community and the consequences of its loss, the rupturing of society, the dissolution of collective ties through a rationalistic desolidarisation. Any urban regeneration that fails to address the loss of this culture will always fall short. There is a need for members of the community to unite to transcend urban regeneration conceived merely as a series of individualistic survival strategies; and the way that they can do this is by developing local cultural and social capital.

The terms of regeneration need to be redefined so as to broaden the notion of success. This returns to the distinction between use value and exchange value with respect to place. This is to distinguish between the use that individuals make of the built environment as a location for working, living and recreation, and the market value of that environment to commercial interests.

There is a tension at the heart of regeneration strategies as a result of this distinction between use and exchange value. The distinction reveals different perceptions of the urban environment by different agents. The urban environment by different agents. The urban environment is both the lifeworld site of everyday human activity and the site of commercial activity. In the view of Peter Roberts, the tension that this creates ‘lies at the heart of a number of urban problems and also helps to define the limits within which solutions can be constructed and applied’ (Roberts and Roberts and Sykes 2000:10/1).

This study has been concerned with emphasising local structures and cultures as crucial to the project of urban regeneration. The old towns and cities of the industrial North have for decades been engaged in attempts to avoid the seemingly inevitable fate of long term decline. The attempts at ‘post-fordist’ economic regeneration have been analysed, with particular respect to Manchester. The economics of this quantitative regeneration has its merits in pointing towards a possible future rather than a lost past. Manchester, the first industrial city could become the first post-industrial city. There are, however, blind spots, the overemphasis of the new services to the neglect of a possible, essential and sustainable local industrial urbanism. Taking this approach avoids the glib celebration of consumer and enterprise culture which disfigures too many regeneration proposals. The interesting question is whether this recognition of the local structures and cultures of urban places and spaces, which affirms the everyday use value of the city, not merely contributes to the process of urban regeneration but contains the potential to constitute the alternative city beyond the domination of exchange value.





1


